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INTRODUCTION 
 
A Tale of Two Churches 
“Grace United Church of Christ” (Grace UCC)1 is a medium-sized congregation 
located in a semi-rural community near the eastern seaboard of the United States. In the 
summer of 2005, following its denomination's passing of a resolution supporting equal 
marriage rights for same-sex couples, Grace UCC found itself embroiled in an intense 
conflict about human sexuality. Some members, deeply disturbed by the UCC's action, 
insisted that the congregation should leave the denomination and become an independent 
entity. Others insisted just as strongly that Grace UCC should maintain its ties with the 
wider church. After a series of very hostile congregational meetings, the conflict ended 
with a vote; roughly 75% of the members voted to remain within the UCC. Those who 
“lost” immediately left the church, leaving a gaping hole in both the membership rolls 
and the relational matrix of the congregation. 
 “First United Methodist Church” (First UMC)2 is a large congregation located in a 
well-to-do suburb of a city in the southeastern United States. This congregation's conflict 
began with the need to consolidate the congregation's Sunday morning worship services from 
three to two due to decreasing attendance numbers. Some of the congregational leaders 
suggested eliminating the early traditional service, which had the lowest number of regular 
worshippers—a proposal that generated great resistance and heightened anxiety within the 
                                                          
1
 This is a pseudonym. All names and identifying details of congregations and individuals in this 
dissertation have been changed to protect their privacy. Throughout this project, I will include a footnote 
each time I introduce a new pseudonym, but not thereafter. Also, each pseudonym will only be noted in 
quotation marks the first time it is used. 
2
 All names and identifying details of congregations and individuals in this project have been changed to 
protect their privacy. 
2 
 
congregation. As a means to resolve the conflict, the church designed an intentional process 
for decision-making about the issue. The process involved recruiting members from each 
worship service to serve on a special committee, which met several times over a period of 
months to discuss all options. Though it seemed, at times, that the committee would never 
succeed in accomplishing its work, ultimately the group developed a solution that, while not 
perfect, was unanimously approved by the committee and enjoyed widespread 
congregational support. 
 
Summary of the Argument 
  In this project, I use extended case studies of the two Protestant churches described 
above to explore the sources and dynamics of congregational conflict around theological 
issues. Drawing on specific elements of existing literature in congregational studies, 
leadership studies, and pastoral theology, I develop an approach to this problem that includes 
thick descriptions of the lived experiences of congregations in conflict, and that aims toward 
recommendations for transformed practice. My thesis is that at the heart of congregational 
conflict lies anxiety triggered by encounters with difference. I argue that when persons 
encounter significant differences between themselves and others, they often feel that their 
sense of self or identity is threatened. In turn, this experience of threat generates anxiety. 
Using insights from psychodynamic psychology and social psychology, I show that this 
anxiety is a normal part of human development, as are the desire for sameness and 
identification with groups of similar others. However, the anxiety raised by difference can be 
dealt with in a variety of ways, some of which are reactive in nature and destructive in their 
consequences. Such behaviors include splitting and projection, strong needs for sameness, 
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group polarization, and contentious tactics, all of which can lead to divisive conflict and can 
potentially damage or destroy communities of faith. 
 With the goal of articulating a more constructive approach to conflict in 
congregations, I offer a theological re-framing of conflict as a natural outcome of the 
diversity inherent in human life. Further, I argue for diversity as a desirable theological 
norm—one that was intended by God and that should be embraced rather than eliminated. 
Building on this argument, I explore the notions of vulnerability and hospitality as 
theological categories that encourage human beings to “sit with” the anxiety stirred by 
communal life, and to seek ways to remain connected across differences rather than trying to 
change them. At the end of the project, with this theological grounding in place, I return to 
the congregational case studies and reflect further on the similarities and differences between 
them. This comparison forms the basis for the practical strategies I ultimately commend for 
congregations in conflict. 
 
Summary of My Method 
 I ground my approach to congregational conflict in a revised critical correlational 
method that brings together insights from psychodynamic psychology, social psychology, 
and theology in a rich, textured conversation about the nature of human being and the place 
of conflict in human life. While these disciplines all contain important ideas about the limits 
and potentials of human beings, I argue that the social sciences prove especially helpful in 
describing the concrete contours of human brokenness. For its part, theology holds out an 
especially compelling vision of human healing—both individual and communal—that 
contrasts with the destructive dynamics that so frequently occur within the context of 
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congregational conflict. By combining these insights in one project, I offer a pastoral 
theological perspective on conflict that takes seriously the individual and communal 
suffering such conflict produces, and that includes deep psychological and theological 
reflection on human existence.  
 
The Significance of the Project 
While this project originally grew out of my own personal interest in 
congregational conflict, it also holds significance for a much wider public and makes an 
important contribution to the field of pastoral theology. First, from a practical point of 
view, conflicts around theological issues affect many contemporary congregations. Too 
often, such conflicts deteriorate into virulent, “us vs. them” disputes that threaten to 
fragment Christian community. By attending closely and seriously to the real experiences 
of suffering created by congregational conflict, my project offers key theological insights 
into how human relationships become disordered and damaged within the context of 
religious bodies. Typically, pastoral theology has focused on individuals as the primary 
loci of suffering—whether in terms of personal, intrapsychic pain, or in terms of the pain 
that results from structural injustices like racial oppression, gender inequality, or 
homophobia.
3
 In contrast, this dissertation will argue that in addition to these types of 
suffering—which are ubiquitous in religious communities—persons experience a unique 
kind of distress in the midst of intense congregational discord. Not only are interpersonal 
relationships damaged in such situations, but often, the entire fabric of the religious 
community may be torn by conflict that is not handled well. When this happens, the 
                                                          
3
 Pastoral theologians who have written on these topics include (but are not limited to) Edward Wimberly, 
Archie Smith, Homer Ashby, Bonnie Miller-McLemore, Jeanne Stevenson Moessner, Christie Cozad 
Neuger, and Joretta Marshall. 
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suffering that results is not only personal in nature, but takes on a communal quality to 
which pastoral theology must attend. The title of my dissertation tries to capture this 
communal quality of suffering, and points to the need for the church—Christ’s body—to 
experience healing in the form of new and more effective ways of engaging conflict. 
Another way in which this project contributes uniquely to the field of pastoral 
theology is through its use of social psychology as a conversation partner. While pastoral 
theology has a long history of utilizing the social sciences as key analytical resources, it 
has relied most heavily on psychodynamic psychology and has focused on intrapsychic 
issues. In contrast, I will employ social psychology to highlight the group dynamics 
involved in congregational conflict, as well as the elements of social identity that 
frequently emerge in situations of theological disagreement. Drawing on the discipline of 
social psychology in these ways will provide important insights that could not be gained 
with a purely intrapsychic approach, and will allow me to attend more fully to the 
communal nature of congregational conflict. 
Finally, this dissertation makes an important theoretical contribution to the field 
of pastoral theology, which, in recent decades, has not placed congregational practice at 
the center of its reflection.
4
 Although in recent years pastoral theology has moved beyond 
its original focus on individual care to attend to the impact of broader social categories 
like race, gender, and sexual orientation, it has neglected to offer sustained attention to 
the practices of congregations themselves as a source for pastoral theological 
                                                          
4
 I should note here that when I use the term “pastoral theology,” I am referring to the liberal, Protestant 
tradition of pastoral theology within the United States. In so doing, I also differentiate the discipline I am 
discussing from “practical theology,” which has traditionally given more attention to congregations and 
their practices than has pastoral theology. 
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knowledge.
5
 My project, which focuses on congregations as both the starting point and 
intended audience for pastoral theology, addresses this lacuna in the field. 
 
The Theological Frame 
 In the preceding section, I have described how this dissertation makes a 
distinctive contribution through its attention to communal suffering, its appropriation of 
social psychology, and its grounding in congregational practice. Yet, part of what makes 
this a project in pastoral theology—as opposed to a project in the psychology of religion, 
for example—is its use of theology as a primary lens through which to understand 
congregational conflict. In this dissertation I bring theology, psychodynamic psychology, 
and social psychology into a productive dialogue in which each discipline critiques and 
supplements the others. However, I also use theology as the overarching framework for 
the entire dissertation. That is to say, I both begin and end my project with theological 
language, and I make this choice for two specific reasons.  
First, as I have mentioned above, the field of pastoral theology has historically 
relied heavily on the language and therapeutic models of the behavioral sciences, at times 
to the neglect of theological themes.
6
 Admittedly, the disciplines of psychology and 
                                                          
5
 I will nuance and expand upon this claim in Chapter One, where I will review pastoral theological 
resources in detail for how they attend to or neglect congregational practice. 
6
 As Bonnie Miller-McLemore notes, “In the 1970s and 1980s, critics drew attention to pastoral theology’s 
psychological captivity and its failure to sustain a theological and moral orientation.” Bonnie J. Miller-
McLemore, "Also a Pastoral Theologian:  In Pursuit of Dynamic Theology (Or: Meditations from a 
Recalcitrant Heart)," Pastoral Psychology 59, no. 6 (2010): 821. Rodney J. Hunter and John Patton have 
further described this pattern as a tendency—particularly within clinical training programs—to prioritize 
“examining personal meanings, motives, and relationships rather than communicating religious meanings.” 
Rodney J. Hunter and John Patton, "The Therapeutic Tradition's Theological and Ethical Commitments 
Viewed through Its Pedagogical Practices:  A Tradition in Transition," in Pastoral Care and Social 
Conflict:  Essays in Honor of Charles V. Gerkin, ed. Pamela D. Couture and Rodney J. Hunter (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1995), 35. This is not to say that issues of religious meaning or theology have been 
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social psychology that I draw upon in this project offer in-depth understandings of how 
individuals and groups operate, and of the ways in which human interactions become 
disordered and damaged. These disciplines, however, provide only limited accounts of 
optimal individual and communal functioning. In contrast, Christian theology attends 
both to human brokenness and healing, typically speaking of the former in general terms 
like “the human condition,” and offering a robust vision of the latter through prescriptive 
recommendations. Because theology attends explicitly to both human brokenness and 
healing, it provides a more encompassing view of the human being, which is the subject 
par excellence of pastoral theology.  
The second reason for using this theological frame is closely related to the first. 
As I have said, both psychology and theology make serious attempts to understand the 
nature of human being, especially human brokenness. However, psychology tends to see 
human brokenness and its accompanying problems in terms of pathologies that call out 
for treatment or cure. Christian theology, by contrast, recognizes that brokenness arises, 
at least in part, from our very nature as created beings that are finite and imperfect. A 
theological approach to human being suggests that brokenness is simply part of who we 
are. It is a condition of living on this planet with other human beings. This does not mean 
that human beings have no reason to hope for improvements in their relationships with 
one another, or for some experience of redemption from the conditions of brokenness. On 
the contrary, Christian theology as articulated through religious traditions insists that 
                                                          
 
completely ignored within the “therapeutic tradition” of pastoral care and counseling. Yet, as Hunter and 
Patton argue, “this emphasis on the person and the pastoral relationship over the formal content of the 
religious message has also often tended to produce, not a mutual enriching, but an unfortunate opposition 
between person and message, with the message sometimes devalued in order to give priority to personhood 
and relationship.” (ibid., 36.) 
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hope is indeed possible, and that grace is offered regardless of whether or not it is 
deserved. Yet, from this theological standpoint, hope and grace become even more 
meaningful when human beings recognize that brokenness already characterizes their 
existence in a fundamental way.  
Within this theological reflection I intentionally use the term “brokenness” instead 
of “sin,” because I wish to emphasize the given-ness of the human condition rather than 
implying that it has to do primarily with moral transgression. Speaking in this non-
moralistic register emphasizes the basic fragility and limitation inherent in human nature, 
instead of focusing on a “fall” from an idealized state of sinlessness. Theologically, this 
will be important when, later in the dissertation, I discuss the possibilities for healing and 
transformation in the midst of congregational conflict. Casting brokenness in terms of sin 
for which one must repent might imply that conflict itself is a sin to be avoided at all 
costs. However, beginning with the theological premise that all human beings exist in a 
state of brokenness that is part of their creaturely condition makes it possible to see 
conflict as one of the consequences of living in an imperfect world—a consequence that 
is not to be eradicated, but dealt with in ways that emphasize respect and compassion. 
 
Overview of the Chapters 
In this project, I aim to bring the theological framework I have described above into 
conversation with the social sciences as a means of addressing congregational conflict. This 
aim is evident in the flow of the dissertation, which is organized into seven chapters. I begin, 
in Chapter One, by presenting a short chronology of how I came to be interested in this topic, 
and articulating why this project matters: namely, because many congregations today are 
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becoming dysfunctional and divided due to their inability to engage theological conflicts with 
respect and care. Building on current research data related to congregational life in the 
United States, I explore the scope of the problem of “serious conflict” within communities of 
faith. I then briefly review selected literature related to conflict resolution from the fields of 
congregational studies and leadership studies, and highlight what I see as the primary 
contributions and limitations of such literature. Given these limitations, I make an argument 
for pastoral theology as a discipline that, because of its attention to context, individual 
suffering, and practice, is especially well-suited to address congregational conflict. I close the 
chapter by proposing a new, complex lens through which to explore congregational conflict. 
This lens uses anxiety—understood as a basic sense of threat to one’s identity—as a central 
organizing principle that carries through the project and helps to connect the diverse 
disciplinary resources I present in the subsequent chapters. 
In Chapter Two I articulate my overall method as one of dialogue between religion 
and science. More specifically, I explain my approach to the problem of congregational 
conflict as a process of critical correlation between the resources of psychodynamic 
psychology, social psychology, and Christian theology, and I delineate the distinct 
contributions that each of these disciplines makes toward understanding the subject at hand. 
In addition, I describe the qualitative case study method that I have used to investigate the 
topic of congregational conflict, and I show how this approach encapsulates pastoral 
theology’s commitment to reflection on lived experience. Finally, I offer a detailed 
description of the ways in which I conducted my field research, and I provide a brief 
introduction to the two faith communities I studied. 
10 
 
Chapter Three lays out the two primary case studies—Grace UCC and First UMC—
that provide the content for analysis throughout the rest of the project. In these case studies I 
focus on the kind of congregational conflict that involves significant theological issues, and 
that can be particularly difficult to resolve. Although each church’s conflict developed very 
differently, these case studies reveal significant common themes that emerged in both 
situations: theological dimensions, identity, polarization and fragmentation, and the pain of 
conflict and change. I argue that, taken together, these themes illustrate important insights 
about the complexities of congregational conflict and about the role anxiety often plays in it. 
More specifically, I contend in this chapter that understanding anxiety as a basic sense of 
threat to one’s identity helps to explain why and how conflict frequently emerges in 
communities of faith.  
In Chapter Four, I engage two specific concepts from the discipline of 
psychodynamic psychology—splitting/projection, and the alter ego need—and explore how 
they contribute to a deeper understanding of congregational conflict. I argue that both of 
these phenomena originate as normal developmental responses to encounters with difference. 
However, in situations of heightened anxiety, these responses may become reactive in an 
attempt to protect the self from perceived threats, and may result in destructive behaviors. 
After offering a detailed explanation of each concept, I describe how each may have been 
operating in the case studies presented in Chapter Three. Acknowledging that each concept is 
not equally applicable to both case studies, I maintain that these concepts point to powerful 
needs for cohesion and sameness that are frequently triggered in situations of conflict.  
Despite the usefulness of the concepts presented in Chapter Four, psychodynamic 
approaches to conflict ultimately focus on intrapsychic dynamics that then affect the ways in 
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which persons interact. While this is an important consideration, social psychology offers a 
different way of understanding how people relate to one another: namely, as members of 
groups. In Chapter Five I argue that an adequate analysis of theological conflict within 
congregations must also attend to the group identities of those involved. Drawing on 
concepts related to collective identification, group polarization, and strategic choice, I use a 
social psychological approach to explain how and why groups form within congregations, 
and why those groups choose specific ways of engaging one another in conflict.  
 In Chapter Six, I introduce theology as another necessary conversation partner in the 
discussion of congregational conflict. Because of its prescriptive nature, the discipline of 
theology goes beyond either psychodynamic or social psychology in its willingness to offer a 
robust vision of what a healthy community looks like, and how Christians should behave 
toward one another in such a community. I begin the chapter with a discussion of the human 
condition as “tragic”—that is, as inevitably characterized by encounters with difference and 
conflict. I then make an explicit theological argument for diversity—including the diversity 
of creation, the religious diversity of human beings, and theological diversity within faith 
communities—as a good that God both creates and intends. Building on this notion, I argue 
for an understanding of identity that is both hybrid and plural as a way of decreasing the 
sense of threat that the discovery of difference often produces. Finally, acknowledging that 
strong reactions to difference are simply part of being human, I offer vulnerability and 
hospitality as theological frameworks that can help individuals in faith communities to honor 
the differences in their midst while remaining connected across them. 
Building on the preceding psychological, social psychological, and theological 
analyses, I turn in Chapter Seven to articulating practical recommendations for engaging 
12 
 
theological conflict within congregations. Returning to explicit reflection on the case studies, 
I use the varied experiences of Grace UCC and First UMC to draw out concrete proposals for 
conflicted congregations and their leaders. These proposals include acknowledging 
difference and the anxiety it produces; re-defining unity and strengthening relationships; and 
cultivating calm, connected leadership. Thus, by returning to the realm of lived experience 
with the goal of transforming pastoral practice, I conclude the project in a distinctly pastoral 
theological fashion. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
THE PROBLEM, THE LITERATURE,  
AND THE DISCIPLINE OF PASTORAL THEOLOGY 
 
The Problem & Driving Questions 
 In the introduction to this project I included a brief description of Grace UCC, a 
congregation that faced a difficult conflict around issues of human sexuality and 
denominational affiliation. Grace UCC is a congregation that I know well because at the 
time of the conflict, I was serving as its Associate Pastor. This experience of serving a 
congregation torn by intense theological conflict raised many questions for me, ranging 
from the extremely practical (“How can members of a congregation learn to resolve their 
differences, or at least talk to one another more respectfully when they disagree?”) to the 
psychologically and philosophically abstract (“What makes people want everyone to be 
the same? What is so threatening about theological difference within a single faith 
community?”). Over time, these questions became so persistent that they led me back to 
graduate school, where I hoped to devote my study not only to understanding why and 
how theological conflicts are generated and sustained within congregations, but also what 
resources pastoral theology can offer to communities who are experiencing such 
conflicts. By “resources” I mean both general theological frameworks for approaching 
conflict in communities of faith, as well as specific suggestions for pastoral practice in 
the midst of congregational discord.  
 Given the problem described above, I have formulated my driving research questions 
as follows:  
14 
 
1. How can we understand the intensity and dynamics of theological conflict within 
congregations?  
 
2. How can pastoral theology offer an alternative vision of theological disagreement that 
aims toward healthy conflict, rather than toward either extreme of eliminating conflict 
altogether, or engaging it in destructive ways?  
 
3. What concrete practices could pastoral leaders and congregations use to handle 
theological conflict more effectively?
7
 
As I noted in the introduction, I have chosen to address this problem by carefully 
examining the lived experience of two congregations that struggled with conflict around 
two very different theological issues. By approaching congregational conflict in this more 
general manner, I aim to produce a research project that may prove useful to 
congregations who are challenged by various kinds of theological differences. 
Furthermore, in this dissertation, I focus primarily on experiences of conflict within 
contemporary, mainline Protestant congregations in the United States. This is the social-
historical location in which my own experience is grounded, and thus with which I am 
most familiar. However, given the ubiquity of conflict within religious bodies of all 
types, I hope that this project may ultimately prove relevant for communities from many 
different Christian denominations, and perhaps even from other faith traditions.  
 Yet, in introducing my topic this way, I do not wish to imply that all types of 
congregational conflict can always be resolved. Indeed, at various times throughout its 
history the Christian church has endured conflicts over crucial theological matters—
matters that ultimately caused its members to break company with one another, and to 
form new groups or traditions. I acknowledge the possibility that in some cases, members 
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of congregations may decide that the conflicts they are facing rise to this level, and that 
they can no longer continue to be in communion with one another. However, I argue that, 
historically speaking, broad agreement on theological issues typically comes about only 
over a long period of time. I suggest that for congregations who are struggling with 
complex contemporary issues, more time is needed to discern whether far-reaching 
theological agreement can be achieved. Until that time elapses, congregations must learn 
how to make room for theological difference in their midst. Otherwise, more 
communities of faith may face the kind of destructive division I have described here. 
 
The Scope of the Problem 
 The type of intense congregational conflict that took place at Grace UCC is, 
unfortunately, not unique. Indeed, a variety of sources within the fields of congregational 
studies and sociology of religion demonstrate that many congregations within the United 
States today cite conflict as a perennial part of their common life. For instance, data 
gathered in 2006 and 2007 as part of the second wave of the National Congregations 
Study show that of the 1506 congregations surveyed, 23.1% had experienced a conflict 
within the prior two years for which a special meeting was called.
8
 Perhaps more 
troubling, this same study found that 26.4% of the communities surveyed had 
experienced a conflict within the prior two years that had caused some members to leave 
the congregation.
9
 A similar, though much smaller, study found that 45% of the 100 
communities surveyed reported having experienced at least one conflict “significant 
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9
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enough to convene a special meeting or call in outside help” during the five years of the 
study.
10
  
 The data reported in the Faith Communities Today (FACT) studies conducted in 
2000, 2005, 2008, and 2010 by the Cooperative Congregations Studies Partnership reveal 
a similar pattern. This study differs from the National Congregations Study in that its 
sample is much larger—surveying 28,787 communities of faith in all11—and it includes a 
larger percentage of non-Christian communities such as synagogues and mosques. 
However, since Christian congregations make up a significant proportion of the 
communities surveyed, the FACT study still proves a useful tool for understanding the 
prevalence of conflict within the types of churches that this dissertation primarily 
addresses. According to the 2010 FACT data, 65.1% of the congregations surveyed had 
experienced conflict within the prior five years in one of four key areas: worship, 
finances, leadership, or program priorities. This figure, which represents a clear majority 
of the surveyed congregations, increased by almost 1% from the data gathered in 2000, 
demonstrating that conflict remains an important issue for most contemporary faith 
communities in the United States.
12
 
 It should be noted, however, that this figure refers only to the general presence of 
“conflict” in churches, which David Roozen, the author of the study, distinguishes from 
“serious conflict.” Roozen defines a serious conflict as “one in which some people left, a 
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leader left or money was withheld.”13 The 2008 FACT study found that this type of 
serious conflict “is present in a third of congregations overall and reaches a high of 45 
percent for Oldline Protestant congregations.”14 Based on these research findings, Roozen 
concludes that  
For virtually every measure of congregational vitality contained in the FACT 
surveys, conflict erodes vitality and the more severe the conflict the greater the 
effect – whether for spiritual vitality, financial health, numerical growth, or the 
securing, nurturing and caring for lay leadership.
15
  
 
These findings related to the prevalence of serious conflict thus correspond closely with 
the data reported in the National Congregations Study about conflicts resulting in the loss 
of membership. Taken together, these studies suggest that such serious conflicts, which 
have detrimental consequences for communities of faith, are present in anywhere from 
one-quarter to nearly one-half of contemporary congregations in the United States at any 
given time. 
  Admittedly, the majority of conflicts reported in these studies do not appear—at 
least on the surface—to be theological in nature. Yet, congregational researcher David 
Brubaker notes that of the respondents in his study reporting a single or first conflict in 
their churches, roughly 25% named homosexuality as the primary problem.
16
 Sociologist 
of religion Penny Edgell Becker discovered a similar trend in her study of 23 
congregations in the suburban Chicago area: out of 65 conflicts reported, 10 centered on 
                                                          
13
 David A. Roozen, American Congregations 2008 (Hartford, CT: Hartford Institute for Religion 
Research, 2009), 26. 
14
 David A. Roozen, "Peace, Peace!," The Progressive Christian:  Faith and the Common Good 184, no. 1 
(Winter 2010): 29.  
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Brubaker, 29.  
18 
 
issues of gender and sexuality.
17
 The emergence of gender and sexuality issues as a key 
category in these studies signals that theology often plays an important role in the 
development of congregational conflict. Granted, discussions about gender and sexuality 
in the wider culture do not necessarily engage explicitly theological themes; however, 
similar discussions within congregations frequently involve appeals to Scripture and 
other theological resources as a way of wrestling with these highly complex issues. 
Talking about gender and sexuality within a religious context almost inevitably touches 
on the nature of human being and God’s intentions for the created order, both of which 
are deeply theological subjects. 
 In contrast to the studies noted above, other researchers have assigned less weight 
to theological issues in comparison to other causes for congregational conflict . For 
instance, in his reporting on the 2000 FACT study, denominational researcher Jack 
Marcum notes that among the 541 Presbyterian (PCUSA) congregations represented, 
theology proved one of the “least likely subjects for conflict,” with “only” 26% of the 
congregations reporting problems in this area.
18
 But while theology represents a smaller 
category for conflict than other areas like finances or leadership, it still—by Marcum’s 
own admission—affects more than one-quarter of the congregations in question. 
Furthermore, according to Marcum’s data, roughly one-half of the congregations who 
experienced conflict over a theological issue described the conflict as “moderate” or 
“serious.” These figures suggest that, while theology may not be the most common 
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reason for conflict in congregations, it continues to be a contested area that can produce 
very destructive results within communities of faith. 
 While these research data maintain that theology represents one of the less 
common issues driving church conflict, I argue that virtually all conflicts within 
congregations possess a theological dimension. Conflicts about church finances, for 
example, are not just about money, but about parishioners’ theological understanding of 
the nature of the church and its mission in the world. In other words, how congregations 
spend their money demonstrates their theological commitments. Similarly, disagreements 
about worship frequently go beyond differences in preference or personal style, and 
instead touch on people’s most deeply held beliefs about who God is, and how God 
relates to human beings. In turn, these theological commitments are deeply connected to 
practitioners’ sense of religious and social identity. If you ask people about their faith 
affiliation, they are likely to respond with phrases like, “I’m a Methodist,” or “I’m 
Lutheran,” or “I belong to the United Church of Christ.” For many parishioners, these 
general religious identifiers encompass a host of specific theological ideas and values that 
they then bring with them into conversations about everyday church matters. 
  Because these conversations take place within the context of religious bodies, in 
which individuals have made covenant promises to one another, it stands to reason that 
conflict between congregants will carry significant theological weight. After all, if 
members of a single congregation have made similar affirmations of faith as part of their 
membership, what does it mean theologically when they discover that they disagree so 
vehemently on important church issues? How can they reconcile their commitments to 
one another with the fact that they seem to believe such different things about worship, or 
20 
 
money, or human sexuality? To put it another way: what are the implications for 
congregants’ sense of identity when they realize that their chosen religious identifiers do 
not guarantee that they will share important theological beliefs and values with their 
fellow church members?  
 The statistics cited above are alarming, but not simply because they point to the 
presence of conflict within faith communities; after all, in any intimate relationship 
between persons, conflict always plays a role. Yet these figures paint a much more 
disturbing picture of serious conflict within congregations that is not only widespread, 
but also destructive in its consequences. As these studies have shown, this type of conflict 
can result in the loss of members, financial support, leadership, and overall vitality within 
congregations. Indeed, the 2005 FACT study found that the most common result of 
serious congregational conflict is the loss of community members: of the congregations 
surveyed that had experienced serious conflict, 69% reported that at least some members 
had left the fellowship as a result.
19
 This figure alone provides a striking example of why 
this kind of congregational conflict is so problematic—namely, because it has the 
potential to break up the body of Christ into smaller and smaller pieces. In an era when 
the mainstream Protestant church is already suffering serious declines in membership, it 
is crucial for congregations to find healthier ways of handling conflict so that continued 
fragmentation does not remain the only option.  
 Furthermore, from a theological standpoint, Christians are called to be in 
covenantal communion with one another. One powerful way in which such communion 
is ritualized is through the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper as it is shared in worship. In 
                                                          
19
 David A. Roozen, American Congregations 2005 (Hartford, CT: Hartford Institute for Religion 
Research, 2007), 20. 
21 
 
that ritual, the bread symbolizes the broken body of Christ, who gave himself in love so 
that those who came after him could be reconciled to God and to one another. Christ’s 
literal body was broken so that his living, enduring body—the fellowship of all 
believers—could be brought together in shared service. Christ made this sacrifice so that 
forgiveness and reconciliation between individuals could become possible; yet, in 
contemporary times, it seems that members of Christ’s church have difficulty finding 
ways to embody the grace modeled by Jesus.  
 Of course, it should be noted that, at times, Jesus also embodied divisiveness and 
judgment—such as when he rebuked the moneychangers in the temple20, or when he 
declared, “I have not come to bring peace, but a sword.”21 Some would argue that these 
aspects of Jesus’ ministry show that he was more concerned with proclaiming “right” 
theology than with bringing people together. I contend, however, that standing firm on 
principle and confronting injustice—as Jesus did—does not necessarily entail cutting 
oneself off from those who disagree. In other words, seeking unity and wholeness for a 
religious community does not have to mean adopting an “anything goes” mentality.22 
Although Scripture tells us that Jesus corrected the Pharisees and shirked many of the 
religious conventions of his day, he also admonished his followers to love their enemies 
and to seek reconciliation with one another before offering gifts to God.
23
 Even on the 
cross, as he was dying, Jesus extended himself in a conciliatory gesture, saying “Father, 
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forgive them; for they do not know what they are doing.”24 In my view, then, the account 
of Jesus’ life that we find in Scripture paints a picture of a righteous leader who had 
integrity and held fast to his convictions, but who ultimately did not allow his theological 
“rightness” to hinder his relationships with others. In contrast to this model provided by 
Jesus, many congregations today are generating brokenness and division in their midst 
through their inability to handle conflict in peaceful and productive ways. This problem 
tears at the very fabric of Christian communities, and threatens to create an environment 
where disagreement on theological issues almost immediately becomes grounds for the 
dissolution of fellowship and covenantal relationship. Such an environment proves 
contrary to the spirit of unity and mutual love that the body of Christ is called to emulate. 
 These reflections on the importance of church unity are undoubtedly shaped by 
my own theological commitments. As I write this dissertation, I find myself deeply 
concerned about the division and fragmentation I have personally witnessed in 
congregations, and that is occurring in Christian communities across this country. These 
developments trouble me greatly because, as a person raised and ordained in the Baptist 
tradition, and now serving in the United Church of Christ, I have great respect for both 
freedom of conscience and commitment to community. Although it is now very 
conservative theologically, the Southern Baptist Church was founded on the principle of 
the priesthood of all believers, which means that each Christian has the ability to relate to 
God, and can read and interpret the Scriptures him- or herself. Along with this emphasis 
on individual relationships with God, Baptists have historically affirmed each believer’s 
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freedom to follow his or her own conscience in matters of spiritual importance.
25
 Even 
now, the website of the Southern Baptist Convention states that each member of a Baptist 
congregation “is responsible and accountable to Christ as Lord.”26 This suggests that 
from its earliest days to contemporary times, the Baptist church has recognized the 
possibility that its members might not agree with each other on all issues, and has 
affirmed the importance of being able to follow one’s own conscience.  
 Although very different theologically from the Southern Baptist Church, the 
United Church of Christ (UCC)—the denomination that now holds my ordination 
credentials—displays similar commitments in terms of the spiritual freedom of each 
individual believer. According to the UCC website, “We seek a balance between freedom 
of conscience and accountability to the apostolic faith. The UCC therefore receives the 
historic creeds and confessions of our ancestors as testimonies, but not tests of the 
faith.”27 In this sense, the UCC also recognizes the potential for theological disagreement 
between its members. However, this does not mean that the UCC has no concern for the 
unity of its congregations. In fact, the key motto of the denomination is taken from John 
17:21, “That they may all be one.” The UCC thus seeks to strike a balance between 
freedom of conscience, on the one hand, and covenant commitment to fellow believers, 
on the other. As I reflect on the shape that congregational conflict has taken in 
mainstream Protestant churches in recent years, I fear that many congregations are 
focusing on one side of this dialectic to the exclusion of the other. In churches where 
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freedom of conscience is emphasized too strongly, the result can be intense conflict and 
fragmentation when people find they cannot agree on all theological issues. Conversely, 
when church unity is interpreted as uniformity, individuals find themselves forced to 
choose between being true to their own spiritual consciences, and being inauthentic for 
the sake of “peace” in the church body. 
 In light of these dangers, what can be done? What resources are available for 
those who wish to think more deeply about the problem of congregational conflict, and to 
discover ways of helping communities of faith deal more effectively with theological 
disagreements in their midst? And, why is congregational conflict a problem that pastoral 
theology should address? After all, many definitions of pastoral theology describe it as a 
scholarly discipline that focuses specifically on practices of pastoral care, rather than on 
other pastoral practices like leadership or administration. Some might wonder whether 
other fields—such as leadership studies or congregational studies—might more 
appropriately address this topic.  
 Here, it is helpful to distinguish between practical theology and pastoral 
theology. While closely related, important differences exist between these two 
disciplines, and each term has held varied meanings at different points in history. Even 
so, the current distinction between the two terms may be succinctly stated as follows: 
“Whereas practical theology is integrative, concerned with broader issues of ministry, 
discipleship, and formation, pastoral theology is person- and pathos-centered and focused 
on the activity of care.”28 In other words, practical theology is a broader, more 
encompassing term that includes a wide range of activities, methods, curricular areas, and 
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academic disciplines.
29
 Pastoral theology thus represents “one among many valued 
subdisciplines within practical theology”—a subdiscipline that is also unique in its 
appropriation of psychology as a key analytical tool for interpreting lived experience.
 30
 
Pastoral theology’s appeal to psychology as an important resource, and its simultaneous 
focus on individual persons, suffering, and practices of care, lead me to situate my own 
work squarely within its borders. However, in this chapter, I also explore resources 
within congregational studies and leadership studies—both of which may be understood 
as forms and methods of practical theology—to discover what their unique contributions 
might be for examining the topic of congregational conflict. Ultimately, though, I return 
to the field of pastoral theology, further illustrating how its approach differs from these 
other practical theological disciplines, and how it might fill the gaps left by 
congregational studies and leadership studies literature. 
 
Literature Review: Congregational Studies and Leadership Studies 
 
Congregational Studies: The Importance of Thick Description 
 The discipline known as congregational studies is quite new on the academic 
scene. Over the last three decades, this field has emerged out of the work of scholars who 
seek to understand more fully the dynamics of congregational life. Practical theologian 
and congregational researcher James R. Nieman defines congregational studies as  
. . . the disciplined process for examining a congregation holistically that uses 
multiple research methods. In place of random intuitions and impressions is an 
orderly exploration of what actually happens in a group, both the obvious and the 
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hidden, in a way that accurately reflects the interaction of component features 
while also noticing overall patterns and structures.
31
 
 
Even in naming these core commitments of congregational studies, however, Nieman 
admits that it remains a developing discipline with “no simple defining feature.”32 Indeed, 
because the field is so new, it is just now beginning to take a definite shape, with only 
nascent consensus on what resources belong within its borders.
33
  
 Nonetheless, part of what makes congregational studies unique is its emphasis on 
the “thick description” of situations, particularly those faced by specific congregations.34 
In other words, rather than speaking of “the church” in generic terms, writers in this field 
use close examination and analysis of particular congregations as ways of understanding 
what is happening on the ground in very specific places and times. While many resources 
in congregational studies attempt thick descriptions of an entire congregation and its 
culture
35
, others seek to examine particular issues—such as community relations36 or 
pastoral leadership
37—as they arise within their congregational contexts. Even within this 
discipline, however, there is a dearth of literature that deals specifically with conflict in 
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congregations. In what follows, I examine three resources in congregational studies that 
do address conflict, and draw out the main contributions and limitations of these texts for 
a pastoral theological approach to this issue. 
 Studying Congregations: A New Handbook represents a key text within the field 
of congregational studies.
38
 This edited volume brings together scholars from a wide 
variety of disciplines—including sociology, history, theology, and professional 
ministry—to produce a text that emphasizes the importance of congregations within 
American religious life, and that proposes theoretical frameworks and practical methods 
for studying them. Because this is a resource designed for a broad audience of religious 
scholars, theologians, pastoral practitioners, and parishioners, it seeks not to describe any 
particular congregation but rather to argue for the importance of description itself as the 
first step in studying congregations.  
 To this end, the text proposes a collection of four distinct “frames” for 
understanding communities of faith: environment, culture, resources, and process. A 
chapter is devoted to each of these frames, demonstrating how they can be used to 
understand complex congregational realities like context, ritual, and conflict. In addition 
to these frameworks, other chapters address key elements in congregational life, such as 
theology, identity, and leadership. The volume concludes with a practically-oriented 
chapter on methods, which describes specific approaches a researcher might use to study 
a congregation, or that congregations might use to study themselves. Thus, through its 
attention to context, culture, resources, and process, and through its thorough treatment of 
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research methodology, this volume marks an important step in the development of 
congregational studies as a discipline.  
 Despite its significance within the field of congregational studies, however, this 
text addresses the issue of congregational conflict only in a limited way. For instance, in 
the chapter on the “process” frame, Carl Dudley discusses some of the common dynamics 
of congregational conflict and suggests a few approaches for more effective conflict 
resolution, such as using small-group processes instead of public meetings. Given the fact 
that this section spans only a few pages, however, there is not sufficient space in which to 
develop a comprehensive approach to congregational conflict. Furthermore, the brevity of 
Dudley’s treatment does not allow for extended theological reflection on the possible 
origins of conflict, other than to note that conflict is complex and typically has a “mixture 
of causes.”39 In short, because this text is geared toward helping scholars and 
practitioners discover the contours of particular congregations, it is more interested in 
developing tools for description than in offering evaluations of various pastoral 
approaches. Thus, instead of offering its own theological reflection on human nature or 
on the nature of the church, this text seeks to help congregations uncover their own 
theology through specific research methods and theoretical lenses. 
 Penny Edgell Becker’s Congregations in Conflict: Cultural Models of Local 
Religious Life explores the specific issue of conflict as it is enacted in real communities 
of faith.
40
 This text is based on Becker’s extensive ethnographic research in 23 different 
congregations in suburban Chicago, which aimed to discover what churches fight about, 
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and why some churches have more conflict than others. Becker’s research uncovered four 
basic models—the House of Worship, Family, Community and Leader models—that 
defined all of the congregations she studied. Becker asserts that each model includes 
particular ways of understanding identity and mission, or “who we are” and “how we do 
things here.”41 These modes of understanding then contribute to specific patterns of 
conflict within each model that, Becker claims, can be used to predict what type of 
conflict a given congregation is likely to have. Yet, Becker is careful not to suggest that 
these models necessarily provide a path toward resolving congregational conflicts. 
Rather, she argues that these models contribute to a deeper understanding of church 
conflicts, as well as “the capacity of a given institution to foster certain forms of 
community or certain forms of moral action.”42  
 While this text focuses much more narrowly on issues of congregational conflict 
than other resources in the field, Becker’s work remains highly descriptive, with very few 
recommendations for transformed pastoral practice. Indeed, perhaps because Becker 
identifies as a sociologist of religion and not a practical theologian, she seems much more 
concerned with developing a theoretical model that accurately describes and explains 
conflict dynamics than with suggesting approaches for changing them. Admittedly, 
Becker’s text proves helpful to a pastoral theological approach to congregational conflict 
because it provides a much clearer view of what such conflict may look like. Ultimately, 
though, such a descriptive approach falls short of the deep engagement with normative 
theological resources that is necessary for developing new and better pastoral practices.  
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 One other resource in this field that addresses the specific issue of congregational 
conflict is Ronald Stockton’s Decent and in Order: Conflict, Christianity, and Polity in a 
Presbyterian Congregation.
43
 In this text, Stockton, a professor of political science, 
presents a detailed case study of a Presbyterian congregation that underwent an intense 
and extremely damaging conflict following allegations that the pastor had engaged in acts 
of sexual misconduct. Stockton, who was himself a member of this congregation, 
interviewed many of the church’s members, as well as denominational leaders, in order to 
gain a more comprehensive understanding of how the conflict unfolded, and what factors 
may have led to the shape it ultimately took. In addition to the thick description that he 
provides through the case material, Stockton also engages in detailed institutional 
analysis of the congregation itself and of the denomination to which it belongs. In this 
way, the author attempts to provide theoretical frameworks that may help to explain why 
this particular conflict became so protracted and divisive.  
 In contrast to many other congregational studies resources, Stockton concludes 
his text with recommendations for improved practice. However, perhaps because he is a 
political scientist, most of Stockton’s suggestions focus on the leadership and 
administrative structures of the congregation and its parent denomination, rather than on 
the communal practices of the parishioners themselves. Furthermore, as is common in 
congregational studies literature, Stockton tends to use the description of this faith 
community as a basis for analysis rather than for sustained theological reflection. While 
Stockton does include a brief chapter on the Calvinist understanding of discipline, he 
presents this material primarily as a means of helping readers grasp why the congregation 
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took the actions it did, and not as a pathway toward deeper reflection on what discipline 
and conflict might mean theologically.  
 As this discussion has shown, these resources in congregational studies advance 
the understanding of congregations through their emphasis on the thick description of 
lived communal experience. Becker and Stockton accomplish this through the reporting 
and analysis of qualitative data on specific congregations, while Studying Congregations 
offers theoretical frameworks and concrete methods for gathering and interpreting such 
data in any community of faith. Such descriptive approaches are important and, as the 
next section will show, they provide a much needed balance to many of the popular 
resources currently available to pastoral practitioners.
44
 Yet, because these texts often do 
not take the next step toward recommendations for transformed practice, or do so in only 
a partial way, their usefulness for a pastoral theological approach to congregational 
conflict remains limited. Additionally, these resources fail to engage in sustained 
theological reflection on the nature of human beings, which seems crucial to a rich 
understanding of how people relate to one another in communities of faith.  
 Finally, all three of these resources tend to sketch the contours of congregations as 
corporate realities, which may miss the individual forms of human flourishing and 
suffering taking place in their midst. Granted, all of these resources emphasize the 
inclusion of individual voices through qualitative methods of interviewing and 
participant-observation; yet, in the end, these texts wish to paint a picture of 
congregations as unique entities rather than simply collections of individuals. This is a 
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valid point, and represents one of the key contributions of congregational studies as a 
field. In focusing primarily on the broader shape of congregations, however, these 
analyses may lose sight of the unique individual plights that take place within the 
communal context.  
 Although this project employs methods frequently used in congregational 
studies—such as the inclusion of case material and interviews with church members—it 
is not a project in congregational studies per se. Unlike congregational studies, which 
emphasizes the “overall patterns and structures”45 of church life, this dissertation seeks to 
balance a view of congregations as corporate realities with a simultaneous focus on the 
unique persons who comprise them. To achieve this goal, in this project I provide 
detailed descriptions of two faith communities, while also highlighting the voices of 
specific parishioners in an attempt to reveal the shape of individual suffering in the midst 
of congregational conflict. This approach allows me to focus on how individuals are 
shaped by and in their context, and not only on the context itself. 
 
Leadership Studies: The Importance of Practice 
 Even if convinced that this project does not fall within the realm of 
congregational studies, some readers might argue that it belongs better in the category of 
leadership studies. More well-established than congregational studies, the field of 
leadership studies focuses broadly on leadership within organizational contexts and in 
human life. This discipline has its primary roots in the fields of sociology, psychology, 
philosophy, and management, many of which are resources upon which congregational 
studies also draws. Additionally, like congregational studies, leadership studies represents 
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a highly multi-disciplinary field in which many different theoretical lenses may be 
brought to bear on the study of leadership in all types of contexts, including businesses, 
medical organizations, academic institutions, and religious communities. Within the 
study of religion, leadership studies tends to concentrate on the understanding of 
leadership in organizations like congregations and denominations, although it may still 
draw upon the theoretical bases used in other sub-fields of leadership studies. In terms of 
the popular literature produced for religious practitioners, resources in the field of 
leadership studies tend to focus on grasping the dynamics of religious organizations, and 
offering concrete suggestions for managing or even changing such dynamics.
46
  
 Unlike congregational studies, however, leadership studies literature tends to 
focus less on description, and more on specific recommendations for improved pastoral 
practice. This proves especially true for resources that are aimed primarily toward 
practitioners rather than scholars. Speed B. Leas, a nationally recognized organizational 
consultant and one of the most well-known writers in this field, has authored many books 
on congregational conflict that clearly emphasize practical knowledge for religious 
leaders rather than the thick description of situations. The most influential of Leas’ texts, 
entitled Moving Your Church Through Conflict (1985) establishes a rubric outlining the 
five “levels” of conflict that communities of faith may experience.47 Leas names these 
levels as follows, in ascending order of severity: Problem to Solve, Disagreement, 
Contest, Fight/Flight, and Intractable Situation. Leas explains that at levels 1 and 2, 
congregations may still be able to discover solutions that are “win/win”; at levels 3 
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through 5, however, solutions become framed in “win/lose” language, which makes 
peaceful resolution less likely.
48
  
 Although this text is now quite dated, it bears special mention here—not only 
because Leas is such a well-known writer in the field, but because the particular rubric he 
develops in this book continues to be referenced in many more recent resources on 
church conflict resolution.
49
 Furthermore, Leas’ approach in this work appears to be 
emblematic of many of the texts currently available for practitioners seeking help with 
congregational conflict. First, Leas makes clear that this text focuses on helping people 
develop practical skills for coping with conflict in their churches: “This is a ‘how to’ 
book. The reader will find some theory here, but not a great deal. This book is for pastors 
or lay leaders who find themselves in a conflicted church or one where conflict is about 
to occur.”50 Leas thus focuses much more on generating practical strategies for conflict 
within congregations than on offering sustained reflection on theoretical or theological 
resources. However, this does not mean that Leas offers no abstract approaches for 
analyzing congregational conflicts; indeed, like many other resources in the field of 
leadership studies, Leas begins with a primary conceptual framework—in this case, the 
five-fold rubric describing levels of conflict—which he then develops throughout the 
remainder of the book. The purpose of this framework is not to delve deeply into the 
nature of human being or ecclesial communities, but rather, as Leas admits, to offer 
practical advice for church leaders in situations of conflict. 
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 However, unlike most resources in congregational studies, Leas’ text does not 
begin with a thick description of conflicts in specific communities of faith; instead, Leas’ 
approach involves first developing a rubric for analysis, and then applying it to a general 
discussion of congregational conflict. Only late in the text—in Chapter 11—does Leas 
offer a congregational case study as an illustration of the concepts he has developed 
throughout the work. Yet Leas’ text does resemble resources in congregational studies in 
the sense that it lacks sustained theological reflection on human nature. While Leas offers 
a brief treatment of theological themes on pages 9 and 10 of his text, theology fades into 
the background in favor of the discussion of skills and strategies that could prove useful 
to congregations experiencing conflict at any one of the five levels. Additionally, like 
much of the congregational studies literature, Leas’ text focuses on the communal shape 
of conflict, to the exclusion of deep reflection on the individual experience of suffering in 
the midst of congregational discord. In fact, any mention of individual experience found 
in this work refers primarily to the person of the pastor or lay leader, or to strategies for 
“dealing with” conflicts with particular individuals.51 
 In addition to being a significant resource in its own right, Moving Your Church 
Through Conflict proves representative of much of the practical literature on church 
conflict published in recent years. For instance, David Sawyer’s Hope in Conflict (2007) 
exhibits many similarities with Leas’ earlier work.52 Sawyer, a professor of ministry at 
Louisville Presbyterian Theological Seminary, intends this work primarily as a practical 
guide for pastors and other leaders, and offers many concrete suggestions for coping with 
conflict in congregations, such as establishing “ground rules” for communication in 
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communities of faith.
53
 Like Leas' work, much of Sawyer’s text develops a theoretical 
lens through which to view specific instances of congregational conflict. While Leas’ text 
uses the “levels of conflict” rubric, Sawyer suggests a three-fold framework of 
“structures, stories, and symptoms” as general analytic categories that may be applied to 
particular conflicts within communities of faith.
54
 These categories focus on identifying 
rules and roles, organizational dynamics, narrative patterns, and problematic behaviors 
that may be contributing to the conflict as a whole. 
 In contrast to Leas, who introduces a case study late in his text as an example of 
how his conceptual rubric might be applied, Sawyer sprinkles case studies throughout his 
work as illustrations of the concepts he discusses. Even with this approach, however, 
Sawyer’s text still focuses primarily on the congregation as a whole rather than on the 
individual experiences of parishioners in the midst of conflict situations. In fact, while 
Sawyer holds out an understanding of conflict as an opportunity rather than a problem, 
his treatment of this concept risks glossing over the real pain that individuals may 
experience in the midst of congregational discord. Finally, like Leas, Sawyer fails to 
provide sustained theological reflection on human being in general, or on the meaning of 
conflict in particular. Although Sawyer employs theological language in various places 
throughout the text, he does not consolidate this language into a comprehensive, well-
defined approach to what such conflict means theologically. Thus, although they were 
written 22 years apart, both Leas’ and Sawyer’s texts embody broad trends within the 
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practical church conflict literature: an emphasis on practical strategies rather than thick 
description; a lack of sustained theological reflection on human nature; and a focus on the 
broad dynamics of congregations to the neglect of deep exploration of individual 
experiences in the midst of church conflict. 
 An even more recent text, David R. Brubaker’s Promise and Peril: 
Understanding and Managing Change and Conflict in Congregations (2009), moves 
toward bringing thick description and transformed practice together. Like many texts in 
congregational studies, Brubaker grounds his work in quantitative data that he gathered 
through a survey of 100 congregations in the southwestern United States. Based on this 
research, Brubaker identifies patterns of conflict and analyzes how these patterns relate to 
significant changes within congregations. For instance, Brubaker’s research shows that 
conflict in congregations correlates highly with changes in decision-making structure, 
worship, and leadership. Given these findings, Brubaker suggests that these types of 
changes—which he terms structural, cultural, and leadership changes—are likely to 
produce conflict in most congregations. Knowing this, Brubaker suggests, is important 
for church leaders not so that they can avoid change, but “so that they can prepare for the 
resistance and conflict that is likely to result.”55 
 In contrast to much of the congregational studies literature, however, Brubaker 
does not stop with thick description, but instead uses it as a platform on which to build 
his own theoretical framework for congregational analysis and his concrete suggestions 
for pastoral practice. Like the other resources reviewed in this section, Brubaker offers a 
conceptual rubric—in this case, the rubric of structural, cultural, and leadership 
changes—which he then employs as a lens through which to view the particular problem 
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of conflict within congregations. Doing so allows Brubaker to move from the level of 
general analysis of his research data to the level of generating specific strategies for each 
type of change that is linked to congregational conflict. For instance, in terms of conflict 
that accompanies structural change, Brubaker recommends that pastoral leaders 
“acknowledge power,” “anticipate conflict,” and “provide leadership”; likewise, in 
situations of cultural change, pastoral leaders should “move slowly,” “acknowledge 
losses,” and “reinforce foundations.”56  
 Yet, like other resources in the field of leadership studies, Brubaker’s text 
neglects to offer extensive theological reflection on human nature, or on the theological 
meaning of conflict itself. Admittedly, in the latter part of Chapter 5, “Change and 
Conflict,” Brubaker does engage in a brief theological exploration that he calls “A 
Theology of Change.” This exploration involves a very short reflection on images of 
transformation within the Christian tradition, such as the person of Jesus, the importance 
of rituals (especially the Eucharist), and the paschal mystery. Brubaker then engages 
briefly with the story of disagreement between Greek-speaking and Aramaic-speaking 
Jews in the early church, found in Acts 6, as an example of conflict from the biblical 
tradition.  
 Instead of using these theological resources as a starting point for more extended 
reflection on human being or ecclesial community, however, Brubaker moves directly 
into drawing out additional strategies for pastoral leaders, such as “mov[ing] toward 
conflict, not away from it.”57 In so doing, Brubaker misses an opportunity to delve deeply 
into the realm of theological reflection as a means to discovering resources for 
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transformed pastoral practice. Thus, while Brubaker’s interest in making practical 
recommendations is admirable, he does so in a way that seems overly facile. 
Furthermore, Brubaker’s focus on organizational dynamics—particularly his choice to 
focus on quantitative data—fails to attend adequately to the unique experience of 
individual suffering within the context of congregational conflict. In this sense, 
Brubaker’s text exhibits many similarities with others in the field, even as it demonstrates 
a unique interest in pairing thick description with practical recommendations. 
 
A Special Category: Leadership Studies and Family Systems Theory 
 In addition to the texts reviewed in the preceding section, a special sub-category 
of leadership studies literature bears mention here. This sub-category includes 
practically-oriented church leadership texts that use family systems theory as the primary 
analytical lens for understanding congregational dynamics. I introduce this literature here 
for two reasons. First, these texts typically address congregational conflict in a more 
specific way than many other resources in church leadership studies. As a result, these are 
some of the most well-known texts for pastors struggling with conflict in their 
communities. Because conflict is my focus here, it seems important to touch briefly on 
some of the key conflict-related resources already available within the sphere of 
leadership studies. Second, because these texts utilize a body of well-established concepts 
from family systems theory as their means of analysis, they provide a helpful model for 
using psychological tools to investigate a multi-layered problem like congregational 
conflict. Although the psychological tools I will use in this project differ significantly 
from family systems theory, reflecting on these practical resources nonetheless provides 
40 
 
insight into the strengths of this approach for the topic at hand. Before moving to an 
exploration of specific texts, however, I will first describe the basic conceptual 
framework utilized by family systems theory. 
 The term “family systems theory” (FST) refers to a way of thinking about family 
and organizational dynamics originally developed by psychiatrist Murray Bowen. Bowen 
built his theory on many of the principles first articulated in the field of general systems 
theory, which grew rapidly after World War II with the advent of cybernetics and other 
computer modeling techniques.
58
 Modern systems theory understands systems as 
dynamic wholes rather than as collections of individual parts. These wholes are complex, 
and operate through the interdependent functioning of their components. Thus, the 
system is affected by the functioning of each part, and each part is also affected by the 
functioning of the entire system. 
 According to family systems theory, family networks also operate as dynamic 
wholes, with individual members both contributing to and being affected by the 
functioning of the larger system. The theory assumes that relationships are a primary 
source of human health and struggle, and that the health or ill health of a system also 
applies to its individual members. Family systems theory thus de-emphasizes individual 
personality as the sole cause of problems, and instead sees individual troubles primarily 
as a result of system dynamics. In other words, “problems” are reactions to changes in the 
system. Such changes disturb the system's usual sense of equilibrium, or “homeostasis.”59 
When this happens, members of the system become anxious and frequently react with 
                                                          
58
 Dictionary of the Social Sciences (Oxford University Press, 2002), s.v. "System(S) Theory." Accessed 
March 26, 2012. 
59
 Edwin H. Friedman, Generation to Generation:  Family Process in Church and Synagogue (New York: 
The Guilford Press, 1985), 23. 
41 
 
unhealthy behaviors such as withdrawal, emotional outbursts, or aggression. These 
behaviors are understood as “symptoms” of the more fundamental anxiety that is 
circulating throughout the family system.
60
 In other words, these symptoms represent 
individuals’ attempts to cope with the anxiety they are feeling due to changes in the 
system. 
 Within family systems theory, anxiety is defined as a “sense of threat” 
experienced both by individuals and by the systems of which they are a part.
61
 This sense 
of threat appears in two distinct forms: acute and chronic. Acute anxiety “generally 
occurs in response to real threats and is experienced as time-limited.”62 Acute anxiety is 
what people typically experience in response to a specific crisis such as a severe illness, 
the loss of a job, a house fire, etc. Once the immediate crisis has passed, individuals feel 
less acutely anxious and are able to begin dealing with the aftermath of the event. 
Chronic anxiety, by contrast, persists across time, and develops in response to imagined 
threats. In this sense, chronic anxiety is a diffuse sense of dis-ease which may manifest 
itself in a general sense of not feeling “safe” in the world.63 One succinct summary of the 
difference between acute and chronic anxiety is that, “Acute anxiety is fed by fear of 
what is; chronic anxiety is fed by fear of what might be.”64 Generally speaking, acute 
anxiety is a natural and automatic response to a threat. When we are truly in danger, 
anxiety can make us more alert and ready to respond to the threat, thus increasing our 
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chances for self-preservation.
65
 But as church consultant and systems expert Peter Steinke 
notes, “If intense and prolonged, anxiety has a strangling effect, depleting people's 
energy, disturbing their thinking, and dividing their loyalties.”66 Steinke further argues 
that because chronic anxiety develops in response to no specific threat, “Any issue, topic, 
or circumstance can provoke chronically anxious people.”67  
 Thus, any event that normally triggers acute anxiety can, in a chronically anxious 
system, create problems throughout the system that are disproportionate to the event 
itself, thereby creating even more chronic anxiety. For this reason, organizational systems 
with high levels of chronic anxiety frequently experience ineffective or destructive 
patterns of relating and communicating. Family systems theory calls such behavioral 
patterns “reactivity,” which is defined as “the emotional expression of people's sense of 
threat.”68 Although the term reactivity may connote a certain level of aggression or 
volatility, patterns of reactivity may also include more passive behaviors such as 
compliance or disengagement. In other words, what makes a behavior reactive is not the 
particular form it takes, but rather its primary goal of “distancing and not dealing directly 
with the experience of threat.”69 
 According to family systems theory, the antidote to high levels of chronic anxiety 
is differentiation. In their text Family Evaluation: An Approach Based on Bowen Theory, 
Michael E. Kerr and Murray Bowen explain that family systems theory assumes the 
existence of an “instinctually rooted life force” called individuality that drives each 
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person to become “an emotionally separate person, an individual with the ability to think, 
feel, and act for himself.”70 Differentiation, then, is the process by which individuals 
learn to define their selves, and move toward achieving the goals to which they are led by 
the force of individuality. It is important to note, however, that the life force of 
individuality is balanced by the life force of togetherness, which “propels child and 
family to remain emotionally connected and to operate in reaction to one another.”71  
 Family systems theory posits that, ideally, the life forces of individuality and 
togetherness remain in equilibrium, so that persons can clearly define their selves while 
simultaneously remaining connected to important others. Yet, FST also recognizes that 
for most people, the pull toward togetherness is much stronger than the pull toward 
individuality, which makes differentiation the key developmental challenge to which all 
persons must respond. In the process of differentiating, individuals develop the ability to 
remain non-reactive in the midst of anxious systems, and to take full responsibility for 
their own thoughts, feelings, and actions. Differentiation, then, may be understood as “the 
capacity of a family member to define his or her own life's goals and values apart from 
surrounding togetherness pressures, to say 'I' when others are demanding 'you' and 
'we.'“72  
 The notions of anxiety and differentiation form the conceptual core of family 
systems theory. As such, they are also the primary tools that authors in leadership studies 
use to analyze congregational dynamics and to make practical recommendations for 
leaders. In what follows, I offer very brief reviews of selected works by three FST-
inclined writers: Edwin Friedman, Peter Steinke, and Ronald Richardson. These authors' 
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primary contributions lie in their concrete descriptions of what happens in organizations 
infected by high levels of chronic anxiety. They also emphasize the central role of 
leadership in managing the process of conflict in religious organizations. According to 
these authors, congregational leaders must remain differentiated yet connected in order to 
help their churches manage conflict well. 
 First published in 1985, Edwin H. Friedman's Generation to Generation: Family 
Process in Church and Synagogue is a classic resource in family systems theory. Trained 
both as a rabbi and as a family therapist, Friedman was the first family systems writer to 
apply FST concepts to the specific context of religious communities. In this work, 
Friedman argues that congregational systems function very much like biological family 
systems. Thus, the same patterns of anxiety and reactivity that take place in families also 
take place in faith communities, but in a more complex way since the clergy and the 
parishioners all bring their own familial patterns into the larger system of the 
congregation. Indeed, Friedman argues that  
. . . all clergymen and clergywomen, irrespective of faith, are 
simultaneously involved in three distinct families whose emotional 
systems interlock: the families within the congregation, our congregations, 
and our own. Because the emotional process in all of these systems is 
identical, unresolved issues in any one of them can produce symptoms in 
the others, and increased understanding of any one creates more effective 
functioning in all three.
73
  
 
Because this text served as many clergypersons' first introduction to family systems 
theory, Friedman spends the first two chapters of the book defining the basic concepts 
that he sees as most crucial for understanding the ways in which the three “families” of 
the clergy overlap. These concepts include some of the core ideas I have described 
above—such as homeostasis and differentiation—as well as others, like “identified 
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patient” and “emotional triangles” that have become foundational to many other systems-
oriented writers in leadership studies. Throughout the text, Friedman provides brief case 
vignettes to illustrate the ways in which these concepts operate in the lives of clergy and 
their congregations. 
 The core of Generation to Generation is Section 3, entitled “The Congregation as 
a Family System.” Having already laid a firm foundation for systems thinking in Sections 
1 and 2, here Friedman shows how such thinking can illuminate specific issues and 
behaviors for clergy, both at work and at home. It is in this section that Friedman makes 
his strongest argument for utilizing a family systems framework to understand religious 
communities: “Of all work systems . . . the one that functions most like a family is a 
church or a synagogue.”74 In light of this claim, Friedman emphasizes that the most 
important element in maintaining a healthy congregational system is the behavior of the 
leader(s), who must constantly work at developing his or her own self-differentiation. For 
Friedman, the key to such differentiation lies in the ability to remain non-reactive in the 
face of inevitable anxiety, while at the same time remaining connected to all parts of the 
system. Friedman makes the link between leadership and congregational health quite 
clear when he writes, “It is in the capacity of a leader to maintain a position and still stay 
in touch [with the organization] that the organism's potential growth resides.”75 
 As mentioned above, Generation to Generation was a watershed text in applying 
family systems theory concepts to the life of religious organizations and their leaders. In 
a very real sense, this text forms much of the bedrock on which many subsequent FST-
related leadership resources were founded. By illustrating how emotional processes work 
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in congregations, and the ways in which those processes interlock with familial ones, 
Friedman demonstrated a wider applicability for Bowen's theory than had previously 
been assumed. In so doing, he pioneered a way for future writers interested in 
congregational dynamics to interpret the behavioral patterns so common to religious 
organizations.  
 Another key writer in the field of FST-related leadership studies is Peter L. 
Steinke. Steinke, who studied with Friedman, is an internationally known congregational 
consultant, as well as a former pastor and therapist for clergy. Steinke has written several 
books drawing on family systems theory as the central framework for understanding 
congregations and their problems. In one of these, Healthy Congregations: A Systems 
Approach (1996), Steinke offers an understanding of congregations as living, changing 
organisms that can experience both health and illness:  
To talk about a healthy congregation is to talk about a congregation from 
an organic perspective. Only organisms can be said to be healthy or 
diseased. Only living systems are characterized by wellness or illness, 
soundness or injury, balance or disorder.
76
 
 
According to Steinke, the term “health” refers not to the absence of disease, but rather to 
a sense of wholeness or integrity. In this way of thinking, “illness” within the body is a 
signal that something is wrong, and that balance needs to be restored to the system. 
Steinke argues that just as major life events and changes put stress on individuals, these 
same occurrences put stress on congregations. Such events consequently unbalance the 
congregational system's sense of equilibrium, and symptoms of illness begin to surface 
within the community.  
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 Throughout the text, Steinke builds on these fundamental concepts of health and 
illness to develop the scriptural metaphor of the church as Christ's body. He then uses this 
image as a lens through which to view congregational patterns of functioning. Steinke 
posits that one of the most frequent symptoms of illness in a congregation's “body” is an 
elevated level of chronic anxiety, usually accompanied by reactive behaviors such as 
secrecy, accusations, deceit, triangulation, and “murmuring” (complaining).77 
Furthermore, Steinke notes that while anxiety is a symptom that something is amiss, it 
also functions like an illness in its own right because it is infectious and can spread 
quickly throughout a faith community. In this sense, anxiety is like a virus that infects the 
organism of the congregation and is transmitted from person to person through reactivity.  
 However, Steinke maintains that just as biological viruses require a host cell to 
replicate themselves, so does anxiety. In other words, if individuals tolerate or encourage 
the reactive behaviors of others, they become like hospitable host cells and allow the 
“anxiety virus” to continue spreading throughout the organism. If, however, individuals 
within the system—especially church leaders—can learn to exercise self-differentiation 
and non-reactivity, they can arrest the spread of the virus and restore the health of the 
congregation. In this way, Steinke again illustrates one of his central claims about anxiety 
and its relationship to congregational health: anxiety itself is not the problem, because 
“Anxiety is always present in community, even as viruses are in the physical body.”78 
Instead, it is the reaction of the entire congregation to the symptom of anxiety that 
determines the overall health of the system.  
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 Unlike Friedman's text, which explains family systems theory concepts in 
extensive detail, Steinke's work utilizes FST in a very general way. As the above 
description shows, Steinke builds on key FST ideas—such as anxiety, differentiation, and 
reactivity—but he does so in a manner that is clearly intended for a lay audience that may 
have little or no background in family systems theory itself. Brief case vignettes are 
sprinkled throughout the text, but Steinke includes no extended case studies of 
congregations as a basis for his use of family systems theory. In this sense, Steinke's 
approach is to use FST as an over-arching framework in which to understand 
congregations as systems driven by emotional processes, and as a means to emphasize the 
importance of leadership in congregational health. 
 Published in the same year as Healthy Congregations, Ronald W. Richardson's 
book Creating a Healthier Church: Family Systems Theory, Leadership, and 
Congregational Life represents another key resource in the field of FST-related 
leadership studies. As a pastor and pastoral counselor, Richardson brings his interest in 
and extensive experience with family systems theory to bear on the basic dynamics 
present within communities of faith. Like Friedman and Steinke, Richardson builds his 
arguments directly on the foundations of Bowen theory, utilizing key FST concepts like 
anxiety, differentiation, and triangles to demonstrate the ways in which these elements 
may appear in congregational life. 
 Richardson begins the text with two case studies of two fictional congregations—
”Third Church” and “Valley View”—both of which are faced with the same crisis on a 
cold, winter Sunday morning: a broken boiler along with a sewer back-up into the church 
building. Richardson uses these case studies to illustrate the churches' vastly different 
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responses to stress. The leaders of Third Church respond with an attitude of responsibility 
and teamwork, while those at Valley View engage in blaming, complaining, and 
criticizing. Richardson then uses the case studies as a launching pad for discussing key 
FST concepts that he argues can illuminate many of the other hidden dynamics of church 
life.  
 The text features extended explanations of such concepts as interlocking systems, 
anxiety, differentiation, triangles, reactivity, and even how birth order may influence 
leadership style. In this sense, Richardson's text is more akin to Friedman's than to 
Steinke's because of the level of detail it offers about FST-related ideas. However, it 
differs from Friedman's text in that it is more clearly pitched to a lay audience; it is much 
shorter than Generation to Generation and, like Steinke, Richardson includes discussion 
questions at the end of each chapter to encourage conversation among clergy and 
parishioners about how they understand the functioning of their own communities. 
Because Richardson's engagement of family systems theory is more thorough than 
Steinke's and more accessible than Friedman's, Creating a Healthier Church remains a 
useful resource for seminarians, pastors, and lay leaders—particularly those who may 
have no previous background in family systems theory. 
 This brief review of leadership studies literature that brings FST to bear on 
congregational conflict demonstrates clear resonances with the case studies I present in 
Chapter Three. These case studies will reveal many of the patterns of reactivity that these 
resources describe, as well as the vital role of congregational leadership in determining 
the ultimate shape of church conflict. However, like the other leadership studies literature 
reviewed in this chapter, these texts also demonstrate significant limitations. In general 
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terms, these resources use particular analytic frameworks (in this case, family systems 
theory) and apply them in a generic way to religious communities, without offering thick 
descriptions of any particular congregation. Richardson's text is an exception to this 
critique, since he begins with two fictional congregational case studies. Even so, these 
case studies provide scant information about the congregations' broader social or 
historical context. Additionally, these resources offer very little sustained theological 
reflection on human being or on the nature of the church. Instead, the focus is almost 
exclusively on the application of particular family systems concepts to congregations. 
Such application is certainly useful, but also misses the opportunity to think theologically 
about conflict itself, or about what makes difference so anxiety-provoking from a 
theological point of view. 
 In addition to these more general shortcomings, FST-related texts in leadership 
studies demonstrate particular limitations that point to the need for further reflection on 
congregational conflict. Ironically, these limitations include both a lack of focus on the 
individual and an over-focus on the individual—both of which, I will argue, can be 
overcome with a pastoral theological approach. First, because these resources deploy 
family systems theory as their key analytical framework, the “system” of the 
congregation is the central focus for reflection. On one level, this makes sense, since 
family systems theory is a corrective to other psychological approaches that tend to treat 
persons as isolated individuals. However, these particular resources talk so much about 
the system that the shape of individuals' particular needs and suffering drops out of the 
picture. In other words, individual persons within these texts risk becoming caricatured 
through particular roles like “the over-functioner,” “the scapegoat,” “the clown,” etc. 
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Such caricatures do not represent the full scope of the ways in which individuals suffer 
when their congregations are torn apart by conflict. Furthermore, the lack of attention to 
in-depth psychological or theological reflection on human being can make these texts 
seem a bit shallow. 
 In other ways, however, these texts focus too much on individuals in terms of how 
they understand identity and where they locate the impetus for change. For instance, 
Richardson offers a definition of anxiety as “the threat to the loss of who we are—our 
'self.'“79 While this definition proves crucial for making the link between anxiety and 
identity, the understanding of identity offered in most of these texts remains highly 
individualistic. In other words, by “identity” these texts seem to mean who we understand 
ourselves to be as individual persons or personalities, with very little attention to identity 
as it is influenced by social designations such as race, gender, class, sexuality, etc. 
Because this social dimension of identity is not addressed, these resources have little to 
say about the very real power dynamics that exist within organizations, and that almost 
certainly play a role in congregational conflict.  
 Additionally, these texts tend to locate the resources for change in a system 
almost exclusively within individuals' (specifically, the system's leaders) capacity to 
differentiate. Though I will also claim that leadership represents a key piece of the puzzle 
of congregational conflict, these FST-related texts place so much emphasis on the need 
for specific individuals to differentiate that, at times, one loses a sense of the communal 
nature and shared commitments of congregations. Later in the project, I will argue that 
this ironic over-focus on the individual can be remedied through engagement with the 
resources of two other disciplines: social psychology, which explicitly addresses group 
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dynamics and social identities; and theology, which offers resources for a vision of 
congregations as communal entities that, while made up of individuals, also possess 
communal features that go beyond any one person or group of people's capacity for 
differentiation. 
 
Congregational Studies & Leadership Studies: Contributions and Limitations 
 As the preceding sections have shown, the fields of congregational and leadership 
studies overlap in a variety of ways. Both disciplines provide important insights into the 
problem of congregational conflict, although they approach this problem quite 
differently. Qualitative and quantitative approaches in congregational studies provide rich 
descriptions of the communities being examined, and identify patterns of conflict that 
may point to common underlying causes which church leaders may then address. 
Leadership studies literature uses theoretical frameworks such as family systems theory 
to analyze conflict and to make suggestions for improved pastoral practice.  
 These differences highlight two elements that, in my view, prove vital to 
understanding theological conflict within communities of faith: thick description and 
recommendations for pastoral practice. Yet congregational studies and leadership studies 
tend to focus on one or the other of these elements, rather than bringing both together in 
their search for a fuller understanding of faith communities. Furthermore, both the 
disciplines of congregational studies and leadership studies lack the keen attention to the 
individual human person and the deep theological reflection that are needed to address an 
issue as complex as theological conflict within congregations. In what follows, I argue 
that, in view of the limitations of congregational studies and leadership studies, the 
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discipline of pastoral theology is the most well-suited to undertake an exploration of this 
topic because of its attention to context, to human suffering, and to transformed practice.  
 
Contributions of Pastoral Theology: Context, Suffering, and Transformed Practice 
 
Pastoral Theology as Contextual Theology 
 I have argued that the field of congregational studies makes an important 
contribution to an understanding of congregational conflict because it provides a wealth 
of both quantitative and qualitative data about the very communities of faith under 
investigation. Such descriptions prove extremely valuable for those who wish to 
understand more deeply the dynamics of congregational conflict. Yet, these kinds of 
resources rarely use context as a starting point for sustained theological reflection. In 
contrast, the discipline of pastoral theology understands the context of lived experience as 
not only the subject for sociological or organizational analysis, but as the very ground for 
the generation of new theological ideas.  
  In an article on Protestant pastoral theology in the Dictionary of Pastoral Care 
and Counseling (1990), Rodney J. Hunter and J. Russell Burck argue that, in addition to a 
specific focus on practices of care, contemporary definitions of pastoral theology describe 
a form of theological reflection in which pastoral experience serves as a context for the 
critical development of basic theological understanding: “Here pastoral theology is not a 
theology of or about pastoral care but a type of contextual theology, a way of doing 
theology pastorally.”80 By defining pastoral theology this way, Hunter and Burck point 
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toward the importance of lived experience as a resource, which also helps to differentiate 
pastoral theology from other theological disciplines. Indeed, although pastoral theology 
presupposes other areas of theology (dogmatic, systematic, biblical, and historical), it is 
unique in its use of pastoral experience as both a source and a norm for theological 
reflection.  
 In a similar vein, Stephen Pattison and James Woodward define pastoral theology 
as “the place where the relationship between belief, tradition, and practice meets 
contemporary experiences, questions and actions, and conducts a dialogue that is 
mutually enriching, intellectually critical, and practically transforming.”81 Again, this 
definition points to the key role of experience, which establishes a two-way interaction 
between theology and pastoral practice within pastoral theology—i.e., practice both 
informs the generation of new theological ideas, and also provides the context in which 
theological ideas are tested for their adequacy.
82
 While resources in congregational 
studies are often useful in describing the lived experience of congregations, they typically 
do not take the next step into the kind of sustained theological reflection that would lead 
to the development of new theological ideas. Without this step, congregational studies 
literature tends to remain at the level of identifying patterns of behavior within 
communities of faith, rather than reflecting on what those patterns mean theologically. In 
this sense, a pastoral theological methodology proves more effective in examining a 
problem like conflict in congregations. 
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Pastoral Theology as Reflection on Individual Human Needs and Suffering 
 Just as congregational and leadership studies provide rich descriptions of 
congregations’ lived experience, they also often offer insight into the particular shape of 
human needs and suffering within the context of faith communities. For instance, the 
FACT studies cited earlier tell us that for most congregations experiencing serious 
conflict, fragmentation through the loss of membership remains a real risk. However, 
these resources do not typically utilize the reality of human suffering as a basis for 
continued reflection on human nature; they do not address what this suffering may mean 
theologically or pastorally. Furthermore, the congregational and leadership studies 
literature tends to take a “macro” view of congregations in an effort to identify the social 
and organizational dynamics that are at play. As a result, attention to the individual 
human person may be overlooked in such resources.  
 The discipline of pastoral theology, in contrast, takes human suffering as it is 
experienced by individuals as a key starting point for theological reflection. Pastoral 
theologian Bonnie Miller-McLemore claims that pastoral theology attends to those 
situations where “human suffering evokes or calls for a religious response and sometimes 
at the point where a religious response is given and/or experienced.”83 In more recent 
writing on this subject, Miller-McLemore has stated pastoral theology’s attention to 
human need and suffering in even more concrete terms:  
Pastoral theologians study human behavior in the midst of Christian faith 
and the divine. But even as categories of the traditional doctrine of 
theological anthropology, foci such as suffering, lament, anger, violence, 
and care break convention. They embody graphic encounter with life 
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rather than the standard categories abstracted from it, such as body, soul, 
and mind or sin and salvation. We might call these loci of human angst 
and flourishing.
84
  
In these descriptions of pastoral theology, Miller-McLemore points to an understanding 
of the discipline that takes human need, loss, and suffering seriously, not only as foci for 
practices of pastoral care, but as critical junctures of experience which may challenge 
traditional theological ideas, and out of which new theological ideas may be generated. 
More specifically, throughout its history pastoral theology has utilized particular methods 
of analysis—including the use of psychology, individual case material, and sustained 
theological reflection—that not only describe what human suffering looks like, but that 
also provide key insights into human nature itself. Thus, one of the key characteristics of 
pastoral theology as a discipline is its ability to hold in tension the unique experience of 
specific persons, on the one hand, with deep reflection on human existence, on the other. 
Unlike congregational studies and leadership studies, which risk overlooking the 
particular shape of individual experiences, pastoral theology has the capacity to honor 
and learn from such experiences while placing them in larger psychological, cultural, and 
theological contexts. 
 
Pastoral Theology as Aiming Toward Transformed Practice 
 As I established above, congregational studies literature often does not attempt to 
make recommendations for improved pastoral practice, except in very limited ways. 
Leadership studies literature, in contrast, focuses heavily on concrete recommendations 
for pastoral practitioners. However, because these recommendations are usually not 
                                                          
84
 Miller-McLemore, "Also a Pastoral Theologian:  In Pursuit of Dynamic Theology (Or: Meditations from 
a Recalcitrant Heart)," 823, emphasis in original.  
57 
 
grounded in deep theological reflection, they can seem like simplistic “how-to” lists that 
are not fully integrated with important theoretical resources. Pastoral theology, on the 
other hand, uses scholarly resources within the social sciences and theology as categories 
for analyzing situations of lived experience, and then uses these categories as the ground 
for imagining improved pastoral practices. Indeed, pastoral theologians have long insisted 
that the discipline cannot be content with simply describing and reflecting on experiences 
of human need, but must also make the next step toward envisioning more effective ways 
of attending to such need.  
 For example, feminist writers have, for years, been pointing to transformed 
practice as a standard for pastoral theology. In her 1996 text Transforming Practice, 
Elaine Graham asserts that liberating praxis serves as a guiding norm for her vision of 
pastoral theology in a postmodern age.
85
 Similarly, in Liberating Faith Practices (1998), 
editors Denise Ackermann and Riet Bons-Storm claim that the essays in their volume 
begin with practice, engage in practical theological reflection, and then lead back into 
emancipatory praxis.
86
 In this same volume, Pamela Couture echoes the editors’ claim by 
insisting that pastoral theology cannot afford to utilize so many resources if it does not, in 
the end, become a vehicle for justice and love.
87
 And, in Feminist and Womanist Pastoral 
Theology (1999), Bonnie Miller-McLemore argues that a feminist approach to pastoral 
theology includes pastoral intent in addition to its revised correlational method, its use of 
psychological and cultural resources, its feminist positioning, and its appeal to power 
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analysis.
88
 In this way, Miller-McLemore suggests that pastoral theology’s critical 
analysis of situations of human suffering must ultimately lead to improved pastoral 
practices. All of these writers thus point to the element that I see as the core of progress 
in pastoral theology: more effective pastoral practices that attend adequately to human 
suffering, and that seek human flourishing and liberation for all. At its heart, then, 
pastoral theology is a normative discipline that describes both “the way things are” and 
“the way things should be.” 
 Pastoral theology is uniquely suited to address the problem of theological conflict 
within congregations because of its pairing of thick description with a turn to improved 
pastoral practice. Certain resources in congregational studies and in leadership studies 
approach each of these elements in helpful ways, but a pastoral theological approach has 
the potential to integrate both, while simultaneously engaging important theoretical 
concepts. Additionally, congregational and leadership studies literature neglects to offer 
keen attention to individual experience or sustained theological reflection on human 
being, both of which have become hallmarks of contemporary pastoral theology. For 
these reasons, I have chosen to situate my own work on congregational conflict firmly 
within the field of pastoral theology. In this dissertation, I seek not only to understand 
what happens when theological conflict erupts in a religious community, or why people 
behave as they do under those circumstances. Instead, I intend to go beyond description 
and explanation, and also offer pastoral theological understandings that can orient and 
guide more effective pastoral interventions. Thus, as a pastoral theological project, my 
research into congregational conflict includes close attention to human suffering, 
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theological reflection grounded in lived experience, and a rootedness in care and concern 
for all of God’s people.  
 
Limitations of Pastoral Theology 
 I have argued that because of its keen attention to context, suffering, and 
transformed practice, the discipline of pastoral theology stands well-equipped to address 
the problem of theological conflict within congregations, and to fill the gaps left by the 
congregational studies and leadership studies literature. However, in making this claim I 
am not suggesting that pastoral theology does not have limitations of its own. In fact, in 
what follows I argue that pastoral theology as a field has, in large part, neglected 
congregations both as sites of individual and communal suffering, and as a key context in 
which pastoral theological knowledge is generated. I will contend that, in light of this 
tendency, pastoral theology must now be more intentional about engaging the lived 
experience of congregations as a basis for sustained theological reflection. 
 This is not to say, however, that that pastoral theology has never been attentive to 
congregations or to the wider cultural context of pastoral care. Indeed, in Pastoral Care 
and Social Conflict (1995), co-editor Pamela D. Couture notes that the pastoral care 
movement in the United States was born at the turn of the twentieth century—a time of 
great social upheaval when people were wrestling with the realities of international 
conflict, needs for social reform, and the rise of the human sciences.
89
 As a result, this 
nascent field struggled to find ways to attend both to social issues and to individual 
problems. Couture explains that,  
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As pastoral care and counseling became a mature movement . . . the 
people in care and counseling whose identities were deeply formed by 
liberation movements struggled to keep one side of their efforts in social 
reform and one side in the need of the movement to legitimate itself 
according to the demands of technological society. These demands created 
within the movement a bifurcation of pastoral theology from social ethics, 
increasing specialization of pastoral counselors, a focus on individuals and 
families almost to the exclusion of groups and communities, and a loss of 
connections with local congregations.
90
 
The “bifurcation” that Couture describes emerged with particular clarity in the struggles 
that took place within pastoral theology during the 1950s and early 1960s regarding the 
appropriate role of congregations in pastoral care and counseling. Key pastoral 
theologians like Seward Hiltner and Wayne Oates insisted that the church remain the 
institutional ground in which all pastoral care and counseling ministries are rooted.
91
 
Meanwhile, other emerging figures in the field, such as Howard Clinebell and Carroll 
Wise, lobbied for the professionalization of pastoral counseling as a ministry related to, 
but not contained within, the church. Ultimately, this latter group won out with the 
establishment of the American Association of Pastoral Counseling in 1963, with 
Clinebell serving as its first president. From that point forward, as the field of pastoral 
theology developed, its emphasis on the individual counseling relationship grew ever 
stronger, with most pastoral theological texts focusing heavily on psychological 
frameworks and individual care. As a result, attention to the practices of congregations 
faded into the background. 
 This turn in the trajectory of pastoral theology’s development, and its consequent 
lack of attention to congregations, has thus become emblematic of modern pastoral 
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theology’s tendency to distance itself from institutionalized religion, and to focus instead 
on individual psychotherapeutic modalities. Pastoral theologian Rodney Hunter has 
reflected on this tendency in a 1998 article entitled “Religious Caregiving and Pedagogy 
in a Postmodern Context: Recovering Ecclesia.” In that article, Hunter writes,  
Pastoral care literature . . . often proceeds as if hurting individuals and families 
and our ministries for and with them were occurring in a public sphere unrelated 
to the ends, meanings, and structures of the church; our caring practices seem 
intended mainly to achieve psychological aims disconnected from the specific 
spiritual and moral meanings of institutional religion.
92
  
 
Hunter further explains that pastoral theology (particularly in its clinical form) “has 
always been wary of institutional claims and agendas that it fears will be imposed 
coercively on people,” and that for this reason, it is not “institutionally oriented.”93 In 
other words, pastoral theology’s critical stance toward the church was born of a desire to 
protect individuals from an institution that had, historically, proved capable of 
perpetrating egregious forms of injustice and oppression. In this sense, pastoral 
theology’s focus on the care of individual persons was a much needed corrective to the 
reigning pastoral models of the day.  
 As I have already established, however, the current religious and cultural contexts 
in which contemporary pastoral theology finds itself are rife with conflicts that are 
tearing communities of faith apart, and creating intense individual and communal 
suffering in the process. The realities of this situation call out for a renewed corrective to 
pastoral theology—one that more closely attends to the lived experiences of individuals 
within their ecclesial contexts. It is true that within the last two decades, pastoral theology 
has moved beyond its original focus on individual care to attend to larger social dynamics 
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like race, gender, and sexual orientation. However, it has often failed to offer sustained 
attention to the practices of congregations themselves as a source for pastoral theological 
knowledge.  
 Hunter further addresses the importance of religious institutions and membership 
in the body of Christ, claiming that  
religious institutions are important for the welfare of society and individuals. 
They socialize and enculturate people into particular worlds of experience, 
meaning, and value, thus generating an organizing sense of philosophic and 
moral orientation which is vital not only to society but to individual health and 
wellbeing . . . And from a theological perspective, in the mainstream of Christian 
tradition, faith is intimately connected with committed membership in sacred 
community; to believe is to belong, to be a member of the body of Christ as 
branches participate in the vine.
94
 
 
According to Hunter’s argument, then, religious communities are not simply a “given” 
with which pastoral theology must reluctantly contend, but rather a key element in the 
health and spiritual formation of individuals, which are central themes for pastoral 
theological reflection. For this reason, pastoral theology must re-focus its energies on the 
institutional forms of faith communities and the ways in which they contribute to or 
detract from human health and healing. Indeed, as Hunter puts it, “the creation of strong, 
durable religious communities and individuals within those communities should be two 
of the basic aims of practical theology in general and pastoral theology in particular.”95 
 Hunter’s claims highlight the tendency of modern pastoral theology to focus on 
the care of individuals and families, often to the neglect of faith communities and the 
particular ways in which they shape the care of their members. Yet, it should be noted 
that in recent years, pastoral theology has tried to correct this trend and to recapture the 
importance of congregational life that early pastoral theologians like Seward Hiltner and 
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Wayne Oates emphasized. In fact, in the early 1990s, the field of pastoral theology 
attempted to move away from its previous focus on psychology and individual pastoral 
relationships through the development of what has become known as the “communal 
contextual” paradigm. This phrase, first coined by John Patton in his 1993 text Pastoral 
Care in Context,
96
 refers to a new way of conceiving the work of pastoral care and 
counseling—not primarily as a clinical intervention by a psychologically trained pastor, 
but as a ministry of the entire faith community that attends closely to “the importance of 
cultural and political contexts shaping persons’ lives.”97 The communal contextual 
paradigm also includes a renewed recognition of the importance of ecclesial communities 
as places where individuals are nurtured in the life of faith and that provide the 
“normative themes” that shape the care offered in those communities.98  
 In the 2004 supplement to the Dictionary of Pastoral Care and Counseling 
(DPCC) entitled Redefining the Paradigms, editor Nancy J. Ramsay argues that along 
with the “intercultural” paradigm, the communal contextual paradigm represents one of 
the most important developments in the field of pastoral theology since the original 
publication of the DPCC in 1990. According to Ramsay, these paradigms are now 
“eclipsing” the more traditional clinical pastoral paradigm that predominated in the 
DPCC, and are guiding pastoral theology to a renewed focus on “ecclesial contexts that 
sustain and strengthen community practices of care.”99 This claim seems to be borne out 
by the fact that many pastoral theological texts published since the mid-1990s utilize the 
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communal contextual paradigm as a guiding metaphor, and critique pastoral theology’s 
historic tendency to rely too heavily on psychological resources and individual models of 
care.
100
 
 Even with this increasing recognition of the communal contextual paradigm, 
however, the question remains as to whether pastoral theology as a discipline has fully 
embraced its implications
101—particularly its emphasis on ecclesial communities as a key 
element in the creation of new theological ideas. Indeed, it has now been fifteen years 
since Rodney Hunter wrote the article referenced above, yet the academic discipline of 
pastoral theology still has not produced many resources that address the concerns he so 
convincingly named. This trend may be changing, however, since a few very recent texts 
have attempted to bring congregational experience back to the center of pastoral 
theological reflection.  
 For instance, Mary Clark Moschella’s Ethnography as a Pastoral Practice (2008) 
offers a concrete methodology for discovering the lived practices and wisdom of a 
congregation.
102
 In this text, Moschella asserts that “when conducted and shared as a 
form of pastoral practice, ethnography can enable religious leaders to hear the theological 
wisdom of the people, wisdom that is spoken right in the midst of the nitty-gritty 
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mundane realities of group life.”103 In making this claim, Moschella indirectly argues for 
the importance of congregations in the generation of theological ideas—ideas that come 
not only from the academic pastoral theologian, but also from the lived experiences of 
individuals within faith communities. Moschella’s approach is thoroughly pastoral 
theological in that she writes with pastoral intent; she envisions ethnography as a tool not 
only for describing and explaining the unique worlds of congregations, but as a way for 
“religious leaders to harness the power of social research to transform a group’s common 
life and its purposeful work in the world.”104 In this sense, Moschella’s text demonstrates 
the commitment to transformed practice that I have named as a hallmark of the pastoral 
theological discipline. Moschella’s use of congregational experience as a basis for 
sustained theological reflection, with the intent of improving practices of care, thus 
embodies the type of pastoral theological approach for which I argue in this dissertation. 
 Susan Dunlap’s Caring Cultures, published in 2009, represents another pastoral 
theological text that attempts to place congregational experience at the center of 
theological reflection.
105
 Utilizing many of the ethnographic methods proposed by 
Moschella, Dunlap conducted extended research studies of three different congregations 
in Durham, North Carolina—one Euro-American mainstream Protestant, one African-
American Pentecostal Holiness, and one Hispanic sub-congregation of a large Roman 
Catholic church. Dunlap’s study seeks to understand how each of these congregations 
cares for the sick; the author then uses the data gleaned from her research to identify each 
congregation’s “belief-practices,” which she defines as “units of assumptions and 
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behaviors that characterize these churches.”106 Following a thick description of these 
belief-practices, Dunlap interprets and critiques them as a means to construct, in the final 
chapter of the text, her own practical theology of care for the sick.  
 To do so, Dunlap first gives a “theological account of illness,” which includes 
reflection on such human realities as finitude, tragedy, and anxiety, as well as goodness, 
redemption, and courage.
107
 Based on this theological account, Dunlap turns to the task of 
describing her ideal vision of the ecclesia, or, as she puts it, “a church that evokes 
courage.”108 Dunlap argues that such a church is one that can, among other things, 
acknowledge human finitude, recognize social sin in the origins of many illnesses, and 
accept difference in its midst.
109
 In this way, Dunlap looks to the real, lived experience of 
congregations as a starting point for theological reflection, and then uses that reflection as 
the ground from which to imagine a normative vision of faith communities. Dunlap thus 
puts into practice the pastoral approach to congregational research commended by Mary 
Clark Moschella. Taken together, these two texts point to a reclaiming of congregational 
experience in ways that pastoral theologians have often talked about over the last fifteen 
years, but that contemporary pastoral theological texts have rarely undertaken.  
 Despite the encouraging new trend in pastoral theology represented by writers 
like Moschella and Dunlap, the resources addressing the specific issue of congregational 
conflict remain extremely limited. In fact, the only contemporary pastoral theological 
resources I could locate on this topic are two essays—one by Joretta Marshall, and one by 
Carl Schneider—contained within the edited volume Pastoral Care and Social Conflict. 
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Published in 1995, both of these essays follow the trajectory of the communal contextual 
paradigm in attending more closely to the situation of ecclesial communities, and both 
point to areas ripe for further pastoral theological research. For instance, Marshall’s essay 
discusses the broad phenomenon of “social stress” within congregations that can lead to 
intense communal conflict.
110
 Such stress can arise from the changing social and cultural 
circumstances of postmodernity in which many contemporary congregations find 
themselves, and can center on such diverse issues as inclusive language, sexual abuse, 
and changing understandings of human sexuality.  
 Marshall’s essay fits squarely into the communal contextual paradigm because it 
calls for “planned theological reflection, not merely techniques, to assist in managing the 
chaos, confusion, and pain of communities.”111 In other words, Marshall advocates for 
using congregational experiences of social stress as a basis for new theological reflection 
that can yield fertile insights for improved pastoral practice. Marshall further argues that 
“those engaged in congregational care need to continue to look beyond the clinical 
paradigm toward a more communal framework when constructing a framework for 
pastoral theology” because “personalized care” often risks “gloss[ing] over significant 
communal issues.”112 Perhaps most strikingly, Marshall echoes the struggle I have named 
as the central problem of this dissertation when she writes, “divergent groups within the 
congregation ought to wrestle with what it means to be participants in the same church 
and to maintain a common or communal vision in the midst of the conflicts of 
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diversity.”113 In these ways, Marshall’s essay identifies congregational conflict as a key 
issue to which future pastoral theological work needs to attend as it moves toward a 
communal contextual vision of pastoral care and counseling. 
 Written in a similar vein, Carl Schneider’s essay focuses less on the broad 
implications of social change and conflict for pastoral theology, and more on a particular 
modality that he believes could prove extremely useful to pastoral care in its approach to 
congregational discord—namely, conflict mediation.114 Schneider notes that in the past, 
pastoral care and counseling relied so heavily on psychotherapeutic approaches because 
they offered very practical tools that pastors could use to cope with the problems 
presented by their parishioners. In the case of conflict, however, Schneider argues that 
pastoral care has failed to develop a “praxis” that could be easily adapted into ecclesial 
contexts. According to Schneider, conflict mediation—defined as “a method of helping 
people [e]nd disputes through the use of a neutral third party, who assists them in 
reaching a voluntary agreement”115—holds the potential to offer just such a praxis in 
which congregational leaders could be trained during their theological education. Such an 
approach, Schneider contends, merits much more exploration within the field of pastoral 
theology because it can provide “a competence in working with social conflict that it has 
not had in the therapeutic pastoral tradition.”116 
 As I have noted, both of these essays address the specific issue of congregational 
conflict, and both do so within the parameters of the communal contextual paradigm by 
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focusing on the lived practices of communities of faith. These essays give the impression 
of having been on the cutting edge of pastoral theology at the time they were written 
because they clearly embody the emerging paradigm, and because they point to an area of 
interest—namely, conflict within congregations—that was ripe for further pastoral 
theological exploration. To my knowledge, however, no subsequent resources in the field 
have used these essays or the topic they address as a basis for further investigation into 
the unique forms of individual and communal suffering that arise in the midst of 
congregational discord. While pastoral theologians like Moschella and Dunlap have 
begun to utilize the lived experience of congregations as grounds for theological 
reflection, no one has done so with the specific problem of congregational conflict in 
mind. My project, which focuses on congregations as both the starting point and intended 
audience for pastoral theology, helps address this lacuna in the field.  
 
A New Lens 
 In the preceding sections I have described the strengths and limitations of 
congregational studies, leadership studies, and pastoral theology for addressing the 
problem of congregational conflict. I have argued that each of these disciplines offers 
tools that illuminate particular aspects of this problem. In the remainder of this chapter, I 
present a way of combining the most useful aspects of these disciplines to create a new 
lens for approaching congregational conflict. This lens offers a more complex 
understanding of the role of anxiety in conflict, and how such anxiety is connected to 
individuals' and communities' sense of identity. The strength of such an approach lies in 
its ability to use the theme of anxiety to unite the three major disciplinary frameworks I 
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will be using in this project: psychodynamic psychology, social psychology, and 
theology.
117
 More specifically, I argue that within the context of faith communities, 
encounters with difference frequently produce perceived threats to identity, both 
individual and social. These perceived threats raise levels of anxiety, and can cause 
conflict to develop or to become more intense. Likewise, increased levels of anxiety can 
cause individuals to become more rigid in their expressions of identity, which also 
contributes to the development of conflict. Conversely, conflict itself can also cause 
increased levels of anxiety to develop, creating a perpetual cycle marked by intractable 
patterns of reactivity.  
 Within such a theoretical framework, one might assume that the goal for 
congregations should be the elimination of conflict. However, such a goal is patently 
unrealistic, and, I will later argue, theologically undesirable. Instead, I wish to reframe 
the goal as reducing (not eliminating) levels of chronic anxiety in congregations so that 
they can learn how to engage in healthy conflict. I will argue that conflict itself is neither 
negative nor positive; it simply represents the differing aims and desires of human beings. 
How conflict is engaged, however, may take on extremely positive or negative aspects. 
Conflict may, as in the case of Grace UCC, become extremely destructive and lead to the 
fragmentation of an entire church community. Or it may, as in the case of First UMC, 
become an opportunity for church members to communicate more effectively, resulting 
in an increased sense of cohesion and fellowship. 
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 To make my argument, I take particular aspects of the literature I have reviewed 
in this chapter and carry them forward as elements of a complex lens through which to 
view the issue of congregational conflict. From leadership resources drawing on family 
systems theory, I use the concept of anxiety as an overarching framework in which to 
understand the ways in which conflict emerges and develops within congregations. 
Family systems theory's description of anxiety as a generalized sense of threat contributes 
to this investigation because it helps to explain what is really at stake for individuals and 
groups in the midst of conflict: namely, their sense of self or identity. Later in the project, 
I utilize other resources from psychodynamic psychology and social psychology to 
describe some of the specific forms reactions to this threat may take. I also use anxiety as 
a springboard from which to reflect theologically about why difference feels so 
threatening, and how faith communities might develop practices to approach difference 
more hospitably. In this way, the notion of anxiety as a key social force that affects both 
individuals and communities serves as a common thread, connecting various means of 
understanding what happens (and what should happen) when congregations discover 
significant diversity in their midst. 
 From congregational studies, I take the importance of thick description and 
integrate it into my work through the inclusion of two detailed case studies of 
congregations that dealt with conflicts around specific theological issues. These case 
studies reveal the particular shape of conflict within individual communities of faith, and 
to move away from generic discussions of “church conflict” to a more focused analysis 
on the ways in which conflict develops in specific places and at specific times. From 
general leadership studies literature, I also take the importance of recommendations for 
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improved practice. As a pastoral theologian, I take seriously the challenge to create new 
thinking that ultimately leads to transformed practice and to the reduction of suffering. 
Texts in the field of leadership studies offer a helpful reminder that even as we delve into 
the depths of theory and theology, we must always keep the practical relevance of our 
theorizing in mind—even if we do not fully develop both parts of this endeavor at the 
same time.
118
 Because of my deep concern for the ways in which my thoughts in this 
dissertation might play out in practice, I return to the realm of practice in Chapter Seven 
and offer some concrete recommendations for communities of faith that are facing 
protracted conflicts. 
 Finally, throughout this dissertation I use a pastoral theological approach to unite 
these individual elements, and to create a new and more complex way of understanding 
congregational conflict. The discipline of pastoral theology is well-suited to bring these 
disparate pieces together because of its keen attention to context, individual needs and 
suffering, and practice. While congregational studies offers tools for creating rich 
descriptions of congregational contexts, and leadership studies emphasizes the 
importance of practice, pastoral theology fills out the picture with its historic 
commitment to deep, theological reflection on the nature of human being in the midst of 
suffering. This kind of reflection is missing from most texts in congregational studies and 
leadership studies, yet it is just the kind of reflection that a problem like congregational 
conflict demands. Only this kind of deep reflection can create a greater understanding of 
this problem and form the foundation for any attempts to improve congregational 
                                                          
118
 During a conversation at the dissertation defense of my colleague, Dr. Katharine Lassiter, I was 
reminded of the importance of making adequate space for theorizing without rushing too quickly to 
practical steps. Indeed, as I have noted, this is my major critique of leadership studies literature written for 
churches—it tends to jump quickly to practical recommendations without doing much of the hard work of 
engaging social scientific theory or theology. 
73 
 
practice. For my own reflection in this dissertation, I engage three key disciplines that all 
take as their subject the nature of human existence: psychodynamic psychology, social 
psychology, and theology. In the following chapter, I explain exactly how I intend to 
bring these disciplines into conversation with one another around the central problem of 
congregational conflict. It is to the articulation of that methodology that I now turn. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
METHODOLOGY: DIALOGUE, CORRELATION, AND CASE STUDY 
 
As a pastoral theologian, I draw on two key methodological elements standard 
within the field: the critical correlation of social scientific and theological resources, and 
the use of lived experience as a starting point for reflection. In this chapter I expand on 
this pastoral theological approach, first by explaining how I envision the relationship 
between religion and science in my own work, and by describing the revised correlational 
method I intend to employ. I then offer a depiction of the specific disciplines I will be 
using in my analysis and the ways in which they each contribute to the understanding of 
congregational conflict. Finally, I describe the particular case study method that forms the 
foundation of this dissertation, and that makes this a uniquely pastoral theological project.  
 
The Relationship Between Religion and Science: An Argument for Dialogue 
 The task of relating science with religion, or, more broadly, human knowledge 
with divine revelation, is one with which theology has wrestled for many years. Pastoral 
theology is no exception; in fact, from its very founding, our discipline has struggled to 
discern the proper relationship between contemporary sources of human knowledge 
(particularly psychology and other human sciences) and the resources of the Christian 
tradition. In 1984, Charles Gerkin, one of the key early figures in pastoral theology, 
identified this struggle as the “root question” facing the field, asking, “How can pastoral 
counseling be at the same time both an authentically theological and a scientifically 
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psychological discipline?”119 Over the years, individual pastoral theologians have reached 
different conclusions in response to this question. Such responses have ranged from 
Barthian approaches that emphasize the primacy of Christian resources over secular 
sciences, to critical correlational approaches that envision a more equitable and mutual 
interchange between sources of knowledge. Although the discipline of pastoral theology 
as a whole tends to favor this latter method, each pastoral theologian must still decide just 
how to relate the various resources of religion and science with one another in the search 
for new theological knowledge. In this section, I use Ian Barbour’s typology to describe 
four different models of relating religion with science, and I argue that the “dialogue” 
option proves the most useful for pastoral theology in general, and for my project in 
particular.  
  In his 1997 text entitled Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary 
Issues, physicist and religion scholar Ian Barbour delineates four basic models for 
relating religion with science: conflict, independence, integration, and dialogue.
120
 In the 
first of these, the conflict model, either religion or science sees itself as the only viable 
means to knowledge; only science or religion can legitimately encompass truth about the 
universe. At the same time, however, the conflict model also blurs the distinctions 
between religion and science by collapsing one into the other, thus destroying the 
disciplinary integrity of both. A key example of a conflict model is the work of Sigmund 
Freud, who argued that religion can be reduced to psychological understandings of wish-
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fulfillment.
121
 Another example of this model from the opposite perspective would be 
fundamentalist Christians who believe in Creation science. Such Christians deny the 
scientific evidence relating to evolution and the age of the earth, and instead posit their 
own understandings of these matters based on the biblical record. In both of these cases, 
the domain of the opposing discipline is taken over and explained in terms that it would 
not recognize, and only one discipline remains as epistemologically viable. 
Like the conflict model, the independence model sees religion and science as 
completely separate spheres. While it recognizes the distinction between religion and 
science, the independence model poses an equally serious problem in terms of relating 
the two disciplines Instead of reducing one discipline to the other, as in the conflict 
model, the independence model simply posits religion and science as operating on 
parallel tracks, without anything of value to say to one another. Barbour offers Protestant 
neo-orthodoxy, illustrated through the theology of Karl Barth, as a compelling example 
of the independence model: within this view, “Science is based on human observation 
and reason, while theology is based on divine revelation.”122 Religion and science thus 
represent separate languages that refer to two totally distinct realms of experience. As 
Barbour points out, however, this model fails to acknowledge the basic fact that science 
and religion are reflecting on the same reality: “both [religious and scientific] 
communities make cognitive claims about realities beyond the human world. We cannot 
remain content with a plurality of unrelated languages if they are languages about the 
same world.”123  
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The integration model is characterized by the belief that “some sort of integration 
is possible between the content of theology and the content of science.”124 Within this 
model, over-arching metaphysical frameworks (such as process philosophy or natural 
theology, for example) are established in an attempt to unite religion and science under 
one conceptual umbrella, and thus to smooth out the apparent contradictions between 
them. This model proves especially interesting within the current discussion, because at 
first glance, it seems like the preferred approach for those who wish to bring science and 
religion closer together. After all, the integration model seeks all-encompassing 
conceptual systems that could unite both scientific and religious truths. Yet, such an 
approach actually replicates some of the key problems with the conflict model—namely, 
obscuring the boundaries between what are actually very different approaches to 
understanding the universe. Admittedly, the conflict model blurs these boundaries in a 
much more harsh way by dismissing the rival discipline altogether. Still, the integration 
model yields the same result by trying to synthesize the two disciplines into something 
larger and qualitatively different. When such an approach is taken, important differences 
between religion and science can be lost, and areas in which these disciplines sharply 
disagree may be prematurely smoothed over or even erased. 
The three models I have discussed thus far—conflict, independence, and 
integration—either fail to acknowledge the significant differences between religion and 
science, or neglect the legitimate areas of common ground that these disciplines share. In 
contrast, the dialogue model represents a middle ground between these options because it 
urges conversation between religious and scientific disciplines without necessarily 
advocating their synthesis. As a result, the dialogue model is able to maintain a clear 
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vision of science and religion as distinct fields of study with their own unique 
frameworks and commitments. This is not to say that one should over-emphasize the 
differences between religion and science, or imply that they are completely 
incommensurate languages. As I have already shown, this is the primary problem with 
the independence model. In fact, the dialogue model does acknowledge key 
commonalities between religion and science—such as the fact that both seek to explore 
mysteries at the limits of human experience, and both use methods that are theory-laden. 
Because of these similarities, the dialogue model argues that religion and science do have 
common ground on which to build fruitful conversation. Within the dialogue model, then, 
“science and religion are separate and related”; they are distinct entities that reflect on a 
shared reality.
125
  
In her teaching on this subject, pastoral theologian Bonnie Miller-McLemore 
explains that her interest in relating religion and science (particularly psychology) lies in 
seeing how they can tell us more about the human person, but also how they can correct 
each other when one starts to wander into the other’s territory.126 This possibility for 
mutual critique between religion and science proves the most important reason for 
adopting the dialogue model in my own work: without a “separate and related” 
understanding of the two disciplines, the opportunity for such interaction disappears. As 
Miller-McLemore has put it, “The goal of dialogue is neither integration nor triumph of 
science over religion (or vice versa) but clear articulation of boundaries, corrections, and 
intersections.”127 For a deeply interdisciplinary field like pastoral theology, finding ways 
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to foster this kind of enriching and challenging conversation between religion and science 
remains crucial. Such a dialogical approach makes it possible to acknowledge the deep 
truths contained within different disciplines, while at the same time recognizing that no 
individual field can get everything right all on its own.  
This recognition takes on particular significance in light of the historical 
trajectory of pastoral theology. In the early decades of the field, psychology served as the 
primary resource for reflection on human experience, with theology playing a much less 
important, and often subordinate, role.
128
 During those years, pastoral theology tended 
toward an uncritical adoption of psychological frameworks, without leaving room for 
theology to critique the human sciences or to reflect on human existence in its own 
language. Subsequent critiques of this trend have led pastoral theology to adopt a much 
less lopsided approach, and to move much closer to a true dialogical model. Still, the 
memory of the field’s history serves as a potent reminder of the importance of 
maintaining the integrity of both religion and science, even while seeking to relate them 
to one another in useful ways. 
  As a project in pastoral theology, my dissertation relies heavily on the dialogue 
model because it allows for diverse fields of both scientific and religious study to 
converse with one another, with the aim of producing enriched understandings of the 
human person. In this project I bring the disciplines of psychology, social psychology, 
and theology together in a mutually enriching conversation that respects the boundaries 
of each field, but that also seeks to discover how these different approaches might 
enhance, affirm, or correct one another. Just as the broad categories of religion and 
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science refer to the same shared world, the specific disciplines that I engage in this 
project all reflect on the nature of human being. For this reason, I argue that they have 
much to say to one another, and that a dialogical model provides the most effective way 
for them to do so.  
 
Theology and the Social Sciences: A Critical Correlational Approach 
In a 2010 address to the Society for Pastoral Theology, Miller-McLemore noted 
that although most scholars in pastoral theology “presume a correlational approach with 
liberationist adjustments,” one is nonetheless “hard pressed to point to a book or article 
devoted to explaining and defending it.”129 Miller-McLemore’s point is well-taken; thus, 
as I describe my own pastoral theological method, I begin by explaining how I 
understand and intend to utilize the critical correlational approach that has become so 
widely accepted in the field. Because this method is chiefly concerned with the proper 
relationship between religion and the sciences, I will also show how the critical 
correlational method represents an enactment of the dialogue model for which I argued 
above. 
The critical correlational method—also known as revised critical correlation—has 
its roots in the correlational method pioneered by Paul Tillich. Tillich was a German-born 
systematic theologian who wrote primarily in the aftermath of World War II and the 
accompanying rise of the Nazi regime. In his theology, Tillich responds to what he saw 
as the overwhelming sense of meaninglessness and despair that emerged during that 
period of history as people were forced to contemplate the depths of human evil and 
suffering. According to Tillich, the basic human problem is that of existential anxiety, 
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which is brought on by awareness of our own finitude. This awareness of finitude, or 
“threat to being” as Tillich called it, causes us anxiety at our core—anxiety that cannot be 
relieved, Tillich argued, until we become willing to take anxiety into our own being and 
trust that God will provide us with the courage needed to face our finitude.
130
  
  This description of the core theological problem Tillich addressed highlights an 
important aspect of his work: namely, his recognition of human experience as one of two 
crucial poles in theology. Tillich believed that good theology reflects on the existential 
questions raised by human experience (what Tillich usually called the “situation”), and 
searches for theological answers to those questions in the resources of Scripture and 
tradition (what Tillich called the “message.”)131 In this way, Tillich established a method 
of correlation between existential human questions and the answers provided by the 
Gospel, between situation and message. This method can clearly be seen in Tillich’s 
description of humanity’s core problem: the question of existential anxiety is answered 
with the theological response of courage.  
In his 1975 text Blessed Rage for Order, contemporary theologian David Tracy 
argues persuasively for a revised model of Tillich’s correlational method—one that 
would allow genuine two-way engagement between Christian resources and human 
experience, which also includes the realm of scientific knowledge. Indeed, Tracy’s 
primary critique of Tillich’s original model is that Tillich only imagined human 
experience as a resource for raising questions which could then be answered by the 
Christian tradition. As Tracy notes,  
The fact is that Tillich’s method does not call for a critical correlation of 
the results of one’s investigations of the “situation” and the “message.” 
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Rather, his method affirms the need for a correlation of the “questions” 
expressed in the “situation” with the “answers” provided by the Christian 
“message” . . . Tillich’s implicit commitment to two sources and his 
explicit insistence upon a theological ideal which transcends both 
naturalism and supernaturalism could be successfully executed only by a 
method which develops critical criteria for correlating the questions and 
the answers found in both the “situation” and the “message.” Any method 
which attempts less than that cannot really be called a method of 
correlation.
132
 
Instead of the one-way correlation Tillich originally envisioned, Tracy argues for what he 
calls a “revisionist” model, founded upon a firm commitment to “the dramatic 
confrontation, the mutual illuminations and corrections, the possible basic reconciliation 
between the principal values, cognitive claims, and existential faiths of both a 
reinterpreted post-modern consciousness and a reinterpreted Christianity.”133 Tracy thus 
insists that a correlational method moving only in one direction from human experience 
toward the Christian tradition proves inadequate. Instead, Tracy calls for a theological 
method that allows both contemporary human experience (including science) and the 
resources of the Christian faith to converse with one another in a dialogical fashion, 
thereby creating the possibility for each side of the equation to illumine, enrich, and 
correct the other. 
Since Tracy proposed his revisionist model in 1975, many pastoral and practical 
theologians have adopted this approach to bringing religion and the sciences (particularly 
psychology) into dialogue with one another. Within the work of such theologians, 
religion and the human sciences are brought together in a mutually critical conversation, 
with each discipline informing and correcting the other as both seek a deeper 
understanding of the human person. As Miller-McLemore has noted, however, this 
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critical correlational method has not remained unchanged over the decades since Blessed 
Rage for Order was published. Instead, contemporary approaches including liberation, 
postmodern, and practice theory have “modified but not completely negated” the critical 
correlational method that Tracy originally commended.
134
 Indeed, Miller-McLemore 
argues that “In postmodernity, the lines between the two previously distinct poles of 
experience and tradition have become increasingly blurred. There is no common human 
experience or generic Christian fact.”135 In other words, from a postmodern point of view, 
it is no longer possible to talk, as Tracy did, about universal human experiences or a 
general Christianity without recognizing the myriad and profound ways in which human 
beings and their religious traditions are shaped by unique contexts and cultures. In this 
sense, critical correlation now refers to the mutually critical dialogue between specific 
human experiences and specific understandings of religious tradition. 
Additionally, contemporary liberationists who employ critical correlation assert 
that such a method must privilege the voices of those who have previously been excluded 
from the conversation, with the aim of attending to and improving their plight. This 
emphasis on liberation points to another reason why critical correlation has remained 
central to pastoral theological method: as Miller-McLemore puts it, “The greater goal of 
correlation when used by pastoral and practical theologians is not just articulation of 
boundaries, corrections, and intersections but also the enhancement of pastoral action.”136 
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Thus, as I argued in the previous chapter, part of what sets pastoral theological 
methodology apart is its insistence on transformed practice as one of its central goals.  
Miller-McLemore makes this goal clear in the four-fold methodological 
framework that she describes in her 1998 article, “The Subject and Practice of Pastoral 
Theology.”137 In this essay, she argues that religion is studied in pastoral theology at the 
point where human suffering calls out for a religious response, and sometimes at the 
point where such a response is given. Thus, in reflecting on a situation of suffering, one 
begins with a thick description of the experience in question, and then turns to 
comparative analysis in dialogue with psychological and cultural resources. The third 
step, evaluation, involves weighing these resources against the truths of theology and the 
demands of practice, and the fourth step, decision, leads to action with transformative 
intent. In this way, a critical correlational method, as it is envisioned by contemporary 
pastoral theologians like Miller-McLemore, provides an important place for psychology 
(as well as other human sciences) in determining pastoral action. At the same time, 
though, such a method retains theology and practical wisdom as key criteria for 
evaluating the sciences themselves, thereby establishing a two-way interaction that can 
produce new theological knowledge and enhanced praxis. 
 Given its emphasis on the mutual interaction between religion and science, the 
critical correlational method proves a natural fit for a project like mine, which aims to 
bring diverse disciplines together in genuine dialogue around the topic of theological 
conflict in congregations. As I have shown, critical correlation promotes a reciprocal, 
critical engagement of various resources with one another, ideally producing a rich, 
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textured conversation rather than a simple monologue. By embracing such a dialogical 
method in my research, I try to insure that important truths contained in differing subject 
areas are not obscured by one another, nor made to fit seamlessly into a predetermined 
pattern of agreement. Instead, critical correlation creates the possibility for religion and 
science to converse with and correct each other, all the while maintaining their distinct 
identities, methods, and languages. 
 
Conversation Partners: Psychodynamic Psychology, Social Psychology, & Theology 
In this project I argue that both the social sciences and theology make important, 
but distinct, contributions to the exploration of congregational conflict. The strength of 
the social sciences lie in their in-depth understandings of how individuals and groups 
operate, and of the ways in which human interactions become disordered and damaged. 
These disciplines, however, provide only limited accounts of optimal individual and 
communal functioning. In contrast, theology attends both to human brokenness and 
healing, typically speaking of the former in general terms like “the human condition,” but 
offering a robust vision of the latter through prescriptive recommendations. By bringing 
these resources together in my project, I hope to gain new insight into the particular 
forms of human brokenness and healing, both individual and communal, that may emerge 
in situations of congregational conflict. 
Given my review in Chapter One of existing literature related to church conflict, 
the most obvious choice for a psychological framework for this project would seem to be 
family systems theory. After all, I have already stated that I plan to use the FST concept 
of anxiety as an organizing principle throughout the dissertation. However, in thinking 
86 
 
about which social scientific tools to use in this investigation of congregational conflict, I 
have decided not to use family systems theory as my primary psychological resource, and 
I make this choice for two reasons. First, as I showed in Chapter One, much work has 
already been done utilizing FST to analyze congregational conflict. Because this is the 
case, it seems important to address this issue by using other psychological resources in 
new ways. Second, I have already argued that FST-related leadership studies literature 
focuses so much on system dynamics that the shape of individual experience is lost. As a 
pastoral theologian, it is important to me to emphasize the “loci of human angst and 
flourishing”138 as they appear in the lived experience of individual persons. However, it is 
also crucial to acknowledge FST's major contribution in this area—namely, to 
acknowledge group dynamics as a key way of understanding what happens in religious 
communities. In order, then, to maintain a simultaneous focus on both individual and 
communal patterns in congregations, I have chosen to use psychodynamic psychology 
and social psychology as two primary analytic tools in this dissertation. As I have noted 
above, these social scientific disciplines often do a better job than theology of describing 
human brokenness in all its detail. In the chapters that follow, I argue that these 
disciplines reveal something specific about human behavior: namely, the ways in which 
individuals and groups react to the anxiety raised by difference, and, consequently, the 
complex ways in which such anxiety is related to notions of identity. 
The discipline of psychodynamic psychology offers resources that illuminate the 
possible intrapsychic and interpersonal dynamics of theological disagreement, and what 
role anxiety plays in these dynamics. Two psychological ideas prove especially relevant 
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here: the concepts of “splitting” and “projection,” terms frequently used to describe 
defensive psychological processes; and Kohut’s notion of the “alter ego” or “twinship” 
need. Object relations theory’s description of the defense of splitting paints a vivid 
picture of how human beings react when they can no longer tolerate the anxiety produced 
by a negative aspect of their own or others' selves. Similarly, Kohut’s concept of the alter 
ego need, or the need for a psychological twin, points to the powerful human need to 
belong to a group of “similar others.”139 By bringing these two particular aspects of 
psychodynamic theory together, I highlight two factors that frequently emerge within 
cases of theological disagreement: a sense of threat to one’s selfhood, and the strong 
drive to reaffirm sameness with others in the group. I show that these factors are, in 
themselves, normal features of psychological development. However, I also argue that 
the ways in which individuals often respond to these features—through defensive 
splitting and projection, or through a return to archaic needs for psychological twinship—
can create or intensify conflict within a congregational setting.  
  While psychodynamic psychology provides helpful insights into the problem under 
consideration here, my study of social psychology has also convinced me that intrapsychic 
and interpersonal explanations often do not tell the whole story of conflict. I argue that in 
order to address the intergroup dimensions of theological conflict, additional tools are 
needed—ones that explicitly acknowledge the ways in which individuals are shaped by group 
memberships. Social identity theory and self-categorization theory, in particular, prove 
helpful in exploring the social dimensions of group conflict. According to these theories, the 
realm of social interaction creates a space in which social comparison is always taking place. 
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This process not only involves individuals categorizing others, but also categorizing 
themselves as alike or different from others. These theories further argue that social identities 
are no less “real” than individual identities, and must always be taken into account in any 
kind of social interaction. The relationship between individual and collective identity is thus 
dialectical, with each element both reflecting and influencing the other.   
Building on these core theoretical concepts, I argue that the process of social identity 
formation is a normal part of human behavior within communities. Some of the behaviors 
produced through this process, however, seem to contribute to the creation or intensification 
of conflict in congregations. Such behaviors include contentious tactics and group 
polarization, both of which tend to increase the sense of intractability in a given conflict, and 
to make resolution of the conflict more difficult to achieve. I argue that, like splitting and 
projection or strong needs for sameness, these behaviors are driven by the anxiety produced 
by differences that threaten individuals' and groups' perception of social identity.  
  As I have claimed above, the discipline of theology intentionally attends to the 
nature of human healing in ways that psychodynamic psychology and social psychology 
do not. Although practical theologian Don Browning has argued convincingly that the 
social sciences contain implicit moral frameworks and visions of the “good life,” the fact 
remains that theology names its own frameworks and visions much more explicitly 
through religious language.
140
 In earlier eras, theology tended to name the element of 
human brokenness with phrases like “original sin” or “fallenness,” which often carried a 
moralistic tone. Contemporary theology has developed compelling alternatives to such 
ideas, such as Edward Farley’s understanding of human existence as deeply shaped by 
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the realities of alterity and alienation. These realities, Farley argues, produce the “tragic” 
dimension of life that characterizes the interaction between all human beings.
141
 Within 
this view, then, human brokenness has less to do with moral transgression and more to do 
with the imperfect and fragile nature of human beings. 
In addition to this unique approach to human brokenness, theology also holds out 
a different understanding of healing than is found in the social sciences. While 
psychodynamic psychology and social psychology may offer suggestions as to the nature 
of mental health or typical psychological functioning, theology envisions human healing 
as a holistic experience that includes body, mind, and spirit. Furthermore, theology makes 
prescriptive recommendations not only for how individuals should live, but for how 
human beings should live together. In this sense, theology functions as an explicitly 
normative discipline that does not shy away from the “oughts” of human life. This 
normative dimension emerges especially clearly in theological treatments of vulnerability 
and hospitality, which offer prescriptive guidelines for how people should behave toward 
one another in communal settings. As a result, such reflections will prove useful for 
exploring how the theological commitments of the Christian community can lead toward 
healing in situations of conflict, even while acknowledging that conflict itself is an 
inevitable fact of human existence.  
 As I have shown above, psychodynamic psychology and social psychology 
provide unique insights into the nature of human brokenness—the former in terms of its 
keen attention to needs for sameness, and the latter in terms of its understanding of group 
identities and dynamics. For its part, theology offers different understandings of human 
                                                          
141
 Edward Farley, Good and Evil:  Interpreting a Human Condition (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), 
29. 
90 
 
brokenness that focus less on individual or interpersonal problems and more on the tragic 
nature of human existence itself. Theology also makes important contributions to this 
conversation through its vision of human healing as both an individual and a communal 
reality, and through its prescriptive recommendations for bringing such healing to pass. 
Holding together these diverse disciplines—with their different understandings of human 
brokenness and healing—opens the possibility for a mutually enriching and challenging 
dialogue, for which I have already argued in this chapter. Such a critical correlational 
approach, I contend, creates the potential for the kind of in-depth conversations that can 
produce new understandings of human beings and the world in which we live.  
 
Reflecting on Lived Experience: Case Study as Pastoral Theological Method 
 In a 2004 essay entitled, “Contemporary Pastoral Theology: A Wider Vision for 
the Practice of Love,” pastoral theologian Nancy Ramsay writes, “In contrast to 
systematic theology or ethics, pastoral theology . . . begins with the concrete particularity 
of experience and intends a useful response for that situation.”142 Ramsay’s observation 
highlights the key element of lived experience that has always been a hallmark of pastoral 
theology. In fact, reflection on human needs and struggles is a core component of pastoral 
theological method, which distinguishes it from other theological approaches. Since this 
is a pastoral theological project addressing theological conflict in congregations, it seems 
especially important to include and reflect on the lived experience of communities of 
faith struggling with such conflict. One way that I have done this is to provide, in Chapter 
One, quantitative data from congregational studies that paint a detailed picture of the 
pervasiveness of conflict in congregations. Yet this kind of data only allows us to see the 
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larger shape of these congregations, rather than the ways in which individual members 
may be affected by conflict. Indeed, as I showed in Chapter One, pastoral theology is not 
only concerned with the broad outlines of communal problems like racism, poverty, or 
conflict, but also seeks to reflect deeply on the individual needs and suffering that arise in 
the context of such problems. 
 This concern with hearing the unique voice of the suffering person emerged very 
early in the development of pastoral theology as a field, perhaps most strikingly in the 
work of Anton Boisen. Boisen was a chaplain and psychologist of religion who had 
himself suffered serious mental breakdowns, and had experienced powerful spiritual 
awakenings in the midst of his mental illness. Boisen insisted that in order to understand 
the relationship between religious experience and psychological health, pastoral care 
practitioners must learn to study “living human documents,” and reflect on the needs and 
suffering expressed there. As Boisen wrote in The Exploration of the Inner World, “I 
have sought to begin not with the ready-made formulations contained in books but with 
the living human documents and with actual social conditions in all their complexity.”143  
As a means to helping his students study living human documents more 
effectively, Boisen pioneered a clinical case study method designed to help religious 
practitioners understand individual persons in all of their depth and complexity. Building 
on case study methods that had long been in use in the fields of law and medicine, Boisen 
developed detailed case study forms that theological students could use to gather relevant 
information about their patients.
144
 These forms included questions about a patient’s 
social and religious background, personal history, particular problems and struggles, and 
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theological understandings. As pastoral theologian Glenn Asquith has noted, the “basic 
goal” of Boisen’s method was to “study and understand religious experience as well as to 
stimulate the formation of the student's own theology. As part of his case discussions, 
Boisen prepared many questions which forced students to think theologically about 
human experience.”145 Thus, in developing and using this case study method with his 
students, Boisen revolutionized theological education and the field of pastoral theology 
by drawing attention to the needs and struggles of individual human persons in their 
unique particularity. 
 As the field of pastoral theology progressed, it continued to emphasize the 
importance of “living human documents” and of reflecting on their needs through the 
inclusion of case material in pastoral theological texts. However, more recent critiques of 
this methodology have pointed out that traditional pastoral theology was done from the 
point of view of the pastor alone. In other words, cases were typically presented from the 
practitioner’s perspective without fully including the voices of those receiving care. 
Furthermore, within pastoral theology there has been a growing awareness that within 
communities of faith, the clergy person is not the only practitioner of care; instead, all 
members of the community are called to care for one another in a variety of ways.  
 Concerns about the apparent hierarchy of the traditional approach eventually led 
to the emergence of the “communal contextual paradigm” for pastoral care, which 
continues to be developed in pastoral theological writing today. Pastoral theologian John 
Patton notes that this paradigm “broadens the clinical pastoral’s focus beyond the clergy 
to include the caring community of clergy and laity. It also calls attention to contextual 
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factors affecting both the message of care and those bringing it and receiving it.”146 The 
emerging communal-contextual paradigm thus emphasizes not only the importance of 
including voices other than that of the ordained person, but also of allowing those voices 
to shape the formulation of new pastoral theological ideas. In addition, this model retains 
pastoral theology’s focus on individual needs and suffering, but insists that these aspects 
be placed within the context of real, living communities of faith and the particular social 
and cultural frameworks in which they are situated. 
As a pastoral theologian, it is important to me to insure that my exploration of 
theological conflict remains intimately connected with the actual life and practices of 
specific communities of faith. Thus, building on the tenets of the communal-contextual 
paradigm, I ground this project in the lived experiences of two specific congregations. I 
do so through the inclusion of two congregational case studies, one based on my own 
experience with a particular faith community, and one based in the experience of another 
congregation. As I noted above, the case study method in pastoral theology was born of a 
desire to understand human persons and their struggles more fully. However, the 
approach I am using with these congregations differs somewhat from the traditional 
model pioneered by Boisen and subsequently developed by the discipline of pastoral 
theology. Instead of focusing on a single individual, or on the pastoral relationship 
between a practitioner and a particular parishioner or client, I am instead trying to tell the 
stories of two faith communities and their struggles with theological conflict. While I 
want to depict the reality of these congregations as a whole, I am also determined not to 
lose the voices of individual persons and their experiences of the conflict that occurred in 
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their congregations. For this reason, I have adopted a qualitative approach to the case 
studies. 
Social scientists Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln describe qualitative 
approaches to research as placing “an emphasis on the qualities of entities and on 
processes and meanings that are not experimentally examined or measured (if measured 
at all) in terms of quantity, amount, intensity, or frequency.”147 In contrast to quantitative 
approaches, which tend to gather large amounts of numerical data and seek causal 
relationships between variables, qualitative research aims to discover “how social 
experience is created and given meaning.”148 Qualitative researchers thus study subjects 
“in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms 
of the meaning people bring to them.”149 Yet, such a focus on patterns and socially 
constructed meanings does not mean that qualitative research is unconcerned with 
empiricism. In fact, qualitative researchers rely heavily on empirical tools—including 
such diverse elements as interviews, participant observation, interpretation of cultural 
texts and productions, analysis of artifacts, participatory inquiry, and focus groups—in 
their quest to provide a rich description of the lives and practices of individuals and 
institutions.  
From the vast array of available qualitative research approaches, I have chosen 
the case study as my primary means for investigating theological conflict within 
congregations. As I have already noted, case studies have been a mainstay of pastoral 
theology since its inception. My use of this methodology, however, moves beyond 
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pastoral theology’s traditional focus on the relationship between a single practitioner and 
care-receiver. Instead, I operate within a broader qualitative understanding that defines a 
case study as a “strategy of inquiry” relying on the specific methodological tools of 
interviewing, observing, and analyzing documents.
150
 Such an approach enables me, as a 
researcher, to provide a fuller description of the congregations I studied than would have 
been possible if I simply told their stories exclusively from my own perspective.  
Of the three tools that most clearly characterize case study method—interviews, 
observation, and text analysis—I have relied most heavily on semi-structured personal 
interviews because they provide me with the most direct access to the voices of the 
people within the congregations I wished to explore.
151
 In other words, I have chosen the 
case study approach because of the detail and particularity it allows me to see about each 
of the congregations I have studied. Indeed, as educational psychologist Robert E. Stake 
has asserted, “What all should be said about a single case is quite different from what 
should be said about all cases. Each case has important atypical features, happenings, 
relationships, and situations.”152 Thus, the key value of examining the individual case lies 
in its ability to communicate something unique about the issue under investigation. Stake 
also notes, however, that “Case researchers seek both what is common and what is 
particular about the case”; in any given case study, then, qualitative researchers are 
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looking not only for what is unique, but also for those elements that may connect the case 
with other comparable situations.
153
 
This is not to say that conclusions drawn from a particular case study may be 
generalized to all similar cases in all places and times. Even so, case studies—like other 
qualitative approaches—do have the potential, through their unique particularity, to 
reveal connections and meanings that might otherwise remain hidden. As practical 
theologians John Swinton and Harriet Mowat argue,  
While the findings of qualitative research studies may not be immediately 
transferable to other contexts, there is a sense in which qualitative research 
should resonate with the experiences of others in similar circumstances . . . 
Qualitative research can therefore claim a degree of transferability insofar 
as it often raises issues and offers insights which reach beyond the 
particularity of the situation. It frequently (arguably always), creates a 
resonance with people outside of the immediate situation who are 
experiencing phenomena which are not identical, but hold enough 
similarity to create a potentially transformative resonance.
154
 
The case study thus functions both to reveal the distinctive features of a specific context, 
and to point toward similarities with other contexts that may yield important insights for 
building new theory and developing more effective practices. 
 In fact, the desire to create more effective pastoral practices remains central to 
pastoral theology’s use of the case study method. As pastoral theologian Emmanuel 
Lartey explains, the “learning cycle for liberative pastoral praxis” always begins with 
concrete experience, which is grounded in the “lived experience of living people.”155 This 
particular experience then provides the starting point for social and cultural analysis, 
theological analysis, critical analysis of the faith tradition itself, and generation of a 
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pastoral response. The response, in turn, is taken back into the realm of experience and 
tested out in practice. In this way, pastoral practices are developed in a never-ending 
cycle of reflection and action. Although one concrete experience may form the starting 
point for reflection, it is assumed that such an experience has the potential—once it is 
engaged through a liberative learning cycle—to provide important insights that may be 
applicable in a variety of situations. 
Despite the potential usefulness of the case study approach I have outlined above, 
my research is also limited in particular ways that I must acknowledge as I move forward 
in my analysis. My choice to utilize case studies (rather than full ethnographies, for 
example) limits the breadth and depth of what I can know about these congregations. 
Instead, I have chosen to focus on the particular issue of theological conflict within these 
communities of faith, and have utilized the case studies to uncover some of the dynamics 
present within such conflicts. I argue that this approach provides a “snapshot” of what 
was happening within these congregations during a particular period of time. Examining 
the case studies of these two congregations side by side provides important insights about 
theological conflict that may prove useful to others in similar settings. Furthermore, these 
case studies, presented in Chapter Three, will form the basis for analysis from 
psychological, social psychological, and theological perspectives later in the dissertation. 
It is important to note here that any conclusions drawn from these case studies are 
necessarily partial and heuristic—both because of the relatively small number of 
interviews I conducted, and because a congregation is a living, changing organism that 
can never be fully captured in a few pages of text. Even with these limitations, I maintain 
that including the voices of congregation members in this study remains preferable to any 
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approach that attempts to theorize about congregational conflict without talking to 
persons who have experienced it.  
Finally, like all social research, my findings will also be limited by my own social 
location, and the ways in which my own perspective determines what I will discover. 
Postmodern approaches to research recognize that all inquiry is done from a particular 
vantage point; one simply cannot stand “outside” a culture or group in order to observe it 
objectively. As Moschella notes, all research “is influenced by the researcher’s attitudes 
and inclinations and by his or her motivations for doing the research . . . Ethnographic 
narratives depict the researcher’s perceptions of the picture, and not merely the picture 
itself.”156 For this reason, qualitative accounts or explanations of phenomena “are better 
understood as narratives than as scientific treatises . . . However rigorous, these accounts 
are neither definitive nor fixed; they are interpretations.”157 Because I am aware of the 
fact that my own perspective necessarily colors my interpretation of these case studies, I 
do my best throughout this project to maintain a stance of reflexivity, which is “the 
process of critical self-reflection carried out by the researcher throughout the research 
process that enables her to monitor and respond to her contributions to the 
proceedings.”158  
One unique aspect of my research that invites further reflection is the fact that I 
served as a pastor for one of the congregations featured in the case studies. In one sense, 
this gives me an advantage in my ability to describe that congregation in rich detail, and 
to provide accounts of events that are supplemented by my own memory of them. At the 
same time, my personal involvement with Grace UCC necessarily colors the way I 
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remember and depict what happened there, even though I have done my best to offer a 
fair representation of the community. One of the ways I tried to insure that my own 
perspective did not dominate this case study was to conduct interviews with other 
members of the parish. In this way, I hoped to balance my account of events with the 
perceptions of others who were there. Yet, even this approach was complicated by the 
fact that the interviewees were also my former parishioners. That is, I recognize that in 
asking these individuals to share their reflections with me, I may have inadvertently 
influenced the ways in which they chose to respond. Again, I tried to address this issue by 
selecting interviewees that I believed would be candid and honest, but I fully 
acknowledge how difficult it could be to share “negative” perspectives with a leader with 
whom one has shared a respectful relationship. 
At First UMC, my role as a researcher was quite different. Because I had no 
previous relationship with the congregation, the interviewees there would have felt little 
pressure to respond in any particular way to the questions I was asking them. However, 
these research subjects were originally recommended to me by the First UMC pastors as 
persons who had served on the worship committee and who would likely be willing to 
speak with me. The interviewees knew this, so it is possible that some of them may have 
perceived me as being allied with their pastors in a way that may have influenced how 
they responded to the interview questions. I attempted to mitigate any such influence by 
assuring each interviewee that his or her responses would be kept confidential and would 
be de-identified, and that no specific details of the interviews would be shared directly 
with the First UMC staff. Nevertheless, as I move forward with my analysis of these case 
studies, I do so recognizing that any researcher—no matter her previous relationship or 
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lack thereof with her subjects—will, in some way, influence the responses she receives. 
By taking this self-reflexive position in regards to my research, and by noting the 
limitations of my conclusions, I hope to do justice to the stories of the congregations I 
have studied, while at the same time acknowledging the ways in which I have contributed 
to the ultimate shape the stories take in this project.  
  
Gathering Data for the Case Studies 
For the research I conducted in both congregations, I began by applying for 
official approval from Vanderbilt University’s Institutional Review Board, which I 
received in May of 2010. Obtaining institutional approval for my research served two 
important purposes: first, it provided additional protection for all research participants to 
insure that their confidentiality and other rights were respected throughout the process. 
Secondly, it created a relationship of accountability between me as a researcher and my 
sponsoring institution, so that ethical standards of research could be maintained at all 
times. Once I had received institutional approval, I set about requesting and receiving 
permission from each church’s leaders to conduct focused interviews with individuals 
who indicated a willingness to talk with me about their experience of conflict in their 
congregations. When this step was completed, I was ready to contact the research 
participants to set up individual interviews. 
 Because Grace UCC is located in a different region of the country, I took a ten-
day research trip during June 2010 for the sole purpose of conducting interviews there. 
During that time period I interviewed fourteen individuals about their experience of the 
conflict that took place in their congregation during 2005. The interview participants 
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ranged in age from 21 to 79, and included eight women and six men. At First UMC, 
which is located much closer to where I currently live, I conducted interviews 
intermittently over a longer period, stretching from June through December 2010. This 
second group of research subjects ranged in age from 48 to 79, and included six women 
and six men. In both congregations, I conducted interviews in a semi-structured format; 
this means that I had several guiding questions that I had formulated prior to the 
interviews, but I did not necessarily ask them exactly the same way each time. 
Additionally, if the conversation went into areas that seemed useful for my research, I felt 
free to follow them even if they were not specifically geared toward answering a specific 
question I had posed.
159
 All interviews were recorded, and then transcribed without 
identifying markers so as to insure the confidentiality of all research participants. Once I 
had completed all of the interviews, I set about writing the case studies themselves. I 
envision these case studies as “thick descriptions” of the conflicts that emerged in each 
faith community, constructed both from the interview data and from other information 
that I gleaned from various sources such as church documents
160
, informal conversations, 
and my own knowledge about the congregations in question. 
 
Introduction to the Cases 
In his now-classic 1991 text, A Fundamental Practical Theology: Descriptive and 
Strategic Proposals, practical theologian Don Browning writes, “For some years I had 
thought that writers in pastoral care (or poimenics) needed to spend more time studying 
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letters or newsletter articles) about what was occurring in the midst of the conflict, and church profiles that 
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what pastors and congregations actually do in addition to making proposals about what 
they ought to do.”161 Building on this conviction, Browning grounds his text in extended 
descriptions of three different congregations in different denominations and geographical 
settings, and uses them as a basis from which to analyze particular aspects of their 
congregational practice. Browning takes this approach to illustrate the practical wisdom 
contained within communities of faith; consequently, his work serves as a helpful model 
for what I hope to do in this project, for two reasons. First, in A Fundamental Practical 
Theology Browning brings communities of faith to the center of theological reflection. As 
I noted in Chapter One, one of the key critiques of pastoral theology over the past few 
decades has been its tendency to focus only on individual care, thus overlooking the 
importance of the care-giving systems within congregations, and their potential to 
generate fertile theological material in the form of practical wisdom.
162
 In utilizing 
extended case studies of congregational practices, Browning makes a significant step 
toward recognizing the community of faith as a crucial context for the production of new 
theological ideas.  
More broadly, in his analysis of congregational practices, Browning helps to re-
focus attention on lived experience and its key role as a starting place for pastoral 
theological method. In so doing, Browning demonstrates that all theology begins with 
practice. He argues,  
We never really move from theory to practice even when it seems we do. Theory 
is always embedded in practice. When theory seems to stand alone it is only 
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Pastoral Care and Counseling (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1992); Hunter, "Religious Caregiving and 
Pedagogy in a Postmodern Context:  Recovering Ecclesia."; McClure. 
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because we have abstracted it from its practical context. We have become 
mentally blind to the practical activities that both precede and follow it.
163
  
Although the centrality of the practical context has long been a hallmark of pastoral 
theology, Browning’s attention to the experience and practices of a congregation lends 
freshness and breadth to what has always been one of our discipline’s greatest 
strengths—namely, its attention to human life through thick description164 and its 
investigation of lived religious experience within the wider study of religion.
165
 In this 
way, Browning exemplifies an approach to pastoral theological method that I find crucial 
to my own work: beginning with practice, moving to theories and resources that one can 
utilize and critique in conversation with practice, and finally implementing the insights of 
reflection into renewed approaches to practice. 
 As a means of implementing this approach, I turn now to the presentation of my 
own case studies, which will form the foundation from which I will analyze two 
congregations’ practices of conflict resolution. Like Browning, I have chosen faith 
communities from different denominations located in separate geographical areas; I have 
also selected churches that struggled with conflicts around diverse types of theological 
issues. The first congregation, Grace United Church of Christ (Grace UCC), endured a 
fiercely divisive dispute centered on issues of gay marriage, homosexuality, and, 
ultimately, denominational affiliation. The second, First United Methodist Church (First 
UMC), faced a conflict regarding changes to its worship structure. These two locations, 
Grace UCC and First UMC, confronted issues that are quite distinct theologically, and 
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the ensuing conflicts differed greatly in terms of their intensity and their long-term effects 
on the respective congregations. Recalling the definition of “serious conflict” introduced 
in Chapter One—i.e., conflict in which some church members left, a leader left, or money 
was withheld—we could say that Grace UCC suffered a serious conflict, whereas First 
UMC’s conflict proved much milder (though no less important.)  
Despite these key differences, I contend that examining these two cases side by 
side allows common themes to emerge—themes that point the way toward a deeper 
understanding of the sources and dynamics of theological conflict within congregations. 
As I wrote and reflected on the case studies, I noticed that many of these themes center 
on notions of selfhood or identity, and that they all relate in important ways to the 
concept of anxiety. This made me wonder whether anxiety might be an important (if not 
the most important) underground source from which conflict springs. Given the 
prevalence of themes of selfhood and identity in the case studies, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that conflict erupts and/or becomes more intense when individuals and groups 
experience anxiety produced by encounters with difference. However, before I can delve 
more deeply into exploring the themes that link these case studies, I must first tell the 
stories of these two communities of faith, and of the conflicts that became part of their 
life together—a task I undertake in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
CASE STUDIES OF CONGREGATIONS IN CONFLICT 
 
Grace United Church of Christ 
The congregation I am calling Grace United Church of Christ (Grace UCC) is a 
church I served as an associate pastor for several years prior to my return to graduate 
school. The congregation is located in the town of “Fairview,”166 near the eastern 
seaboard of the United States. Fairview is a semi-rural community, made up of active 
downtown and commercial districts, as well as large areas devoted to farming and other 
agricultural pursuits. At the time that the conflict erupted at Grace UCC in 2005, the town 
had a population of roughly 79,000 people, and the most recent census information 
available estimates that approximately 40% of Fairview’s population is African-
American.
167
 The particular area of Fairview in which Grace UCC is located is called 
“Wood Hollow”; Wood Hollow has a quaint, village feel, and features a very small 
cluster of businesses including a gas station, hair salon, restaurant, and the local post 
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office.
168
 In fact, Fairview residents who live within the borders of Wood Hollow proper 
cannot receive mail directly at their homes, but must go to the post office to retrieve it. 
As a result, the village post office has become an important social hub at which many 
residents—including many members of Grace UCC—see one another and catch up on 
local news. In Wood Hollow, one has the sense that everyone knows one another, even 
though the village is situated within a much larger town. 
Grace UCC is located just up the road from the heart of Wood Hollow, roughly a 
mile from the post office. It is a white, clapboard structure, similar to many other rural 
churches built in the same era. Though the building is much larger now than at the time 
of its initial construction in 1872, the sanctuary features the original stained glass 
memorial windows which were added in 1893—an aspect of the physical plant of which 
members are very proud.
169
 Indeed, one Grace UCC member once boasted to me that 
these windows are “the prettiest in all of Fairview.” The sanctuary of Grace UCC has 
pews arranged in a large half-circle facing the altar, over which sits a large, stained-glass 
depiction of a scene from the life of Jesus. Other stained-glass windows line the entire 
right side and back wall of the sanctuary, while the left side is open to the fellowship hall 
in order to accommodate overflow crowds. 
The stained glass windows comprise only one aspect of Grace UCC’s historic 
feel. Directly behind the church building is a large cemetery, in which members of the 
church and other members of the community are buried. The fact that Grace UCC’s 
website features a “Cemetery” link on its home page illustrates its importance in the life 
and identity of the congregation. The cemetery grounds are lovingly maintained by Grace 
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UCC’s cemetery committee—a committee that has seen its own share of internal power 
struggles over the years as members have disagreed about the most appropriate ways to 
honor the memories of those interred at Grace UCC. Many of the gravestones in the 
cemetery date back to the turn of the century or even earlier, as the cemetery was 
established in 1882. In fact, many times during my years at Grace UCC I encountered 
people who had shown up at the church wishing to examine headstones, cemetery 
records, or the stained glass windows as part of their genealogical research.
170
 
At the time that I began serving Grace UCC in 2002, the congregation was 
comprised mainly of working class or professional individuals, rather than farmers or 
agricultural workers. However, a significant number of people within the congregation 
still owned large portions of land, some of which they paid others to farm for them. Many 
of the families at Grace UCC had lived on the same land for generations, which gave the 
church a very close-knit feel. In fact, many members said that they liked how Grace UCC 
made them feel like part of a “family”; indeed, a great many people in our congregation 
were actually related to one another through blood or marriage. Yet, even with the deep 
family interconnections at Grace UCC, the community around the church was changing 
rapidly. In 2010 it was estimated that the population of Fairview had grown by 32.8% 
since the 2000 census.
171
 More and more families were moving into Fairview, and often 
these families had little or no connection to the land, or to the traditional Fairview of 
years past. 
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 To its credit, Grace UCC had made steps toward recognizing the ways in which 
their community was changing. When they hired their current pastor, “Bill Turner,”172 in 
1993, they deliberately sought someone that they thought could help their church to 
grow. Rev. Turner turned out to be quite successful in this regard; for the first ten years 
of his tenure at Grace UCC, the church had grown significantly in membership. Many of 
the new members were young families with children, which boosted the church’s youth 
and Christian education programs, and revitalized the congregation as a whole. Due to 
this influx of new members, Grace UCC hired me as its first full-time associate pastor in 
2002. Although by 2003 the number of church members had reached a plateau, Grace 
UCC still seemed to be a healthy, thriving church, active in its surrounding community, 
and poised for further growth into the future. 
 Indeed, everything seemed to be going quite well for Grace UCC. That changed 
in the summer of 2005, when the General Synod of the United Church of Christ (Grace 
UCC’s parent denomination) passed a resolution supporting equal marriage rights for 
same-sex couples. While the members of Grace UCC had previously seemed quite 
uninterested in the national decisions of the UCC, this resolution caught their attention 
and, for many of them, sparked outrage and disgust. However, Rev. Turner and I were 
not fully aware of these strong feelings until the night of the summer quarterly business 
meeting, when a large group of angry parishioners voiced their displeasure with the 
passage of the equal marriage resolution. This group was composed primarily of 
members of one particular Sunday School class which, I later learned, had spent the three 
weeks prior to this meeting complaining about the resolution and discussing strategies for 
airing their grievances to the wider congregation. Thus, by the time these parishioners 
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arrived at the meeting, they had already built up a great deal of emotional investment in 
this issue, and were determined to do something about it. 
Although the discussion in the meeting proved heated, it seemed at first that the 
disgruntled individuals might be satisfied with voicing their disagreement through a letter 
to the president of the denomination. However, as the debate continued, participants 
became increasingly volatile in their emotional expression, and more aggressive in their 
demands. “Barry Wingate,”173 a well-known professional who had been a member of 
Grace UCC for several years, provided one particularly striking example of this. In the 
course of the discussion that night, Barry stated that he had several gay friends and found 
them to be “nice people”; yet, he remained convinced that their lifestyle was abhorrent to 
God. By the time he finished speaking, Barry was red-faced and literally yelling at the 
assembly about how “God’s law” is clear in regards to homosexuality. At one point, he 
asserted that the Bible recommends executing those who engage in homosexual acts.  
As the rhetoric of the meeting rose in intensity, Barry and others who agreed with 
him became more and more critical of the UCC. At the height of this emotionally charged 
discussion, one very vocal member—”Peter Vance”174—made a motion that the 
congregation sever all ties with the denomination. Peter, and others who shared his 
perspective, said they had never realized that the UCC stood for such liberal theological 
and political values, and that they could not in good conscience remain part of such an 
institution. Rev. Turner requested that Peter amend his motion to allow two months for 
the congregation to discuss the issues more fully before taking a vote. Peter agreed, and 
the vote was set for late September. At the end of the meeting, Rev. Turner and I voiced 
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support for our parishioners’ right to express their views, but also reminded the group 
that due to our denominational commitments, we could no longer serve the congregation 
if it chose to disassociate from the UCC. 
  During the two-month period between this meeting and the actual vote, the 
division between the two opposing “sides” of this issue grew wider. On one side—which 
I will call the “complaining group”175—were Peter Vance, Barry Wingate, and most of 
the members of their Sunday School class, as well as other members of the congregation 
who felt that the UCC was too liberal to continue associating with it. On the other side—
the “defending group”—were Rev. Turner, myself, and a significant number of other 
parishioners, who felt that leaving the UCC would prove highly detrimental to the 
congregation. In the weeks prior to the vote, both groups engaged in a variety of 
strategies aimed at making sure that their own viewpoint would garner the most votes: 
calling inactive members and encouraging them to vote a particular way; engaging in 
letter-writing campaigns aimed at the entire congregation; and publicly calling into 
question the values and intentions of opposing group members. All of these tactics were 
designed to further each group’s cause, and to insure victory on the day of the vote.  
  In the midst of this contentious atmosphere, Rev. Turner and I tried to provide 
opportunities for conversation about the issue of homosexuality. Unfortunately, this 
vision for peaceful, productive conversation between church members was never 
realized, but instead mirrored the conflict that was already taking place behind the scenes. 
In fact, the “dialogue” that we worked so hard to create often dissolved into angry 
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exchanges in which people accused each other of being “un-Christian” or of ignoring 
Scriptural mandates. Indeed, from the time this conflict first emerged at the summer 
business meeting, members on both sides of the issue appealed to religious tradition and 
Scripture as a means of justifying their own positions. As I noted above, Barry used 
Scripture as evidence for his understanding of homosexuality as a lifestyle abhorrent to 
God. Likewise, on more than one occasion individuals quoted Leviticus 18:22 as proof 
that the General Synod’s support for gay marriage, and the denomination’s support for 
gay rights in general, goes against Scriptural mandates.
176
  
In contrast, those who wished to remain in the UCC, and particularly those who 
personally agreed with the General Synod resolution, emphasized how their approach to 
Scripture differed from those who wished to disassociate. I recall very clearly a 
congregational meeting that Rev. Turner and I organized after worship one Sunday, for 
the purpose of fostering conversation about the issues at stake. “Noelle Faulkner”177, an 
avid supporter of the denomination—at least in part because of its stance on gay rights 
issues—stood up and stated that when she reads the Bible, she places more importance on 
some parts than others, and even chooses to disregard some parts as no longer culturally 
relevant. As soon as Noelle spoke these words, people around the room uttered audible 
gasps. Clearly, some members of the congregation were shocked by the idea that anyone 
would admit emphasizing some parts of the Bible while ignoring others.  
Rev. Turner and I had hoped that these meetings would provide an opportunity for our 
church members to listen to and learn from one another. In effect, though, the meetings 
we held seemed to do little more than uncover deep theological disagreements that were 
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already present within the congregation, without pointing the way toward bringing 
differing viewpoints together. In fact, over time, Rev. Turner and I actually became a 
focus of the conflict itself. For example, some of the parishioners who wished to leave 
the UCC turned their anger directly onto us, perhaps because we represented the 
denomination in bodily form. Early in the conflict, these parishioners roundly criticized 
me in particular, because I had served as a delegate to the General Synod and had not (in 
their view) accurately represented the church’s feelings about gay marriage through my 
vote.
178
 Others in this group openly questioned why Rev. Turner did not preach against 
homosexuality from the pulpit. Additionally, at one of the after-church discussion 
meetings, a woman stood up and asked Rev. Turner and me to state publicly whether or 
not we believed homosexuality was a sin. When we declined to do as she asked, she 
became angry and declared that she and her family would not stay in a church where the 
pastors would not publicly condemn homosexuality. 
Those who believed that remaining in the UCC was the right course of action 
(even if they did not agree with gay marriage) became quite defensive of Rev. Turner and 
me, and felt deeply offended by what they perceived as the other group’s disrespect for 
the congregation’s pastoral leadership. “Charles,”179 who was serving in a position of 
leadership at the time of the conflict, recalled that some of those advocating 
disassociation from the denomination “did say some real ugly things about our pastor, 
and maybe even you. And I think that’s wrong.” “Tom,”180 a long-time member of the 
congregation, remembered events in a similar way:  
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I felt that the pastor was publicly attacked by some in not a kind way. It was 
demanded that he say how he felt about certain things and that, and that is not . . . 
I mean, they were trying to back him into a corner and make him say things that 
could then be held against him. I didn’t think that tactic was fair. 
Several of the other people I interviewed from Grace UCC echoed Charles and Tom’s 
sentiments, and stated that part of the reason they felt so strongly about staying in the 
denomination was because they wished to keep the church’s pastoral leadership in place. 
For them, getting out of the UCC simply was not an option if it meant that Rev. Turner 
and I would have to leave. 
These complex and growing tensions ultimately produced an extremely polarized 
situation: by the time of the vote, many individuals with opposing perspectives had 
stopped speaking to one another. Then, when the results were announced, those who 
perceived themselves as “the losers” immediately transferred their membership to other 
churches. In the end, the congregation chose to stay in the United Church of Christ, but at 
the cost of some sixty members who believed that an essential tenet of their faith had 
been ignored. For a church that, at the time, claimed an active membership of about 250 
persons, this exodus of nearly 25% of its core participants proved a crushing blow—
especially since most of the people who left had been members at Grace UCC for many 
years, and were deeply rooted in the community. Many of those who remained at Grace 
UCC felt torn between their conviction that the congregation had made the right decision, 
and their intense grief about the damage done to their relationships with friends, 
neighbors, and even family members because of this conflict.  
In fact, in 2008, when Grace UCC created a congregational profile for the purpose 
of hiring a new associate pastor, and was asked to name the “most challenging event” in 
the last three years of the church’s life, the search committee wrote the following:  
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July 2005. After the General Synod Recommendation for marriage 
equality, there were many Church members seeking to and encouraging 
other church members to leave the UCC. This caused great stress and 
turmoil within our congregation. A breakdown in communications and 
intolerance among members developed leading to a church split. This lead 
[sic] to a called church conference and vote resulting in the church staying 
with the UCC, but with the loss of 60+ members.
181
  
The division and relational rupture described here by the search committee also went 
beyond the bounds of the congregation and extended into the wider community life of 
Fairview. As would be expected, those who chose to leave Grace UCC following the vote 
remained active in a variety of community causes, as did those who chose to stay. This 
meant that people who had formerly shared close relationships as fellow church members 
were encountering each other in the community, often with little sense of how to relate to 
one another following the conflict. Although several of the Grace UCC members I 
interviewed stated that their interactions with former members in the community were 
always cordial, others shared that people who had been their close friends at Grace UCC 
would barely speak to them when they saw them at community events. As a result, 
leadership and participation in some of these community causes suffered because former 
Grace UCC members on opposite sides of the conflict were reluctant to work together 
any more. To this day, many of these friendships and community relationships remain 
broken. 
From a technical standpoint, the conflict at Grace UCC was about denominational 
affiliation; the question on the ballot was whether or not the church should remain in the 
United Church of Christ. Yet, as this case study shows, several different concerns were 
actually at issue within the conflict at Grace UCC. First, what might be called the 
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“presenting issue,” was the topic of gay marriage raised by the General Synod’s 
resolution. This was the issue about which the members of the complaining group were 
so upset, and that they initially came to the summer business meeting determined to 
address. Closely related to the specific issue of gay marriage was the general notion of 
homosexuality. I make this distinction because, while the conflict at Grace UCC 
originally erupted in response to a resolution supporting gay marriage rights, the 
discourse within the congregation quickly broadened to include arguments about 
homosexuality more generally.  
I should note that very few people at Grace UCC (including those who wished to 
stay in the denomination) actually supported the particular Synod resolution of 2005, or 
gay marriage in general. In fact, in public discussions at Grace UCC, many members of 
the defending group stated openly that they disagreed with gay marriage as a legal and 
social policy. As I have shown, however, the focus at the original business meeting 
shifted almost immediately away from gay marriage, and toward homosexuality more 
broadly. As it did, the accompanying emotions in the room seemed to grow stronger, 
especially on the part of those who disagreed so vehemently with the Synod resolution. 
Many of these individuals felt that the UCC represented values so liberal that they simply 
could not embrace them. This contributed to yet another issue within the conflict at Grace 
UCC: namely, tensions surrounding the pastoral leaders. For those who wished to leave 
the denomination, the loyalty that Rev. Turner and I shared toward the UCC seemed to 
mark us as “liberals” who stood for the very same values that troubled them so deeply.  
As I have mentioned, many of those who advocated for staying in the UCC also 
disapproved of gay marriage, and/or had conflicted feelings about homosexuality in 
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general. Yet, the parishioners in this defending group firmly believed that to disassociate 
from the UCC over this issue would prove destructive for the congregation in the long 
run. For these congregants, the loss of pastoral leadership and of the overall supporting 
structure of the denomination seemed too costly to risk, even if they personally believed 
gay marriage or homosexuality was wrong. It seemed that many in this group arrived at 
their position primarily out of loyalty to Rev. Turner and me, and to the congregation as a 
whole, and not so much out of devotion to the United Church of Christ itself. Thus, while 
the congregation ultimately elected to remain part of the UCC, it did so in the midst of a 
complex web of tensions surrounding not only gay marriage, but broader issues of human 
sexuality, scriptural interpretation, pastoral leadership, and denominational identity. 
 
First United Methodist Church 
As I began to think about my research for this project, I became increasingly 
convinced that telling only the story of Grace UCC would be inadequate to address the 
topic of conflict in congregations. I have argued that there is great value in examining the 
lived experiences of faith communities in all their concreteness; yet, Grace UCC 
represents only one particular church and its approach to conflict. Furthermore, my 
personal involvement at Grace UCC means that I necessarily bring a biased perspective 
to the events that occurred there, though I have attempted to represent the church and its 
members as fairly as possible. I concluded that in order to add some nuance to my study, 
I would need to include the story of at least one other congregation that had experienced 
conflict in its life together and would be willing to share its experience with me.  
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Identifying such a congregation proved challenging, since many churches that 
have experienced intense conflict are reluctant to talk about it, especially with an 
outsider. During the time that I was looking for a second research site, I happened to meet 
a local clergy person who provides consultations to churches in conflict and helps to train 
their leaders in conflict management techniques. This person put me in touch with the 
pastors at First UMC, with whom he had recently consulted. First UMC’s pastors—”Bob 
Fisher” and “Carol Stewart”182—agreed to meet with me, and gave their permission for 
me to do research at First UMC. Revs. Fisher and Stewart then contacted members of the 
worship committee and explained that I would be conducting interviews for my research, 
and encouraged them to participate. Prior to my first meeting with Revs. Fisher and 
Stewart, I had never visited First UMC, nor was I acquainted with anyone there. In this 
sense, I was a true outsider, and had to learn everything about First UMC from its written 
documents and from interviewing its pastors and members. 
The first time I turned onto the shady street that leads to First United Methodist 
Church, I immediately noticed the large spire that rises above the trees in the surrounding 
neighborhood. The spire is grandly traditional, pointing skyward as a reminder of the 
awe-inspiring, transcendent God worshipped within the 500-seat sanctuary below. 
Indeed, several of the parishioners I interviewed described First UMC’s sanctuary as 
“high church,” given the size and layout of the space. The sanctuary is long and narrow, 
with multi-colored stained glass windows that stretch all the way up to the high vaulted 
ceiling. The flooring throughout the sanctuary is ceramic tile in green and earth tones, 
except for an area at the front that features dark green carpeting. Twenty-five double 
rows of pews, all facing forward, flank the center aisle, which leads to the chancel. 
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Separated from the pews by a kneeling rail, the chancel is a raised platform that supports 
the main pulpit on the right side, and the lectern on the left. Due to the height of the 
chancel, both the pulpit and the lectern seem to loom over the sanctuary. In addition to 
being raised, the chancel is also deep; behind the pulpit and lectern are two choir lofts, as 
well as a grand piano and pipe organ. At the very back of the chancel, in a recessed 
alcove, sits the altar, on which the communion elements would typically be consecrated. 
The altar is round, and a large cross hangs from the top of the alcove over the altar. Given 
its position at the back of the chancel, it seems likely that worshippers in the back rows 
would have difficulty even seeing the altar on a communion Sunday.  
Across the courtyard from the main sanctuary sits a much more humble structure. 
From the outside, you might not even know that the modest building houses a worship 
space. Inside is a 240-seat chapel, markedly different from the main sanctuary in almost 
every way. Where the sanctuary is grand and spacious, the chapel has a much more 
intimate feel. The altar area is nearly on the same level as the pews, and very little 
distance separates the chancel from the worshippers. Instead of a raised pulpit or lectern, 
the chapel features a very small podium, placed not on the chancel, but on the floor just 
beyond the front pews. On one side of the chancel is a large display of candles; on the 
other, an electronic keyboard, microphones, and a drum set. Above the candles is a large 
screen, with a high-tech projector mounted to the ceiling in front of it. Two decorative 
banners depicting the communion loaf and cup, respectively, hang from the front wall 
above the musical instruments. The chapel boasts the same beautiful stained glass 
windows as the sanctuary, but here they are smaller and more understated. 
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These depictions of the physical worship spaces at First United Methodist Church 
are crucial to understanding the nature of the conflict that occurred there in 2009, 
because, as this case study will show, they vividly illustrate the varying theological 
understandings of worship held by congregation members. The conflict between these 
perspectives began in earnest when, in 2008, the church’s administrative board issued a 
directive to reduce the number of Sunday morning worship services from three to two. 
On the surface, such a change might appear relatively minor within the wider context of a 
congregation’s life. However, my research revealed that individuals’ feelings about their 
particular services were deeply-rooted, and were tied closely to their understanding of 
how God relates to human beings in worship. 
In talking with the pastors at First UMC, I learned that the seeds of this conflict 
had been planted many years before. First UMC was organized in 1950 in an area called 
“Forestdale,”183 located in a medium-sized city in the Southeastern region of the United 
States. According to the booklet that First UMC produced for its “jubilee” year in 2000, 
the founding of this congregation occurred when “God put it into the hearts of some 
thirteen families” to start a Methodist church in Forestdale, which, at that time, was 
beginning to grow rapidly in population.
184
 By 1953, First UMC had nearly 200 
members; amazingly, just ten years later, it had over 1100. Because of the exponential 
growth it experienced in its early years, First UMC had to hold multiple worship services 
to accommodate its members. During the 1960’s and 1970’s, First UMC continued to 
expand in size – both in terms of membership and physical space. By 1977, the 
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congregation had 2150 members, a budget of $355,000, and had added educational 
facilities and an administrative wing to its physical plant.
185
 At that time, First UMC 
continued to hold two Sunday morning services in the sanctuary to accommodate its 
members—one at 8:30 and one at 11:00.  
Beginning in the early 1980’s, the membership of First UMC began to decline 
gradually. By 1991, the church had just under 1400 members—quite a drop from its peak 
in the late 1970’s. Numerically speaking, there was no longer such a pressing need for 
multiple services on Sunday morning; however, because both services had been going on 
for so long, they seemed an integral part of First UMC’s structure. Both Sunday morning 
services could be called “traditional” in style, and both met in the sanctuary.186 The 8:30 
service was typically a bit more informal in that it involved a smaller group of 
worshippers, featured a choir that rehearsed less often than the 11:00 ensemble, and 
included more leadership from the youth (as ushers, musicians, etc.) The 8:30 service 
also included communion every week, whereas at the 11:00 service, communion was 
served only once a month. 
As I have noted, these two services co-existed for decades, with the pastor 
preaching at both each week. In 1997, however, a major shift occurred when active 
parishioner “Roy Sanderson,”187 with the support of the senior pastor, introduced a new 
opportunity for contemporary worship at First UMC. Musicians were brought in from 
outside the congregation to provide leadership for the new service, which was held at 
8:45 in the small chapel each Sunday morning. The new service took off and began 
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attracting many people who had never previously been associated with First UMC. 
Attendance at this service grew to over one hundred people per Sunday, and remained at 
that level for several years. Over time, however, the contemporary service began to falter 
a bit. The outside musicians, who had previously given such strong leadership to the 
service, left in favor of other opportunities. This produced a temporary vacuum in 
leadership for the service, and attendance began to drop.  
Simultaneously, attendance had been shrinking at the 8:30 and 11:00 services as 
well. Current senior pastor Bob Fisher described this turn of events as a result of 
“generational recycling”: the generation that had helped found First UMC was aging and 
dying, but it was not being replaced quickly enough with newer, younger members. As a 
result, both the 8:30 and 11:00 services were beginning to feel sparse, particularly since 
they were both being held in First UMC’s large sanctuary. By 2009, the 8:30 service had 
a maximum attendance of 90 people, and the 11:00 had a maximum attendance of 
roughly 250 people. Furthermore, because there were now three morning services, 
whoever was preaching on a given Sunday had to attend all three, which meant literally 
running from the 8:30 service in the sanctuary to the 8:45 service in the chapel in time for 
the sermon.
188
 
When Rev. Fisher came to First UMC in 2005, there had been some discussion 
about reducing the number of worship services, but there had also been powerful 
resistance to making such changes. By 2009, however, attendance at all three services 
had shrunk enough that the congregation’s administrative board felt it was time to revisit 
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the issue. Members of the board were especially concerned about two things: first, the 
considerable strain on the preaching pastor, and second, the perception that the 11:00 
service felt “empty” because the large sanctuary was usually half-full, at best. The board 
felt that having the sanctuary look and feel empty could potentially make a negative 
impression on any visitors that might attend the service. Based on these concerns, the 
administrative board charged the church’s “worship work area” with devising a plan to 
reduce the number of morning services from three to two, with one being traditional and 
one being contemporary. Rev. Fisher told me that some individuals within the 
congregation had long considered the contemporary service an “irritant”; however, by 
2009 the service had been in place for twelve years and included some key members of 
First UMC. As a result, the board felt it was important to keep a contemporary service as 
one of the two worship opportunities on Sunday morning. 
From the twelve interviews I conducted with parishioners at First UMC, I learned 
that when the administrative board’s directive was announced, people within the 
congregation immediately became anxious about losing “their” service. This was 
especially true for the 8:30 traditional worshippers, since the most obvious solution to the 
problem would simply be to get rid of the 8:30 service and merge it with the 11:00 
service. Senior pastor Bob Fisher was aware of this anxiety, and believed that to simply 
eliminate one service and merge it with another would create a great deal of resistance 
and hostility. Rev. Fisher felt strongly that in order to avoid a highly contentious conflict, 
the church needed to put an intentional decision-making process into place. By 
“intentional process,” Rev. Fisher meant a carefully designed course of action that would 
have clearly defined goals, and that would insure that stakeholders from all three worship 
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services could contribute to the development of the ultimate solution. As a means to this 
end, Rev. Fisher worked with “Judith Murray,”189 the chair of the worship work area to 
create a special committee to address this problem. He and Judith invited between six and 
eight individuals from each worship service to participate in this committee, and asked 
members to commit to being present for four separate meetings. However, it was also 
made known throughout the congregation that anyone who wished to attend the special 
committee’s meetings was welcome to do so, even if they could not come to all four 
sessions. 
The sessions themselves were held between January and March of 2009, and each 
one opened with a structured devotional time that included Scripture reading, prayer, and 
reflection. Rev. Fisher and Judith Murray intentionally included these spiritual elements 
in the meetings in an effort to head off some of the hostility and resentment they expected 
committee members to bring with them. Evidently, these fears were well-founded. 
According to some of the parishioners I interviewed, at the very first committee meeting, 
everyone sat with people from their own service. One interviewee said he could feel the 
tension in the air, because, as he put it, people were “loaded”—they were ready to “line 
up and fight” for their service. Those who attended the 8:30 service expected their service 
to be eliminated entirely, while some of those who attended the 11:00 were concerned 
that there would be an attempt to “blend” their service and make it more contemporary. 
For their part, the 8:45 contemporary worshippers also worried that significant changes 
might be made to a service that had become extremely meaningful to them.  
In addition to the intentional inclusion of devotional time at each meeting, the 
sessions were designed according to a specific plan, which was described to me in detail 
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both by Rev. Fisher and by others that I interviewed. At the first meeting, committee 
members spent time getting to know one another, and also worked in small groups made 
up of people who attended the same service (i.e., 8:30 worshippers met together, 8:45 
worshippers met together, etc.). Subsequent meetings also included small group work, 
but these groups were made up of members from different services. The small groups 
were charged with coming up with potential plans for fulfilling the administrative board’s 
directive to reduce the number of worship services from three to two. These plans were 
described and discussed at the third meeting, but no decision was made at that time; in 
fact, by the end of the third meeting, more than a few committee members were 
beginning to feel hopeless that a consensus could ever be reached.  
The fourth meeting began with a devotional time that included members serving 
communion to one another. The committee then reviewed together the various plans that 
the small groups had generated over the previous weeks, all of which included having the 
traditional service remain at 11:00. Yet, according to the meeting minutes from that night, 
“Early traditional worshipers wanted to continue worshiping at an early time and were 
not at all comfortable with leaving the late service at 11:00.”190 “Not at all comfortable” 
seems to be a mild way of describing the feelings in the room that night. In fact, First 
UMC’s pastors shared with me that during this last meeting, there was a point at which it 
seemed that all three groups might “dig in their heels.” The 8:30 worshippers, in 
particular, became “belligerent” because they felt that they were the only ones being 
asked to change. At this point, it seemed that the group might be at a stalemate. However, 
at that moment, Roy Sanderson made what many of the interviewees described as an “out 
of the box” proposal. He suggested that Sunday School should be moved from 9:30 back 
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to 9:00; traditional sanctuary worship moved from 11:00 to 10:30; and the contemporary 
service be held at 5:00 on Sunday afternoon, with covenant groups and other spiritual 
growth opportunities offered afterward.  
Although the administrative board’s directive had clearly stated that there should 
be two services held on Sunday morning, the committee members ultimately agreed that 
Roy’s proposal offered the best solution for what had, just moments before, seemed an 
intractable problem. Some committee members did express concern about what effect 
this proposal might have on Sunday School, but in the end, the committee unanimously 
voted to accept Roy’s plan and to present it to the administrative board for consideration. 
In talking with committee members about how this unorthodox solution came about, 
most indicated that they believed it was a result of the Holy Spirit’s work among the 
group. In fact, interviewees described the solution as “a God thing,” “God intervening,” 
and even “miraculous.” Similarly, in his charge conference report to the congregation the 
following fall, Rev. Fisher described the events this way:  
The Spirit moved and the proposal was made to move the Praise Service to 
Sunday evening. This gesture of sacrifice transformed three groups with each 
inclined to defend its right to its own service into as [sic] shared spirit of mutual 
love and concern. The result was an “out of the box” option that seemed right to 
everyone.  
It seems important to note here that at least two of the people I interviewed did not see 
this development in quite the same light. Instead of understanding the solution as direct 
intervention from the Holy Spirit, these individuals thought that the decision to move the 
contemporary service to the evening was more likely due to the fact that no other solution 
seemed viable, or to the fact that Roy Sanderson decided to make a more dramatic 
compromise in an effort to avoid further conflict within the committee. Still, it is difficult 
to underestimate the importance that interviewees attributed to the chain of events during 
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the last meeting; even those who disagreed with the “God thing” language admitted that 
the solution was reached much more peacefully than they would have thought possible. 
 Ironically, the creative solution that received such acclamation within the 
committee did not work out in the end. The new worship schedule was implemented in 
June of 2009, but by August, it was clear that the 5:00 time for the contemporary service 
was not viable. Attendance at the contemporary service had dropped dramatically, and 
even those who were still coming felt that they had to choose between coming to worship 
in the evening or going to Sunday School in the morning. For them, it simply did not 
seem feasible to come to church twice in the same day. By the end of the summer, the 
decision was made to move the contemporary service back to Sunday morning, although 
because of the new schedule, it had to begin at 8:15 so as not to overlap with Sunday 
School. This posed a new problem for the contemporary service, since even when it had 
been held at 8:45, participants often had trouble getting there on time. Due to this early 
time slot, attendance at the contemporary service continued to be lower than in the past, 
but began to grow slowly from the slump it had experienced when it was in the evening. 
Eventually, the time of the contemporary service was changed to 8:30 to try to allow a bit 
more time for worshippers to arrive.  
 Given the failure of the attempt to move the contemporary service to an evening 
time slot, one might be tempted to assume that the whole decision-making process at 
First UMC was a waste of time. After all, the church now has essentially the same 
schedule it had before: a traditional late morning worship service in the sanctuary and an 
earlier contemporary service in the chapel. From the outside, it would appear that the 
church could have obtained the same results simply by eliminating the 8:30 traditional 
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service from the beginning. Yet, in my interviews with members of First UMC, there was 
widespread consensus that even though Roy Sanderson’s idea ultimately failed, it had to 
be tried in order for the committee members (particularly those from the 8:30 service) to 
feel that everyone involved had made some sacrifices. In other words, if the committee 
had simply decided to eliminate the 8:30 service without exploring any other creative 
solutions, 8:30 worshippers would have felt extremely disenfranchised, and might even 
have left the church in protest.
191
 Instead, by the time the contemporary worship service 
was moved back to a morning slot, the 8:30 worshippers had become integrated into the 
new 10:30 traditional service—which, by all accounts, is now going extremely well and 
drawing more attendance than it has in years—and were not bothered by the fact that the 
contemporary worshippers ended up with the coveted early morning spot.  
In addition, given the fact that both 8:30 and 8:45 worshippers were accustomed 
to having communion every week, a very brief service of communion and prayer was 
added to the Sunday morning worship schedule at 8:45. This service helped provide an 
opportunity for early worshippers to have communion every week, but at a time that 
would not interfere with the Sunday School classes that are so important within the life of 
First UMC. Looking back on all that has happened within the last few years, most of the 
people I interviewed admitted that the solution generated by the worship committee has 
included some significant losses: 8:30 worshippers still keenly miss certain aspects of 
their previous service, and attendance at the contemporary service has never quite 
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recovered. Yet, they almost all agree that the current worship schedule is what is “best for 
the church” as a whole, and they continue to stand behind the committee’s decision. 
 
Common Themes 
 Clearly, Grace UCC and First UMC are two very different congregations that 
faced very different problems. Not only did these two churches wrestle with distinct 
issues, but the intensity and outcome of their respective conflicts varied widely. Grace 
UCC endured a severely divisive conflict over the extremely volatile topic of gay 
marriage, and lost a significant portion of its membership as a result. First UMC, on the 
other hand, dealt with important changes to its worship structure and lost a few members, 
but overall it weathered the situation well and arrived at a solution that garnered 
widespread support within the congregation. Additionally, the process that these two 
churches used to confront the disagreements in their midst differed dramatically. Because 
the prospect of denominational separation was raised so suddenly at Grace UCC, the 
pastors and lay leadership there were put in a position of reacting rather than carefully 
planning an approach to the conflict brewing within the congregation. First UMC, by 
contrast, had been indirectly dealing with the worship issue for a number of years, and 
was thus able—through the initiative of its pastors and other congregational leaders—to 
design an intentional, structured process by which the conflict might be handled carefully 
and calmly. Given these significant differences, the value of examining these case studies 
side-by-side might not be immediately clear. 
 I argue, however, that exploring these case studies together yields important 
insights about congregational conflict. First, the very differences between these two 
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congregations raise questions that bear further investigation. For instance: why did the 
conflict at Grace UCC become so intense, while that at First UMC did not? What factors 
allowed First UMC to find a relatively peaceful solution to its problem? Were those 
factors absent at Grace UCC, or, if they were present, why didn’t they have the same 
effect? What can we learn about conflict from a church like Grace UCC that has suffered 
a violent rift, and what can we learn from one that has managed to deal effectively with a 
potentially divisive problem? Seeking answers to these questions—born out of the 
differences between the two congregations—may lead to new insights about 
congregational conflict, and especially about what steps pastoral leaders might take to 
deal with it more effectively.
192
  
 At the same time, considering these cases together also reveals important areas of 
similarity between them. Exploring these points of connection opens a pathway for 
analysis of some of the common features of congregational conflict, and provides a 
foundation from which to reflect on these events using psychodynamic, social 
psychological, and theological tools—a task to which I will turn in later chapters. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I enumerate what I see as the most significant similarities 
between the two case studies, how these similarities are connected, and what they may 
reveal about the nature of theological conflict within communities of faith. 
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Anxiety 
 The first important similarity between Grace UCC and First UMC involves the 
notion of anxiety. As this dissertation has taken shape, I have become increasingly 
convinced of the fundamental role that anxiety plays in interpersonal and communal 
conflict. Through the lens of family systems theory, I have come to recognize some of the 
ways that such anxiety was operating in the conflicts that took place at both 
congregations. In each faith community, anxiety seems to have been most acute and 
recognizable when the initial “presenting issue” emerged. At Grace UCC, for instance, 
this anxiety took the form of an almost palpable feeling of tension that permeated the 
summer business meeting. Such a feeling of tension is common in communities 
experiencing an increase in anxiety:  
With a gradual or sudden elevation of anxiety in your congregation, a 
different tone or mood develops . . . The minute you arrive at church, you 
know something is different. The usual lighthearted banter and general 
chatter has given way to serious silence.
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This description proves quite apt for what occurred at Grace UCC that night: the moment 
the senior pastor and I entered the room, we could feel the anxiety in the air and knew 
that something significant was going to happen. The tension continued to rise throughout 
the meeting, and culminated in the explosive interactions that accompanied the discussion 
about leaving the denomination.  
 At First UMC, anxiety was also present, but it appeared in a more gradual and 
understated way. Because the congregation had been discussing making worship changes 
for some time, the initial charge from the administrative board did not set off the kind of 
volatile conflict that took place at Grace UCC. However, the pastors of First UMC told 
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me that the administrative board's directive immediately caused many members—
particularly those from the 8:30 service—to become “anxious” about the prospect of 
losing their worship opportunity. Additionally, several of the interviewees stated that at 
the first meeting of the worship committee, a feeling of “tension” permeated the air, and 
that individuals sat with others from their own service as if they were ready to “line up 
and fight.” Clearly, then, First UMC's need to make a firm decision about changing their 
worship structure caused anxiety to rise throughout the congregation—anxiety which the 
worship committee members then brought with them into their deliberations. 
 Recall that as I am using it here, the term anxiety refers to a general “sense of 
threat” that causes persons to feel unsafe in the world.194 This understanding of anxiety 
naturally leads one to wonder: what, specifically, made the parishioners at Grace UCC 
and First UMC feel threatened or unsafe? In other words, why did these conflicts over 
sexuality and worship have such a powerful effect on those involved? Although I will 
answer this question more fully later in the project, I wish to posit here that perceived 
threats to identity likely played a key role in the development of anxiety within these two 
congregations. That is to say: threats to one’s identity or sense of self typically create 
anxiety—anxiety that is difficult to relieve and that frequently results in unhealthy 
behaviors. When read with this idea in mind, the disparate case studies presented in this 
chapter begin to appear more connected, since parishioners in each congregation 
struggled to cope with challenges to beliefs and institutions that had become closely tied 
to their own sense of identity. 
 In addition to the general notion of anxiety, which I have identified as a common 
feature of the conflicts at Grace UCC and First UMC, the interview data from these 
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congregations also reveal a number of other similarities. I have summarized these 
similarities through the following themes, all of which, in different ways, illustrate the 
complex nature of conflict: 1) the theological dimensions of conflict; 2) identity; 3) 
polarization and fragmentation; and 4) the pain of conflict and change. In the sections 
that follow, I describe each of these themes, and I illustrate them by including the voices 
of specific interviewees. These themes not only represent similarities between Grace 
UCC and First UMC, but, as I will show at the end of the chapter, they also all relate to 
the dynamics of anxiety in important and interlocking ways.  
 
Understanding the Complexities of Conflict 
As I stated in Chapter One, this project focuses on congregational conflicts that 
include an important theological dimension.
195
 In making this my focus, however, I am 
not suggesting that theological disagreement was the only cause of the shape these 
conflicts ultimately took. Common wisdom tells us that conflict is a multivalent reality 
that almost always contains many layers—layers that are formed by a complex interplay 
of events and relationships. Naturally, the more individuals involved in a conflict, the 
more complicated it becomes to tease apart just what is happening, and exactly what the 
issues are. At both Grace UCC and First UMC, there was widespread acknowledgment 
that although theological issues played a key role, many other factors were at work as 
well—some of which had originated years before. 
In the case of Grace UCC, many of the people I interviewed believed that the 
conflict over gay marriage actually had its roots in a longstanding dispute between certain 
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members of the church and the pastor, Bill Turner. “Leah,”196 who had been a member of 
Grace UCC for over twenty years at the time of the conflict, said, “I think there was an 
underlying motive. I think there were some people who were not pleased with our pastor. 
And I think that became an issue, kind of a hidden agenda in it.” Noelle, who had joined 
Grace UCC only a year before the conflict, said that she only understood the multi-
layered nature of the conflict after the fact:  
I didn’t know people really hated Bill and were trying to get rid of him, or that 
some were. So I was taking the conflict pretty much at face value. So it was a 
learning experience for me to come to understand that there was a longstanding 
conflict, and that that was playing a large role in how this was playing out.  
“George,”197 another relatively new member of Grace UCC, agreed with both Leah and 
Noelle’s assessment, but felt that the underlying tension revolved not only around Bill, 
but around the church leadership in general. He told me, “Over the five years [since the 
conflict] I have come to believe that the fight was much more a ‘systemic control of the 
congregation fight’ between people who felt entitled to run the church and the changing 
leadership of the church.” 
Of course, this is not to suggest that those parishioners who wished to leave the 
UCC were only pretending to be opposed to gay marriage just so they could disagree 
with Bill. Indeed, the emotional intensity with which these congregants expressed their 
opposition to the General Synod resolution easily persuaded me and many others present 
that their position reflected deeply held beliefs. Yet, as the preceding quotations show, 
many in the congregation felt that these parishioners’ staunch opposition to gay marriage 
was only part of the story. Admittedly, it was a very important part, but certainly not the 
only factor behind the divisiveness that ultimately came to characterize the conflict at 
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Grace UCC. Charles, an elderly member and active leader at Grace UCC, put it this way: 
“it wasn’t all about that [homosexuality]. It wasn’t all about that, there was some other 
dynamics taking place there. That might have been 50% of it, you know? Maybe half of 
it.” Tom, a long-time member of the congregation, agreed: 
The group who was displeased and raised this issue, were reacting to 
several motivations: there was, there has always been in Grace UCC a 
very conservative element, who was opposed to a lot of social change . . . 
For others, who really started out with this unhappiness with the pastor 
over theological issues and some other issues, the gay marriage issue 
became a convenient excuse to leave. 
At First UMC, the tension surrounding the upcoming worship changes also 
seemed to intertwine with both past and ongoing struggles related to the leadership of the 
church. Carol Stewart, the associate pastor at First UMC who had been serving that 
congregation for twelve years at the time of my interview with her, noted that when Rev. 
Fisher and a previous associate pastor, “Wanda Jenkins,”198 arrived in 2005, there was 
already a strong theological conflict going on within the congregation. This conflict had 
itself been fueled by conflict between the previous pastor and one of his associates. Rev. 
Jenkins got drawn into the conflict because she was preaching at the contemporary 
service, and her theology tended to be more conservative than Rev. Fisher’s, but quite 
similar to that of the contemporary worshippers. As a result, some of those attending the 
contemporary service wanted to demonize Rev. Fisher and question his theology. 
Ultimately, Rev. Jenkins left after only a year at First UMC, due at least in part to the 
growing tension in the congregation. It was at that point that Rev. Fisher decided that 
First UMC should start having more consistency in its preaching, so he began preaching 
at all three services. When the administrative board announced that the number of 
services would be reduced in order to help the pastors manage the Sunday schedule, some 
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in the congregation wondered whether Rev. Fisher was actually behind this decision as an 
indirect way of eliminating the contemporary service.  
It is also noteworthy that at the time the worship discussions began in 2009, First 
UMC was in the midst of looking for a new minister of music. The previous music 
minister had been asked to leave because the church felt that they needed someone with a 
different set of skills to help re-vitalize the late morning traditional service. As is always 
the case with staff changes, some in the congregation were quite loyal to the previous 
music director, and harbored resentment over his dismissal. Furthermore, in a 
conversation with First UMC’s pastors, I learned that the administrative board chair—
who had overseen the entire process relating to worship changes—ultimately resigned his 
post in protest of Rev. Fisher, with whom he had some fundamental theological 
disagreements. Interestingly, just a few months later, in March of 2010, the youth director 
of seventeen years also resigned due to friction with the pastoral staff. Given these factual 
pieces of First UMC’s story, it seems likely that although the primary issue in 2009 was 
the reorganization of the congregation’s worship structure, issues surrounding staff 
relationships and pastoral leadership were part of the story as well. In essence, these 
various other conflicts formed a complex backdrop of tensions that were already swirling 
throughout the congregation when the worship change issue came to the fore. 
 
Theological Dimensions of Conflict 
 Perhaps the most striking similarity that emerged between the situations at Grace 
UCC and First UMC is the fact that both of these conflicts took on theological 
significance for those involved in them. In other words, it felt as though something was at 
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stake theologically for the individuals who participated in these conflicts. In Chapter One, 
I argued that it is possible to discover a theological component to almost any conflict 
within a congregation, because such conflicts take place within a religious context. As a 
result, they necessarily raise the following question for parishioners: how can we believe 
such different things about worship, or the nature of the church, or human sexuality (or 
any other issue) and still be members of the same religious body? As I conducted my 
research for this project, I found that my assumptions about the theological dimension to 
conflict were largely borne out in the interviews that I conducted with parishioners from 
both congregations.  
 In the case of Grace UCC, the theological dimension seems quite obvious; after 
all, from the beginning, the conflict there took the form of biblical and theological 
language as people argued over interpretations of Scripture, and over what a “Christian” 
approach to homosexuality should be. Particularly for those who wished to separate from 
the UCC, it seemed that conforming to a specific way of understanding biblical teachings 
about homosexuality was paramount. For instance, “Phyllis,”199 a woman who had been a 
member at Grace UCC for twenty years but then left following the conflict, said to me, 
“It’s just when it says in the Bible that it’s an abomination for man to lay with a man, you 
know, to me that’s not right.” To clarify the reason that she decided to leave Grace UCC, 
Phyllis added, “I did not leave the church because of the people; I left because of the 
issue.”  
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 Others who elected to stay at Grace UCC had just the opposite viewpoint; for 
them, staying in the UCC carried a great deal of theological significance. “Christine,”200 
who was in the youth group at the time of the conflict, said,  
I personally at the end of the day don’t want to be a person who shut other 
people out. And I don’t think that’s the purpose of a church so I would 
have fundamentally had a lot of problems if we had left [the 
denomination] because I think I would have been lost and it would have 
made me question my faith a whole lot . . . I think that’s what I had to 
lose, was my footing.  
 
Similarly, Tom, an older man who had held a variety of leadership roles at Grace UCC, 
stated that “the more I’ve learned about the larger denomination, the more I find that it 
corresponds to how I’ve felt for a long time about social issues as well as religious beliefs 
and it just speaks to me like no other denomination does about my faith.” Thus, for these 
and other individuals at Grace UCC, the conflict initially generated by the 2005 equal 
marriage resolution took on powerful theological significance as it touched on deeply 
held beliefs about the Bible, sin, and the nature of the church.  
Admittedly, the theological component of the conflict at First UMC is a bit more 
difficult to discern ; after all, the disagreement in this congregation seems to have 
centered primarily on logistical matters and preferences in worship style. However, since 
worship constitutes one of the central ways that human beings collectively relate to God, 
I wondered whether there might not be more theological significance under the surface 
than was readily apparent to an outside observer. In an attempt to explore the theological 
dimension of the conflict at First UMC, I included questions in my interviews relating to 
how individuals understood worship, and what they felt they might lose from their 
worship service if changes were made.  
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Interestingly, some interviewees answered these questions by reflecting on the 
worship space itself, and what that communicated to them about God’s presence in 
worship. “Nancy,”201 a middle-aged woman who had been attending the contemporary 
worship service at First UMC for several years, said,  
one of the appeals of having worship in the chapel was the intimacy of the room . 
. . The windows in that time of morning and the light coming through and the fact 
that it just – the room would just take on a glow. And the warmth was just – you 
felt it. And you just couldn't feel that same atmosphere in a huge, big sanctuary 
with tile floors and high ceilings and people scattered all over the room.  
 
Judith, the chair of the Worship Work Area, was very comfortable with the 11:00 
traditional service, which she had always attended, but the process of chairing the 
worship committee helped her to understand the theological importance of the worship 
space for the contemporary worshippers:  
[The chapel] is an intimate space; they [the 8:45 worshippers] like that small 
community/small church feeling. Our sanctuary is very lofty. There were things 
about it that those people appreciate. But apparently, that smallness of the chapel 
is what helps them see God on a Sunday morning, that connection with others. 
That's where the veil becomes very thin for them, that connecting with 
community. And that is where they are able to encounter God. 
 
Of course, the theological importance of the contemporary service was not limited 
to the role of the worship space; interviewees also shared what they found meaningful in 
the music and general atmosphere of the contemporary service. “Bart,”202 a middle-aged 
man who is deeply committed to the contemporary service, explained, “I love this 
worship style because I can connect to God better . . . I love to sing, but you put a hymnal 
in front of me, it's like you've got to be a professional . . . to me, singing is part of 
worship. And if I've got to think about the song, there's a barrier between me and God. 
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And so that's why I love contemporary so much is because there's no barrier there.” 
“Esther”203 agreed:  
To me worship is like an opportunity . . . to kind of move the obstacles in your 
life out of the way so that you can connect with God in that setting while there's 
people standing around you . . . And I don't find that in the traditional service. I 
get cluttered by the number of verses in the hymnal and by looking down at the 
hymnal when I'm a “look-up-er.” And I think the difference to me in 
contemporary is when you go in, it's not [that] you’re best friends with Jesus, but 
you're much more relational . . . And I prefer being one-on-one more than 
separate.  
 
This notion of a more relational feeling in the contemporary service was also echoed by 
Nancy, who expanded upon the importance of relationality and community for her in 
worship:  
I felt like it [the contemporary service] really was filling my spiritual need of the 
way that I communicate with God, in that I feel it's a very personal thing. And I 
do a lot of meditation and journal writing and reading and my relationship with 
God is very one-to-one and very personal . . . And then one thing that continued 
to be really important was that that service seemed to – we became friends. It 
became a community. It became – it was informal enough that we could stop and 
pray for each other. People could be spontaneous if they had something on their 
heart that they needed to share during the morning service, which certainly 
couldn't have been done in a traditional service. And it just – it allowed for some 
freedom. It was the first time I had really ever felt free in a church, free to be me, 
who I am and what I needed to share. 
These quotations demonstrate that many individuals who attended the 8:45 
contemporary service see an intimate connection between the style and space of worship 
and their ability to feel connected with God. In theological terms, we would call this 
God’s immanence through an indwelling presence, which appears to be what these 
interviewees were seeking. For them, such immanence seemed more elusive within the 
context of traditional worship in the large sanctuary; indeed, some described their 
experience in traditional worship as “awestruck,” “high church,” or “separate,” which, for 
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them, prevented the kind of spiritual experience they hoped for in worship. In addition to 
a sense of God’s immanence, contemporary worshippers seem to have longed for the 
intimate connections of community that often seemed absent to them in a larger worship 
setting. Several interviewees told me that the actual physical space between bodies in the 
large sanctuary made them feel disconnected, thus rendering the worship experience less 
meaningful. 
The 8:30 worshippers seemed to share this desire for close contact between 
participants in their service, as well as the quieter atmosphere that comes with a smaller 
group. “Dorothy,”204 an elderly woman who has attended the early service for decades, 
talked about how the smaller setting allowed worshippers to get to know one another and 
keep up with each other: “We knew where everyone sat. If someone wasn't there, we 
knew they weren't there.” “Colin,”205 who in his twenty-five years at First UMC had 
never attended anything but the 8:30 traditional service, said, “I like the 8:30 service, 
because the sanctuary is quiet. I liked the idea there were fewer people in there . . . [the 
11:00 service] was always full of people. You go in there before the service, there's all 
this chatter, this loud noise in there. To me, it never felt like a worship service.” One 
might imagine that this is just a personal preference on Colin’s part, and not something of 
theological import. However, Colin went on to explain that on the first Sunday that First 
UMC instituted the new worship schedule, he tried to attend the 10:30 worship service in 
place of his beloved 8:30 service, which had been eliminated. Colin described his 
experience this way:  
And I go in there [the sanctuary] and, like I say, it was just packed full of people 
and just—I didn't enjoy it that much. I remember the next Sunday, certain people 
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in Sunday school were talking about how they could just feel God's presence, how 
we all came together. And I sat in there going, “Well, I wish I had felt him.”  
Clearly, for Colin and for others accustomed to the 8:30 worship time, the peaceful, 
quieter atmosphere of the early service provided a clearer pathway toward connecting 
with the presence of God. 
Likewise, worshippers from the 11:00 service imbued elements of their worship 
with theological significance. “Ann,”206 an older woman who is relatively new to First 
UMC, said she prefers the 11:00 service because of the liturgy and the fact that there is a 
full choir; for her, the more formal atmosphere of this service meshes well with her desire 
for a “non-chatty” worship experience. When I asked Ann to elaborate on what she meant 
by “non-chatty,” she said,  
I think it's good to be friendly in the vestibule . . . and to make sure you welcome 
all the visitors and look to make sure that if they're in your row that you introduce 
them to the clergy afterwards, all those kinds of things. But I kind of—probably 
prefer . . . the time when there's silence so you can actually focus on the Lord and 
not be distracted. 
 For Ann, then, it would seem that the very close-knit feel and personal sharing so 
cherished by the contemporary worship-goers could actually get in the way of her 
experience of God’s presence in worship. As Ann makes clear, she very much values 
friendliness and personal interaction within the community of faith, but does not see 
those elements as particularly appropriate in a worship setting. 
Like Ann, Judith expressed a strong affinity for the liturgy used at the 11:00 
service. Judith explained her understanding of worship this way: “I need people around 
me worshiping because watching them worship is part of how I see God . . . So I would 
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say liturgy is hugely important to me, the words that connect me back with the saints.” 
Judith went on to expand upon her love of traditional liturgy and hymnody: 
And then the liturgy, the words are more important to me . . . I mean, I'm glad to 
have a sermon illuminate Scripture. But I don't want the sermon to be the focal 
point of the service. There's plenty of other elements in the service where the veil 
becomes very thin and you see God. And so for me the contemporary service had 
stripped out too much of the words that I have internalized for so many years in 
my heart that speak to me. And the hymns. Too many of the hymns that have the 
really good stories they're telling and the good words and the metaphors. I'm kind 
of a person of the metaphor. So those hymns come to me in times when I'm just 
living my ordinary life because I've sung them so much or I've spoken a creed so 
much that those words pop into my head at times when I need for them to. So I'm 
kind of a person of order and I need that. I don't need to say the Apostle's Creed 
every Sunday, but I need to say it enough that I know it. 
Interestingly, the sense of community connection that 8:30 and 8:45 worshippers said 
they missed in the 11:00 service was important to Judith too, but she said she found such 
a sense in the traditional worship setting:  
It's easier for me in a group where you're packed in and you can pat someone on 
the shoulder in front of you instead of they're three rows up and I might get to 
speak to them after the service . . . I like the fact that if you're in a group closely 
together, then to me it says that what we're doing is important because we've all 
come together to do it. And I think it's easier to nurture when you've got people 
around you than when you're sitting there alone. And I think worship is corporate. 
It's not your time alone with God; it's your time with God with others. 
As these quotations show, First UMC members’ reflections on what they find meaningful 
about particular worship services reveal deep theological dimensions to what otherwise 
might seem a superficial issue. Thus, the decision First UMC faced was not only a 
logistical one, but one that surfaced real tension between parishioners’ different 
understandings of who God is, the nature of God’s relationship to human beings, and the 
purpose of worship. For this reason, I maintain that although Grace UCC’s conflict 
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proved much more intense and volatile than First UMC’s, both congregations had to cope 
with contending views about issues of theological significance. 
 
Identity 
  The theological dimensions of these congregational conflicts were also 
inextricably linked with parishioners’ sense of identity. These links often surfaced in the 
form of identifying with a specific group or position as the conflicts unfolded. Some 
members of Grace UCC, for instance, had strong ties to the denomination itself, which 
profoundly influenced their belief that the congregation should stay within the UCC. 
Charles said simply, “The history of the denomination means a lot to me. I grew up [in 
it], it was the only church I ever knew.” Similarly, Noelle, who became a member of the 
UCC later in life, stated that 
the more we’ve learned about the denomination, the more we felt at home, where 
our values coincided with the prevailing norms at the church . . . So, you know, 
I’m committed to the church because I like its values, its national values . . . And 
you know it [leaving the UCC] would really be like leaving home. 
 
Noelle’s use of the words “values” and “home” signals that for her, the UCC represents 
more than just a denomination she chose from among others. Instead, it is an institution 
to which she feels intimately connected, and which reflects her own deeply-held personal 
commitments.  
 
Others at Grace UCC felt less committed to the denomination itself, but more to 
keeping the congregation intact or preserving some of what they perceived to be its core 
values. “Jack,”207 a lifetime member of Grace UCC, explained, “I’ve got no ties to the 
Conference, but I’ve got ties to Grace UCC.” For this reason, Jack said, he wanted to do 
                                                          
207
 All names of congregation members have been changed to protect their privacy. 
144 
 
all he could to keep the congregation healthy and strong, and to him it seemed the best 
way to do that was to remain in the denomination. Christine supported staying in the 
denomination because it seemed like the option that most coincided with her personal 
beliefs: “I think that it’s not up to us to determine who can be a part of our church and 
who can’t . . . I think the moment that when we stop welcoming people, we stop leading a 
faithful life.” In fact, for Christine, these beliefs form a central part of who she 
understands herself to be – namely, an inclusive, welcoming person: “at the end of the 
day [I] don’t want to be a person who shut other people out.”208 
 At First UMC, people seemed to identify less strongly with their particular 
position on the worship issue than did Grace UCC members with their views on leaving 
the UCC. Yet, as I have shown above, individuals’ preference for their specific worship 
service frequently included very personal and theological elements, which they often 
described in identity-based terms. For instance, in talking about their preferred worship 
style, interviewees would frequently say “I am” rather than “I like” or “I prefer.” Colin, 
who had worshipped at the 8:30 traditional service for twenty-five years, said, “I’m an 
early morning person. Always have been.” “Marion,”209 a traditional 11:00 worshipper, 
described herself as a “real music [person]” who had participated in the choir for many 
years, which is why she preferred the 11:00 service and its traditional music. Similarly, in 
describing her affinity for the liturgy and hymns at the 11:00 service, Judith noted that 
“I’m a person of order” and “I’m a person of the metaphor.” And Nancy, who found deep 
spiritual nourishment at the contemporary service, said that that particular style of 
worship allows her to be “free to be me, who I am.” This tendency to talk in such 
                                                          
208
 Emphasis added. 
209
 All names of congregation members have been changed to protect their privacy. 
145 
 
personal terms belies an understanding of worship that connects deeply with individuals’ 
sense of who they are. As I noted above, parishioners’ choice of one particular worship 
service over another often points beyond simple stylistic preferences to more profound 
theological convictions about how human beings relate to the divine. Thus, commitment 
to a specific kind of worship experience also appears to be intertwined with notions of 
“who I am in relationship to God” or “who I am as a spiritual person.”  
 Furthermore, in addition to individual identifications with particular theological 
understandings of worship, many parishioners at First UMC experienced their service as 
a place where they took on a unique identity as a member of a group.
210
 As Nancy put it, 
“we became friends. It [the worship service] became a community.” Judith expressed a 
similar sentiment: “I like the fact that if you're in a group closely together, then to me it 
says that what we're doing is important because we've all come together to do it . . . I 
think worship is corporate. It's not your time alone with God; it's your time with God with 
others.” In this sense, each worship service at First UMC became a key category through 
which congregants interpreted important aspects of their religious identity. Gathering 
regularly with others who shared their understandings of worship helped form 
parishioners’ understanding of themselves as church members and as Christians, and 
thereby cemented the link between their theological commitments and their sense of 
identity.  
 
Polarization and Fragmentation 
 Another key theme that emerged in both the conflicts at Grace UCC and First 
UMC was the tendency to split into factions according to the positions individuals held 
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about the issues at hand. At Grace UCC, this tendency proved quite dramatic: the 
congregation, made up of seemingly harmonious relations only days before the conflict 
erupted, suddenly polarized into two clearly defined “sides.” Jack, a lifetime member of 
Grace UCC, put it this way: “I don’t know anyone that was on [one] side of the fence or 
the other that crossed over after the lines had been drawn.” Others in the congregation 
seemed to agree with Jack’s assessment. A teenager at the time of the conflict, “Sean”211 
remembered the events this way: “And almost instantly the church was just split into like 
two factions, one that was ready to go because they didn’t agree.” Charles, who was 
serving in a position of leadership when the conflict began, observed that parishioners 
had quickly “divided into ‘you’ and ‘they,’ which is never good in a church situation.” 
Indeed, this sense of impending fragmentation appears to have been extremely troubling 
for most everyone involved. As she looked back on the conflict and reflected on her 
feelings about it, “Lily,”212 a long-time member of Grace UCC, said, “I guess to me it 
was just the thought that everybody that I felt was family was getting ready to split. It 
was kind of intimidating, scary.” 
 As it turned out, the split at Grace UCC was not only a division between 
members, but an actual exodus of one entire group from the congregation. Early in the 
conflict, the group that had originally raised objections to the General Synod’s resolution 
made it clear that if their position did not prevail in the vote, they would no longer remain 
members of Grace UCC. Tom, who shared deep personal friendships with some in this 
group, said, “those who wanted to separate made it very clear that if they lost the vote, 
they were leaving.” Several of the other people I interviewed also remembered this aspect 
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of the conflict quite clearly, and saw it as a factor that only exacerbated the sharp 
disagreement already present within the congregation. Jack put it this way:  
I’m a little perturbed at, you know, okay I’m not getting my way, I’m leaving. 
You know, you don’t always get your way and I’m not saying conflict is good, 
but I’m saying it gives you a chance to come together with ideas and try to derive 
something from it.  
 
Similarly, Sean said,  
I know churches will have disagreements in beliefs, but I really think it’s not 
worth splitting a church in two for anything. And I think that people treat 
churches like they would treat a glove. If it doesn’t fit them, they go try on 
another one. 
 
Congregational leader Charles had a slightly different view; he believed that some of 
those who initially advocated for leaving the UCC would have liked to stay at Grace 
UCC, but found it too difficult to do so from a relational perspective: “I think many of 
these people had painted themselves in a corner to where they said if you don’t—if we 
don’t leave, I’m going to leave . . . I think in order to save face they just felt they had to 
leave.” In any case, whether interviewees saw Grace UCC’s fragmentation as a result of 
complete rigidity or simply the inability to reconcile relationships, all seemed to agree 
that the conflict in their congregation resulted in a rapid split into two opposing camps, 
with very little possibility of resolving the disagreement in a way acceptable to both 
sides.  
 The situation at First UMC was quite different, in that the various groups involved 
in the worship discussions did not become as hostile toward one another as they 
ultimately did at Grace UCC. Furthermore, by virtue of the decision that had to be made 
at First UMC, the congregation naturally divided itself based on which worship service 
individuals attended, rather than according to a “pro” or “con” position on a particular 
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issue. In this sense, the contending groups at First UMC were an artifact of the 
congregation’s pre-existing worship structure; that is, the groups were already formed 
when the conflict got started, whereas at Grace UCC, the groups seemed to form in 
response to the issue at hand. Yet, because the groups at First UMC were based on 
worship attendance, these individuals had already self-selected to be in those groups; in 
other words, just as Grace UCC members chose one “side” or the other in their conflict, 
members of First UMC essentially had done the same thing – they had simply chosen 
their position earlier, when they decided which worship style most closely matched their 
personal theology. For this reason, individuals’ identification with their particular groups 
often proved quite strong, which ultimately contributed to the fragmentation that began to 
occur within First UMC in the face of impending worship changes. 
Indeed, early on in my research at First UMC, Rev. Fisher shared with me that 
some traditional worshippers were quite suspicious of those who attended the 
contemporary service. To them, it seemed as though the contemporary worshippers were 
taking part in something strange, something that they did not understand and the value of 
which they had difficulty appreciating. In fact, according to Roy Sanderson, the founder 
of the praise service, some members of First UMC – including the previous music 
minister – saw the contemporary worship service as “cheap worship” that held no 
spiritual depth. Roy also told me that contemporary worshippers were frequently 
stereotyped as “Johnny come latelys” who did not contribute much money to the church, 
and who did not make a regular pledge of time and talents.  
Yet, as the case study showed, the division among First UMC members was not 
limited only to their preferred style of worship, but also involved which particular 
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worship service individuals habitually attended. As I noted above, at the first committee 
meeting people sat with members from their own worship service, and there was palpable 
tension in the room as individuals braced themselves to fight for “their” service. Nancy, a 
committed contemporary worshipper, described the situation as follows:  
I was involved in the [worship] committee meetings where people came and 
expressed their views and it seemed like the two [early] morning services were 
going to have to sort of battle it out. Who was going to win over who was going 
to get the morning slot? And that became really uncomfortable for everybody, I 
think.  
Thus, while 8:30 and 11:00 worshippers may have shared an affinity for a more 
traditional worship style, early service participants felt strongly about maintaining their 
own, more informal worship opportunity.  
These 8:30 participants were clearly upset when, by the last committee meeting, 
they began to realize that the worship service they had attended and cherished for so long 
would probably not survive. Dorothy, who had attended the 8:30 service for more than 
forty years, described her feelings this way: “And of course, going into it, those of us 
who had been at 8:30 for so long . . . felt like we're having to give up the most, that this 
was comfortable to us.” Roy agreed with Dorothy’s take on the situation; according to 
him, at the point in the meeting where everyone acknowledged that the 8:30 service 
would likely be eliminated,  
 . . . you could see some really, really, really good people being really, really 
frustrated and hurt. I could see it in the room going around. We’re fixin’ to – this 
thing’s fixin’ to blow. Because 8:30 folks felt like, “You just crammed it down 
my throat. Why didn’t we just do this four weeks ago?”  
 
Thus, the challenge that First UMC faced in making substantial worship changes resulted 
in division along two different lines: one line divided traditional from contemporary 
worshippers; another divided 8:30 worshippers from those whose services were perceived 
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to be “safe” from major alterations (8:45 and 11:00). In such an atmosphere, it was easy 
for tension and even distrust to develop, particularly when one group (8:30) felt as though 
no one else would be making any significant sacrifices.  
 
The Pain of Conflict and Change 
In reviewing the data I collected at Grace UCC and First UMC, a theme that kept 
recurring was the pain that interviewees experienced due to the conflicts and tensions 
within their congregations. This aspect came out especially vividly in the interviews I 
conducted at Grace UCC. Almost every single person I spoke with talked about how 
painful this conflict had been, and continues to be, for the faith community. Christine, 
who was a teenager at the time of the conflict, told me that “It was really difficult . . . I 
know that some of those people, my family was close with before, don’t really talk to 
them anymore and that’s kind of hard.” Similarly, Tom, an older man who had been part 
of Grace UCC for many years, said,  
for me, at stake was the loss of some very good church workers and close friends. 
And that has happened and my wife and I still feel that loss. People that we felt 
were good friends, anyway, have been very distant . . . We still don’t see them 
very much and when we do it’s . . . we try to make overtures and they are 
rebuffed. 
 Noelle, a woman who had only been a member of Grace UCC for a short time before the 
conflict erupted, stated,  
I still see the effects of that conflict in the congregation . . . we’re very careful 
about talking about the issue [of homosexuality] . . . for fear of stirring it up . . . 
So I feel the conflict, the rending of the common fabric, or the fear of that is still 
great and still lingers in the congregation. 
Finally, Jack, a lifetime member of Grace UCC, simply said, “I just felt like it [the 
conflict] was going to tear the church apart and in essence it did.” 
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 Because the conflict was less intense at First UMC, this theme of pain took on a 
different form—more akin to pain resulting from the necessity of making any change, 
rather than pain from the decision-making process itself. In describing the process First 
UMC used to make its worship changes, Judith Murray, the chair of the committee, said, 
“we wanted it to be a process of many weeks of actually sitting and trying to discern what 
was right for the church. And we knew there was going to be pain.” Esther, a vocal 
proponent of the contemporary service, described her feelings this way:  
I was – yeah, I think I could say angry, frustrated – frustrated definitely, angry 
sometimes that my opportunity for worship got moved and that the church was 
willing to give that up – not just for me, but for the other people who cherish that . 
. . that really bothered me. 
Nancy described her memory of the resulting worship changes in terms more akin to grief 
than anger:  
And actually, I mean, it was just sad. I mean, the last few services of that 8:45 
service when we knew we were going to night time, it was just sad because we 
just didn't like it, it was sad and we were giving up friendships and things that 
we'd established and it was kind of like having to leave town, move to a new city 
or something.  
 Clearly, the pain that people at First UMC experienced when they contemplated 
making changes to their preferred worship services was quite real. In fact, at times, 
members of different worship services felt that they were being asked to bear more than 
their share of the pain. Yet, at the same time, many of the people I interviewed from First 
UMC agreed that in the end, the solution that the church came up with meant that 
everyone would have to make sacrifices, and consequently, everyone would have to 
experience at least some pain. “Simon,”213 a middle-aged man who had attended the 
contemporary service since its beginning, observed, “I guess the feeling was you wanted 
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to make all three groups accept a little of the pain that would be involved in consolidating 
services.” Esther, who had originally expressed frustration and anger about the 
contemporary service being moved to the evening, reflected on the events at First UMC 
this way: “somehow it worked out and everybody came out with the feeling that this was 
the answer. Everybody was going to hurt in some way. It was going to cost a little bit in 
some way. But that was the answer.” Nancy agreed with Esther’s perspective, stating,  
I felt like that what we had done had unified the church and that everybody had 
compromised a little bit and everybody had won a little bit and everybody had 
given up a little bit. So there wasn't one group that was being picked on. 
Everybody had to make some kind of concession for the times to change.  
Even Dorothy, who had attended the 8:30 service for more than four decades and worried 
about her group having to bear a disproportionate share of the pain from the proposed 
changes, said, “So in one respect I feel like everybody gave up something for what would 
be the better good. And I think overall we've adjusted.” 
 
The Role of Anxiety in Conflict 
 The common themes that emerged from the interview data are interesting in their 
own right, because they illustrate important similarities between two congregational 
conflicts that, on the surface, seem to have been quite different. Placed in conversation 
with the more general theme of anxiety, however, these themes take on even greater 
significance. In fact, as I will show below, each of these elements points the way toward 
a deeper understanding of how the anxiety produced by encounters with difference 
contributes to the development and intensification of conflict in congregations. 
 As I am using it here, the term “anxiety” refers to a basic sense of threat that may 
be either acute (in response to a specific danger) or chronic (generalized and diffuse). 
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According to family systems theory, high levels of chronic anxiety within an organization 
tend to create more intensely emotional responses to acute anxiety-producing events. In 
other words, in any organization, major changes or problems will create a rise in acute 
anxiety. In a chronically anxious organization, however, these changes or problems will 
unbalance the system more dramatically and generate more reactive behaviors than in an 
organization with less chronic anxiety. Recall that “reactivity” refers to the “emotional 
expression of people’s sense of threat.”214 Thus, while members of a healthy 
congregation can usually handle significant problems with relatively little difficulty, 
those same problems will often cause members of a chronically anxious congregation to 
experience more powerful emotional responses. In turn, such responses give rise to more 
intensely reactive behaviors—such as aggression, extreme compliance, or 
disengagement—all of which allow individuals to avoid dealing directly with their 
feelings of threat.
215
 Given this framework for understanding how anxiety operates, one 
can now see how the themes I described above connect with the concept of anxiety as a 
key social force in congregations. 
 First, in describing the themes contributing to the complexities of the conflicts, I 
noted the many different layers of history, events, and relationships that formed the 
backdrop to the conflicts at Grace UCC and First UMC. Both congregations, for instance, 
shared long histories of previous conflicts among different pastoral leaders, and between 
pastoral leaders and their parishioners. Such elements seem to have caused levels of 
chronic anxiety in both communities to rise over time. As a result, when conflicts over 
the specific issues of denominational affiliation and worship structure arose, they 
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triggered acute anxiety responses and threatened to create a severe imbalance in these 
congregational systems. In other words, because the history of both congregations 
already included complex webs of tensions, both communities were operating with 
elevated levels of chronic anxiety that made it more difficult to respond calmly. 
 As I have noted, the acute anxiety-triggering events in these case studies took the 
form of disagreements over important decisions that each congregation had to make. I 
argue that the core of this anxiety revolved around encounters with difference that 
individuals in these communities experienced in relationship to one another. These 
encounters with difference are illustrated through the themes of theology and identity 
discussed above. Indeed, as I stated in Chapter One, disagreements around theological 
issues within a single faith community raise a compelling but disturbing question for 
many church members: how can we be members of the same congregation and believe 
such different things? At Grace UCC, parishioners were suddenly confronted by the fact 
that they all belonged to the same church, but held vastly different theological views, 
both on the specific issue of homosexuality as well as on broader notions of scriptural 
interpretation and denominational affiliation. In the same way, the need to make 
structural changes forced the members of First UMC to face just how differently they 
understood the relationship between God and human beings as it is expressed in worship.  
 These theological commitments, in turn, contributed to individuals' affiliation 
with particular groups within the congregation. At Grace UCC, parishioners identified 
with either the group that wished to disassociate from the denomination, or the group that 
wished to remain within it. Important elements of these individuals' sense of identity—
including their commitment (or lack thereof) to the denomination and their allegiance to 
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particular beliefs and values—had a strong impact on which group they chose. Likewise, 
at First UMC, parishioners had already expressed important aspects of their theology and 
their identity through their selection of a primary worship experience. When the 
administrative board required a fundamental change in the congregation's worship 
structure, these identity groups were brought into conflict with one another. Thus, in the 
events that unfolded at both congregations, church members were forced to confront 
significant theological differences in their midst—differences that raised levels of anxiety 
and that caused the development or entrenchment of particular sub-groups within the 
faith community. The friction that then developed among these sub-groups produced 
even more anxiety, which ultimately contributed to reactive behaviors and to the threat of 
fragmentation. 
 As the case studies revealed, the conflict at Grace UCC was far more reactive in 
nature than that at First UMC. In fact, all of the behaviors that Peter Steinke lists as 
characteristic of congregations with high levels of chronic anxiety—secrecy, accusations, 
deceit, triangulation
216
, and complaining—were on display at Grace UCC at some point 
during the conflict.
217
 It is not surprising, then, that this congregation experienced such a 
rapid polarization of its members into two opposing groups—a development that, in 
itself, suggests the presence of reactivity.
218
 In contrast, at First UMC, the conflict was 
much less intense. However, the interview data showed that this congregation also 
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experienced the threat of fragmentation, since the conflict began with individual 
parishioners identifying strongly with their own worship groups. These groups had the 
potential to become rigid in their positions, which could have made the conflict at First 
UMC quite intractable. I suggest that in both cases, elevated levels of chronic anxiety, 
combined with the acute anxiety-producing trigger of encountering significant difference 
within the congregation, made the situation ripe for polarization and fragmentation. Yet, 
because each congregation coped with anxiety so differently, the outcome in each case 
proved markedly different as well. 
 Finally, although the respective conflicts at Grace UCC and First UMC developed 
in very different ways, interviewees in both places spoke frequently of the “pain” that 
accompanied the disagreements in their congregations. On closer inspection, though, the 
pain described by parishioners at Grace UCC appears to have been more intense, and 
primarily caused by ruptured relationships. At First UMC, the pain that interviewees 
described was more akin to the discomfort that accompanies any significant change, and 
seems to have been mitigated by the maintenance of important relationships throughout 
the faith community. The difference between these descriptions of pain, I suggest, lies in 
the varied ways these congregations handled the anxiety produced by the discovery of 
important differences in their midst. At Grace UCC, the acute anxiety created by the 
initial conflict unbalanced the entire system; consequently, church members began 
engaging in unhealthy behaviors in an attempt to cope with their emotional distress. 
These behaviors caused severe damage to parishioners' relationships with one another, 
and resulted in the literal fragmentation of the church body. At First UMC, the anxiety 
triggered by the need to make worship changes also threatened to unbalance the system, 
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but in the end the congregation was able to handle the situation calmly, without resorting 
to destructive or divisive behaviors. Consequently, the congregation did not experience 
the same kind of severe discord that plagued Grace UCC. 
 The major themes that emerged from the case studies at Grace UCC and First 
UMC are thus tied together by the central concept of anxiety. The complexity of the 
conflicts at both congregations signaled elevated levels of chronic anxiety, and set the 
stage for severe system imbalance triggered by an acute event. Such an event came along 
when parishioners in both places discovered significant theological differences in their 
midst—differences which compelled them to identify with sub-groups in the 
congregation and move toward the possibility of polarization and fragmentation. The 
development and entrenchment of identity groups, and the subsequent splitting of the 
congregations into smaller pieces, raised anxiety levels even further and threatened to 
make both conflicts impossible to resolve. At Grace UCC, anxiety translated into harmful 
behaviors, which produced severely broken relationships and a subsequent loss of 
membership. At First UMC, leaders and parishioners managed to minimize such 
behaviors and find a mutually agreeable solution to the problem at hand. As a result, 
members at First UMC ultimately felt that everyone bore their share of the “pain” that 
comes with important changes in communal life.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have told the stories of conflicts that emerged in two specific 
congregations: Grace UCC and First UMC. These conflicts took very different 
trajectories, and as a result, each congregation bore very different consequences. Yet, in 
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certain ways, the conflicts in these two communities of faith also displayed strikingly 
similar themes—including theological dimensions, identity, polarization/fragmentation, 
and the pain of conflict and change. As I have shown, the combination of these themes 
illustrates the complexity of conflict, as well as the role of anxiety in the development of 
the congregations’ struggles. Despite these insights, however, important questions 
remain: why, exactly, do feelings of threat to the self or identity arise in the first place? 
Why do these feelings produce such destructive behaviors in some situations of conflict, 
and not in others? Are such experiences of anxiety necessarily a sign of pathology, or are 
they part of normal human behavior? To begin to answer these questions, I turn to a 
scholarly discipline that focuses explicitly on the understanding of the human person: 
psychodynamic psychology. In Chapter Four, I will engage the resources of this 
discipline to see how they might further illuminate the etiology and dynamics of conflicts 
like the ones that surfaced at Grace UCC and First UMC. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
SPLITTING, PROJECTION, & THE DESIRE FOR SAMENESS: 
ENGAGING PSYCHODYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
At the end of Chapter Three, I argued that anxiety is the central theme tying the 
cases of Grace UCC and First UMC together. To make this claim, I showed how anxiety 
interlocks with the four other major themes that emerged from the case studies, all of 
which demonstrate the complex nature of conflict—namely, the theological dimensions 
of conflict, identity, polarization/fragmentation, and the pain of conflict and change. The 
concept of anxiety thus helps to explain why and how the disagreements at Grace UCC 
and First UMC developed as they did. Because anxiety played such an important role in 
both of these conflicts, I will carry it forward as an organizing principle in the remaining 
chapters, which further analyze the case studies from psychodynamic, social 
psychological, and theological perspectives. 
I should note that as I embark upon this analysis, I continue to rely on the 
definition of anxiety that I have already established in this project—that is, as a basic 
“sense of threat” to one's person or selfhood.219 I acknowledge that the other scholarly 
disciplines I engage in subsequent chapters do not necessarily use the term “anxiety” in 
their descriptions of human functioning. Nevertheless, I argue that anxiety as a sense of 
threat to the self can be broadly applied in a wide range of discussions about human life 
and functioning. This foundational definition of anxiety will thus form a central thread 
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connecting the other disciplines I am using, and bringing them together to illuminate the 
problem of congregational conflict. In this chapter, I will tie this theme of anxiety even 
more closely to the notion of identity by arguing that when individuals experience threats 
to their sense of self, they become anxious. As a result, persons often engage in 
ineffective or destructive behaviors in an attempt to soothe the anxiety they are feeling. 
Earlier in this project I noted that family systems theory's conceptualization of 
anxiety has contributed greatly to the understanding of organizational dynamics within 
congregations. However, I also argued that this systemic perspective tends to neglect the 
individual shape of human struggle, and typically offers very scant reflection on the 
nature of human being itself. As a means of correcting this limitation, I begin my analysis 
of the congregational case studies by engaging a discipline that specializes in exploring 
human personhood: psychodynamic psychology. The term “psychodynamic psychology” 
refers to psychological theories that understand the human person in terms of conscious 
and unconscious forces, which guide individuals toward particular goals in their growth. 
Sigmund Freud, widely recognized as the father of modern psychology, was one of the 
first to theorize such unconscious forces, or “drives,” as key factors in the development of 
the human personality. Freud understood the human psyche in terms of ongoing conflict 
between three basic structures of the mind—the id, ego, and superego.220 According to 
Freud, intense sexual and aggressive drives emanate from the id and seek release within 
the closed system of the mind; that is, if energy builds up in any part of the system, it 
must necessarily seek relief, or “discharge,” somewhere.  
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Freud thus understood the central task of psychological development as the ego’s 
successful negotiation of the competing demands of the id, superego, and external reality. 
Under ideal conditions, the ego is able to meet these demands by finding appropriate 
means for the release of the id’s energies without conflicting too severely with the harsh 
strictures of the superego or the expectations of the external world. However, when the 
ego feels weak in the face of these demands and is unable to satisfy them appropriately, it 
uses repression as its key defense mechanism. Repression relieves the ego’s anxiety by 
removing troubling thoughts or affects from consciousness. Yet, even when the ego 
represses the impulses generated by the id, they continue to seek re-entry, like someone 
pounding on a locked door. When repressed thoughts and affects continue to place strain 
on the ego, the person develops symptoms and neurosis results. For Freud, neurosis 
represents the central problem human beings face, and it is the primary ailment 
psychoanalysis is designed to heal. As is clear from this very brief sketch of Freud’s 
theory, Freud presents a model of mental life that is almost completely intrapsychic in its 
focus. Indeed, Freud’s understanding of human development as dominated by constant 
negotiation between psychic structures proves highly individualistic, and leaves very 
little room for the self to attend to the impact and influence of interpersonal relationships 
or wider social contexts. 
For some of the psychological theorists who built on Freud’s work, this highly 
intrapsychic model based primarily on the drive to attain pleasure or satisfy aggression 
seemed out of touch with the way that human beings actually mature. Although many of 
these thinkers agreed that sexuality and aggression are important aspects of human 
behavior, they wondered whether Freud’s structural theory missed a key aspect of human 
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development—namely, the drive toward relationships. This interest in the role of 
relationships in personality development became the capstone of two specific schools of 
thought within psychodynamic psychology: object relations theory (ORT) and Heinz 
Kohut’s self psychology. Although these schools of thought vary in important ways, they 
also share two important characteristics: both are grounded firmly in the psychoanalytic 
(Freudian) tradition, and both understand the drive toward establishing relationships—
rather than the drive to release sexual or aggressive energy—as the central factor in 
human health and transformation.
221
  
To state it simply: object relations theory and self psychology focus on the role of 
primary relationships in human development, rather than on the discharge of 
physiological drives. Because this project deals with the fundamentally relational and 
communal issue of conflict in congregations, object relations theory and self psychology 
prove a more natural fit for my analysis here than does classic Freudian theory. Thus, in 
what follows, I utilize ideas from these two schools of thought to explore the 
psychological aspects of congregational conflict. In so doing, I also use the concept of 
anxiety as a lens through which to examine human functioning from a psychodynamic 
perspective. More specifically, I draw upon particular concepts from object relations 
theory and self psychology—namely, splitting and projection and the alter ego need—to 
argue that anxiety is a natural human response to difference, which may be perceived as 
complexity or ambiguity in the self, in important others, or in groups. Such difference 
often causes individuals to experience threats to their sense of identity, which also 
generates higher levels of anxiety. If it is not managed well, this anxiety produces highly 
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defensive and/or destructive reactions such as splitting and projection or rigid needs for 
sameness. In discussing these kinds of reactions, I also illustrate the ways in which they 
manifested themselves in each of the congregations described in the case studies. 
 In addition, while resources from ORT and Kohut’s theory illuminate both case 
studies in certain ways, they do not apply equally well to both situations. As I noted in 
the previous chapter, the conflict at Grace UCC proved much more emotionally volatile 
and divisive than did that at First UMC. For this reason, the defensive mechanisms of 
splitting and projection seem to have been much more pronounced at Grace UCC. In 
other words, because Grace UCC members’ sense of self, and the sense of the 
congregation’s group identity ,” felt more threatened, their anxiety was much more 
intense and the defensive processes of splitting and projection surfaced much more 
strongly. In contrast, at First UMC, the congregants' overriding sense of identity was 
rooted more firmly in the church as a whole, rather than in the sub-groups represented by 
various worship services. In fact, many of the people I interviewed at First UMC said that 
although they very much wanted to keep their particular worship service intact, in the end 
they really wanted “what was best” for the congregation. This is not to say, however, that 
the parishioners at First UMC did not display strong desires for sameness. In the latter 
part of this chapter I will argue that the pull toward sameness is helpfully clarified by 
Kohut’s concept of the alter ego need, which was also operative in both of the case 
studies under examination here. 
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Splitting and Projection 
 
History of Terms 
In Splitting and Projective Identification, psychoanalyst James S. Grotstein notes 
that the concept of splitting first appeared in the field of psychoanalysis in the nineteenth 
century. Many psychiatrists of that era referred to it as “double consciousness,” while in 
their 1895 text Studies in Hysteria, Joseph Breuer and Sigmund Freud describe a similar 
phenomenon that they call “splitting of consciousness.”222 In both cases, the kind of 
splitting described is a deeply pathological response, often in reaction to trauma, which 
splits off an unwanted idea or memory and makes it inaccessible to the conscious mind. 
In his early work Freud referred often to “splitting of consciousness,” but he gradually 
moved away from this terminology, choosing instead to emphasize the defense of 
repression as it functioned within his structural theory of the mind.
223
 In other words, 
instead of focusing on the actual splitting of intrapsychic phenomena, Freud concentrated 
on the second part of the process: namely, the removal and suppression of unwanted 
elements from conscious memory through repression. Freud returned to the study of 
splitting much later in his career; however, the concept was more widely explored in the 
work of object relations theorists. For this reason, I will engage the concepts of defensive 
splitting and projection primarily through the lens of object relations theory, while 
acknowledging that these terms have their genesis in much earlier psychoanalytic 
thought. 
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Basic ORT Terminology 
In order to understand how the specific mechanisms of splitting and projection 
operate within an object relations framework, it is necessary to establish a basic definition 
of the field and its key terms. As I previously noted, object relations theory (ORT) refers 
to a psychological school of thought that grew out of the psychoanalytic tradition 
originally established by Sigmund Freud.
224
 Primarily associated with theorists like 
Melanie Klein, Ronald Fairbairn, and D.W. Winnicott, ORT departs from classical 
Freudian notions of child development as a process of harnessing sexual and aggressive 
drives. Instead, ORT views human development in terms of “individuation,” a process 
that “proceeds by way of diverse emotional attachments to familial and social ‘objects,’ 
which the child progressively internalizes and distinguishes from the self.”225 ORT claims 
that early relationships between children and their primary caregivers “leave a lasting 
impression . . . These residues of past relationships, these inner object relations, shape 
perceptions of individuals and relationships with other individuals.”226 In this way, ORT 
acknowledges a more central role for relationships than was afforded by earlier 
psychoanalytic formulations.  
   Freud originally used the term “object” to refer to the target of an individual’s 
libidinal drives. ORT, by contrast, defines an “object” as “that with which a subject 
relates. Feelings and affects have objects; for example, I love my children, I fear snakes, 
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I am angry with my neighbor.”227 Yet, within ORT, “object” also refers to the mental 
representation of important objects. For example, my spouse is an important “object” in 
the actual world of my social relationships, but he is also an “object” in my internal 
psychological world because I carry constructed representations of him in my mind. 
Thus, within discussions of ORT, one must be careful to distinguish between “the 
external person who is observable [and] the inner object, which is the mental 
representation of the actual observable person.”228  
One way to make this distinction clear is to use more specific terminology in 
reference to internal psychological objects, so as to differentiate them from actual people 
or things in the external world. ORT uses three key terms to describe an individual’s 
intrapsychic “objects”: self-representation (SR), object-representation (OR), and object 
relationship (O/R). Self-representation simply refers to the mental representation of 
oneself. Self-representations may include both “narrow” and “broad” elements; narrow 
elements would include images of the self stored in memory, memories of the self at 
different points in life, or imagined images of a future self. In other words, narrow self-
representations refer to direct and immediate images of the self, which may be either 
positive or negative.
229
 Broad self-representations, in contrast, may include images of 
groups or organizations that are related to the self in some important way. These may be 
referred to as “associated self-representations” because they are not direct images of the 
self, but of a particular category to which the self belongs.
230
 For instance, I might have 
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an associated SR that includes general images of Vanderbilt graduate students or clergy 
persons because I am a member of both groups. 
  Object-representations (ORs) can be defined as “our conscious and unconscious 
images of an external object.”231 In other words, ORs represent something important to a 
person that is external to his or her self. Like self-representations, object-representations 
can appear in both narrow and broad forms. Narrow ORs would include images of other 
people, whereas broad ORs would include non-human objects such as religious entities or 
abstractions of various types.
232
 Furthermore, both broad and narrow ORs may include 
past, present, and future images of the objects in question. To return to the example I 
used earlier: an object-representation of my spouse (which would be a narrow OR) might 
include memories I have of him, present images of his role in my life, and how I imagine 
him in the future.  
 The term object relationship (O/R) refers to how a person understands the 
relationship between his or her SRs and ORs. The O/R thus represents a relationship that 
is important to the self, and that describes how the self relates to a significant object. The 
O/R may be either positive or negative, and can therefore include a sense of deep 
attachment to or strong reaction against the object. To carry the previous example 
through: because my relationship with my spouse is a loving one, the O/R between my 
self-representation and the object representation of my spouse is primarily a positive one 
that creates a feeling of connection.
233
 These concepts of self representation, object 
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representation, and object relationship are central to the current discussion of splitting 
and projection, because, as I will show below, these are intrapsychic mechanisms that are 
applied to mental representations of the self or others.  
 
Defensive Splitting and Projection in ORT 
Having established basic definitions of the intrapsychic “objects” that form the 
focus of ORT, it is now possible to explore how the concept of splitting operates within 
this theoretical framework. James Grotstein defines splitting as “the activity by which the 
ego discerns differences within the self and its objects, or between itself and objects.”234 
Thus, in its most basic sense, splitting is a value-neutral term that simply refers to the 
self’s ability to make distinctions between intrapsychic phenomena. However, when used 
in its defensive sense, splitting refers to the self’s attempt to “split itself off from the 
perception of an unwanted aspect of itself” or to “split an object into two or more objects 
in order to locate polarized, immiscible qualities separately.”235 Both of these kinds of 
defensive splitting tend to separate self or objects into “all good” or “all bad” categories.  
Melanie Klein, considered by many to be one of the co-founders of ORT, has 
noted that this kind of splitting begins in the earliest days of infancy (the “pre-
Oedipal”stage), and that it is initially part of normal human development. At this stage, a 
baby will split his conception of his mother into two separate entities: the “good breast,” 
who “satisfies all [the baby's] desires,” and the “bad breast,” who is held responsible for 
the baby’s feelings of hunger, pain, or other discomfort.236 According to Klein, the baby 
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experiences the “good” and “bad” breasts as two completely different realities; doing so 
helps the baby cope with powerful contradictory feelings of love and hate toward the 
mother.
237
 Likewise, Vamik Volkan, a contemporary psychoanalyst and psychiatrist, 
explains that when infants experience instances of pleasure (having a clean diaper or 
being held) and pain (being cold or hungry), they lack the capacity to understand that 
both these positive and negative aspects are contained in a unified self. As a result, they 
split these experiences into “the pleasant I” and “the unpleasant I,” keeping the positive 
associations located within “the pleasant I,” and externalizing the negative ones.238  
 As the infant matures, he or she is forced to accomplish the task of bringing 
dissimilar pieces of experience together—to merge the pleasant and the unpleasant “I,” as 
well as to merge positive and negative aspects of beloved objects into singular entities: 
“The child attempts to create a whole object from disparate parts – to make gray from 
black and white.”239 This process of “gray-making” begins at about six months of age, 
and is typically completed around the age of 36 months. At that point, “the child should 
be able to tolerate ambivalence—to love and hate the same person or himself at any given 
time.”240 Thus, although splitting originates as a normal part of the child’s orientation to 
external reality, over time it becomes unnecessary as the child learns that both good and 
bad qualities can be contained in the same person. 
 However, even in the case of “normal” human development, the process of gray-
making is never totally complete. As the child grows into adolescence and then into 
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adulthood, small remnants of “black” and “white” persist within his or her self- and 
object-representations. If these remnants were allowed to remain un-integrated in the self, 
they would become sources of perpetual internal conflict and fragmentation. Instead, they 
are split off and placed on “suitable targets of externalization.”241 In this way, the 
intolerable or “bad” qualities can be removed from the self-representation and placed on 
someone else. Likewise, “bad” qualities of a beloved object can be projected onto another 
person, who then becomes an enemy that can be hated completely. 
 The notion of externalizing the “bad” qualities of the self or beloved objects 
points to a key characteristic of this kind of splitting: as opposed to the normal splitting 
that takes place in early child development, splitting that persists into adolescence and 
adulthood is defensive in nature. It is designed to defend the self against perceived 
threats. As I have already noted, basic threats to the self typically produce generalized 
anxiety within individuals; anxiety thus represents one of the most common catalysts for 
defensive splitting. I argue that such anxiety frequently arises in response to an encounter 
with difference that feels threatening in some way. Anxiety-producing difference may 
come from outside—such as experiencing another person or group as profoundly 
different from the self—or from inside, when a person's self-representations appear too 
complex or ambiguous. In this case, aspects of an individual's SRs are experienced as 
“different from the rest of me”242; consequently, the person's SRs feel too heterogeneous 
and difficult to contain, which creates anxiety. Such intense anxiety may then cause a 
person to feel that his or her self is at risk of fragmenting or disintegrating. In other 
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words, the unified self that was achieved during childhood, and that has managed to 
incorporate both good and bad qualities, may feel threatened by the anxiety created by 
the remnants of intensely positive or negative aspects within the self. Thus, when 
understood from an ORT perspective, the anxiety created by the remnants of all-good or 
all-bad qualities in self-representations can spur a person to find ways of getting rid of the 
un-integrated pieces. In many cases, defensive splitting may prove the most accessible 
remedy for the powerful discomfort generated by such threats to the self.  
 As we have seen, when individuals are unable to tolerate certain aspects of their 
SRs, they remove them by splitting them off from other aspects of these mental 
representations. The split-off qualities are then ascribed to an object external to the self, 
to which the self often responds with aggression. This process, known as projection, is 
recognized as a “basic and primitive ego defense,” and often arises when the self feels 
threatened in some way.
243
 Pastoral theologian David Augsburger describes the process 
as follows:  
The defensive denial ‘I am not self-centered!’ is immediately transformed to the 
accusation ‘You are so self-centered.’ ‘What do you mean I’m lazy? You’re lazy.’ 
The disowned part we had gunnysacked returns to confront us; the split-off 
reappears in others who threaten us; the ostracized elements of our personalities 
are encountered in the adversary.
244
  
Similarly, contemporary psychoanalyst Marshall Edelson describes projection as the self 
creating a “container” for those aspects that it cannot bear to possess:  
 . . . if there is something in myself that is different from the rest of me, that I feel 
doesn’t belong in me, you become a container in which I can throw what I want to 
disown in myself, just by imagining that what I feel to be not-me is in you. You 
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can be the container in which I dispose of my garbage, which has become 
nothing-to-do-with-me.
245
 
These descriptions demonstrate how projection defends the self from unwanted qualities 
and the uncomfortable feelings of ambiguity they produce. So, for example, if I cannot 
tolerate the idea that I am lazy (or sick, or arrogant, etc.) I will split that trait off from my 
self-representation and project it onto someone else. As I noted earlier, such splitting and 
projection are defensive maneuvers designed to maintain an integrated sense of self in the 
face of anxiety-producing threats. Yet, it is important to recognize that defensive splitting 
and projection are unconscious processes. In other words, people are not aware that they 
are splitting off unwanted aspects of their self-representations and projecting them onto 
others. Again, in early childhood such a maneuver constitutes a normal part of the 
developmental process; later, though, it represents a defensive mechanism that arises 
when a person has difficulty holding seemingly opposed traits together in his or her self-
representation.   
 Splitting and projection may also occur when a person cannot tolerate 
contradictory elements within a beloved object. In this case, to cope with the anxiety 
produced by such contradiction, individuals may split representations of other persons or 
groups into separate hated or beloved entities. In Playing Pygmalion: How People Create 
One Another, psychotherapist and professor of psychology Ruthellen Josselson describes 
how this kind of splitting operates within the context of interpersonal relationships: 
People are bonded through their mutual creations, each carrying a part of the other 
that the other either can’t recognize (in terms of positive aspects) or can’t bear 
(negative ones) in the self . . . we can also enlist people to be villains and spend 
our lives defending ourselves against them, we can create people as needy and 
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spend our lives enslaved to them, or, as parents, create children as disowned parts 
of ourselves and then punish or reject them for it.
246
 
While Josselson does not actually use the term “splitting” in her discussion of these 
defensive processes, the reality she describes meshes well with the phenomenon of 
splitting under examination here. When Josselson speaks of “creating” others in a 
particular image—the villain, the dependent, the “bad” child—she is talking about the 
process of splitting objects into all-good or all-bad categories, to which the self can then 
react positively or negatively, with no uncomfortable sense of ambiguity. As Josselson 
notes, these categories most frequently originate from disowned parts of the self that have 
been split off and projected onto someone else. Yet, no matter what the origin of these 
categories, the goal of defensively splitting objects remains the same: to remove the 
uncertainty from one’s relationship with important objects by refusing to acknowledge 
that both good and bad qualities can be contained within one person.  
 
Collective Splitting and Scapegoating 
As I have shown above, defensive splitting refers not only to splitting off parts of 
the self, but also to splitting objects into two or more objects so as to divide their qualities 
into all-good or all-bad categories. When the object in question is a group, this process is 
called “collective splitting,” and results in the division of the group into hated and 
beloved sub-groups.
247
 A discussion of collective splitting proves especially relevant for 
this project, for two specific reasons. First, because this dissertation addresses conflict 
within congregations, it is important to examine how the particular psychological 
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concepts under examination here might function within group settings. Second, it is 
important to acknowledge that within a case study approach, it is very difficult to access 
the internal psychological functioning and intentions of individuals. In this regard, 
collective splitting proves an especially helpful concept in that it moves the discussion 
from an intrapsychic focus on internal self- and object-representations to an exploration 
of the ways in which group members may utilize splitting and projection as part of 
interpersonal and group processes.  
In Internal World and External Reality, contemporary psychoanalytic theorist 
Otto Kernberg notes that collective splitting frequently appears within the context of 
groups which “cannot tolerate any opposition to the ‘ideology’ shared by the majority of 
[their] members”; as a result, this kind of group “easily splits into subgroups which fight 
each other.”248 Similarly, pastoral theologian K. Brynolf Lyon argues that collective 
splitting is a common feature of conflict within communities of faith: when church 
members are unable to tolerate the inclusion of diverse qualities within one religious 
body, they split the community into subgroups that they then label as all-good or all-bad. 
When these dynamics occur, it becomes difficult for members of each subgroup to 
recognize others as unique human beings:  
For both subgroups, the complexity and emotional depth of other participants in 
the conflict are occasionally lost. It is as if the members of the other subgroup are 
no longer subjects at all but rather objects or forces which are experienced as 
attacking or opposed to the self.
249
  
 This observation highlights the fact that in such situations of intense conflict, collective 
splitting occurs, at its root, because the experience of too much difference within the 
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group causes individuals to experience a threat to their sense of self or identity. When the 
self feels threatened in this way, intense anxiety develops. As a result, the individual 
begins to define those in the “all-bad” category in terms of how they affect the self, rather 
than as individuals in their own right.  
 Recall, too, that defensive splitting is quite frequently accompanied by projection. 
In a communal context, collective splitting and projection produce the phenomenon of 
scapegoating, in which a group displaces blame and anger onto an individual or another 
group through defensive projective processes. Lyon studies this specific phenomenon in 
religious communities and describes in detail how it functions in such contexts:  
The basic process of scapegoating is this: disturbing feelings in some group 
members are unconsciously projected onto another individual or subgroup. In 
other words, as a way to protect against the pain of recognizing and managing 
these disturbing feelings in themselves, these group members imagine that those 
feelings are not present in themselves but only in those identified others. The 
group acts, therefore, as if it is that other person or that subgroup of people who 
possess what is bad or distressing.
250
  
This description clearly illustrates the processes of defensive splitting and projection that 
are under discussion here. In fact, many of the same characteristics that were highlighted 
in the previous discussion of splitting and projection appear in scapegoating as well; they 
simply take on new forms within a communal setting. These forms include two key 
elements that I will discuss below: the establishment of all-good and all-bad sub-groups, 
and the intolerance of complexity and ambiguity. As I will show, both of these elements 
function as attempts to eliminate the anxiety produced by encounters with difference in 
the group. 
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As I have explained above, scapegoating involves splitting the self and/or 
important objects into all-good or all-bad categories; negative qualities from one’s self- 
or object-representations are then projected onto others in the group so that the self does 
not have to own them. As with defensive splitting and projection in interpersonal 
relationships, scapegoating serves to protect the self from aspects that it experiences as 
intolerable, and that would create intense anxiety if they remained within a person's self-
representation. Edelson describes the process this way:  
Looking for some person or some group to blame, members put (project) what is 
unwanted in themselves into a member, subgroup, or group, already marked in 
some way as different or other. That is, they now perceive it to be there, outside 
themselves, where it can be extruded from their group or organization.
251
  
Here Edelson notes that in collective splitting, individuals not only seek to expunge 
negative qualities from the self, but also from the group in which the self participates. 
After all, as we have seen, group memberships are part of one’s self-representation. As 
such, if there are qualities in a group to which one belongs that are unbearable, those 
qualities may also have to be removed in order for the self to feel protected. Removing 
such qualities through defensive splitting and projection allows an individual to simplify 
his or her relationship to the group, which becomes “all-good” and thereby minimizes the 
anxiety created by conflicted or contradictory feelings. Scapegoating thus serves to 
protect not only the individual self, but the “group self” to which individuals belong.252  
Another hallmark of scapegoating involves the inability to tolerate complexity or 
ambiguity, either in the self or in a group to which the self belongs. As noted above, 
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scapegoating begins when “disturbing feelings” arise within members of a group.253 The 
need to split these feelings off and project them onto others seems to coincide with an 
inability to tolerate complexity or ambiguity within group life. The prior discussion of 
object relations theory showed that developing infants lack the ability to hold positive 
and negative qualities together in the same person. Yet, within just a few years, most 
children achieve this capacity and are able to recognize that the “pleasant I” and the 
“unpleasant I,” or the “good mother” and the “bad mother,” are contained within a single 
individual. When this capacity is not fully realized, or when the self feels threatened, 
individuals may respond with the unconscious defenses of splitting and projection. 
Within a group context, a similar process operates: ambiguous or contradictory 
elements feel impossible to hold together. This generates anxiety, which drives 
individuals to simplify their experience by dividing the group into factions through 
either/or thinking, which is itself a form of splitting. For example, in a congregation, 
intense anxiety might cause individuals to split the group into sub-groups that they then 
label as “supportive of the pastor” and “critical of the pastor.” Such either/or thinking 
frequently leads to a process of scapegoating, because as positive and negative elements 
of experience are split off from one another, they can then be assigned to various persons 
or subgroups. As Edelson explains:  
Members of a group or organization deal with a problem by simplifying it, 
attributing it to a struggle between two mutually exclusive opposites. It is either 
this or that . . . Often, the situation is more complicated. That’s really why there is 
a problem. Both this and that exist together. But either/or thinking leads members 
to split what actually co-exists. They accept, acknowledge, are willing to own one 
of the two pieces that issue from the split, while they reject, refuse to 
                                                          
253
 Ibid., 143. 
178 
 
acknowledge, want to disown, the other – some feeling, attitude, belief, or 
impulse in themselves.
254
 
Again, this description points to the ways in which collective splitting and projection 
serve to protect the self or the group from unwanted qualities by placing them onto 
others.  
 It is important to recognize, however, that this process not only projects negative 
traits onto other people or subgroups, but it also pretends that these other people or 
subgroups only possess negative traits. In other words, in situations of scapegoating, one 
loses the ability to see others as complex individuals or groups with a diversity of 
qualities. In such situations, those doing the scapegoating lose “the ability to understand 
the scapegoat’s behavior in terms of the scapegoat’s own feelings, longings, and 
intentions. The scapegoat appears as having cartoonish feelings and longings rather than 
complex and understandable ones.”255 Subsequently, unwanted qualities of the self or the 
group are split off and projected onto another person or group; that person or group (the 
scapegoat) then becomes a flat, simplistic entity that one can wholeheartedly criticize or 
even hate, without the discomfort of conflicted or ambiguous feelings. 
Both in terms of interpersonal and group relations, the phenomenon of scapegoating 
proves deeply problematic because it grossly misrepresents the true nature of human 
beings and the way human relationships actually work. Individuals are neither all-good 
nor all-bad, and every relationship—no matter how positive or negative—contains some 
ambiguity. As Josselson writes,  
Trying to recognize our projections means acknowledging to ourselves that how 
we see people is not the totality of how they ‘are’ . . . The nature of relationships 
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is always ambivalent – filled with love and hate. It is the effort to keep these 
powerful feelings apart that leads to the distortions. The more we really ‘know’ 
people, the more complex they will appear and the more contradictory will be our 
feelings toward them.
256
 
Once again, this observation points to a difficulty that appears to lie at the heart of 
splitting and projection, in both its individual and collective forms: namely, an inability 
to contain diverse qualities within a single individual or group, without having intense 
anxiety develop.  
 This point highlights the role of difference in the processes of splitting and 
projection: when the self or beloved objects (including groups) are experienced as too 
complex or heterogeneous—i.e., as containing too much difference—the self (or the 
group to which the self belongs) begins to feel at risk of losing its cohesiveness and one’s 
sense of identity feels deeply threatened. As a result, the defenses of splitting and 
projection emerge. This helps to explain why conflict arises so frequently in groups like 
congregations, which pride themselves on cultivating intimate relationships among their 
members. In other words, the more we come to know others, the more complex they will 
seem, which in turn creates increasingly intense contradictory feelings.
257
 These 
contradictory feelings then generate anxiety as individuals struggle to hold together the 
positive and negative aspects in their representations of other individuals and of the group 
as a whole. If individuals are not equipped with healthy ways of handling such anxiety-
producing feelings, they may resort to splitting and projection as a means of defending 
against them.  
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Application to the Case Studies 
 Thus far in this chapter, I have established extensive definitions of defensive 
splitting and projection within an object relations framework, and described some of the 
ways in which these mechanisms may function in communal settings. Now, I will show 
how these concepts illuminate the conflicts in the specific congregations I described in 
the previous chapter. I have already suggested that splitting and projection appear more 
obvious in the case of Grace UCC than in that of First UMC; I will explore possible 
reasons for this difference below. First, though, it is important to flesh out just how 
defensive splitting and projection may have been operating in each of the case studies at 
hand. The previous chapter clearly showed that the conflict at Grace UCC proved much 
more emotionally volatile than that at First UMC. At Grace UCC, the “discussions” 
around gay marriage frequently turned into heated exchanges, complete with raised 
voices and pointed fingers. Yet, the presence of emotional volatility does not necessarily 
mean that defensive psychological maneuvers like splitting and projection are operative. 
Indeed, because splitting and projection are, by definition, intrapsychic phenomena, there 
is no way to “prove” that such mechanisms were at work in this or any other particular 
conflict. However, if we return to some of the characteristics of collective splitting 
described above, we can begin to see that the conflict that emerged at Grace UCC 
displays many of these same traits. 
 In terms of the overall group dynamic at Grace UCC, it seems clear that 
“splitting” of some kind was taking place, since the congregation divided itself into two 
distinct groups: one that favored staying in the United Church of Christ and one that 
argued for leaving it. As I noted in Chapter Three, I base this characterization on my own 
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observation of how the conflict at Grace UCC played out, as well as on the perceptions of 
several of the individuals involved. As Jack noted in his interview, once the “sides” of the 
conflict were established, very little could be done to bring them together: “I don’t know 
anyone that was on [one] side of the fence or the other that crossed over after the lines 
had been drawn,” he stated. 
Once the congregation divided into two opposing groups, they quickly began to 
see each other in very stark terms, based almost exclusively on their position on the issue 
at hand. In other words, members of each group began to identify those in the other group 
as “with us” or “against us,” almost solely along the lines of whether or not they wanted 
the congregation to leave the UCC. This fact demonstrates several of the characteristics 
of collective splitting described above. For instance, in collective splitting, a group is 
divided into smaller sub-groups that are labeled as “all-good” or “all-bad”; the members 
of the sub-groups are stereotyped according to a particular trait that they ostensibly hold 
in common. Thus, the groups at Grace UCC were sometimes labeled as “pro-UCC” or 
“anti-UCC,” even though individual members within the groups may have held more 
nuanced views toward the denomination. In some cases, members of the sub-groups 
characterized each other with pejorative words and phrases, such as “un-Christian,” 
“against Scripture,” “liberal,” “fundamentalist,” “homophobic,” and “irrational.” 
Although these terms take on very different meanings depending on the context in which 
they are used, in this case it seemed clear that church members used them to create a 
sense of one’s own group as “right” and the other as “wrong.”  
As we have seen, splitting positive and negative aspects apart in this way allows 
individuals to get rid of unwanted characteristics within the self, or the group to which 
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the self belongs. In the case of Grace UCC, I suggest that individuals may have been 
deeply disturbed by a particular trait—such as tolerance of homosexuality or the 
appearance of bigotry—and as a result, felt compelled to split that trait off and project it 
onto others through the use of homogeneous categories. More specifically, the passage of 
the UCC resolution may have caused many of the members of Grace UCC to reflect on 
the self-representation that they associated with their religious denomination. For some 
of them, the discovery that this associated SR contained a very powerful negative element 
(i.e., support of gay marriage) may have created so much anxiety that they felt the need to 
split it off from their SRs. In other words, to them it seemed impossible to maintain any 
SR that was still associated with the UCC; thus, the entire UCC-related SR had to go. 
Once this associated SR was split off from the self, its most undesirable characteristics 
(“un-Christian,” ignorant of Scripture, etc.) could then be projected onto members of the 
opposing group.  
In the same way, those who experienced their UCC-related self-representation in 
primarily positive terms (tolerant, supportive of pastors, etc.), may have also harbored 
some internal doubts about the issue of gay marriage specifically, or homosexuality more 
generally. Those doubts may have felt intolerable to them, and caused them to split those 
aspects off of their self-representations and project them onto those in the other group, 
labeling them as “homophobic” or as ruled by their “emotions.” However, I assert that, in 
reality, people in both groups had more complex and nuanced ideas than what is 
represented in these stark categories. I know, from having been present during the 
conflict and from interviewing individuals who were involved, that some of those who 
wished to leave the UCC on theological grounds were actually wrestling with just how to 
183 
 
understand homosexuality from a religious perspective. Likewise, some of those who 
wished to stay in the UCC had strong reservations about gay marriage and/or 
homosexuality, or about the denomination as a whole. Even though some of these 
nuances were stated publicly, the conflict continued to develop along rigid lines, with 
very little opportunity for productive discussion.  
In addition to splitting off elements of the self and projecting them onto others, 
the events at Grace UCC also included splitting important objects into positive and 
negative categories. The clearest example of this appeared in a few parishioners’ attempts 
to scapegoat me or the senior pastor as being the root cause of the conflict. Some of these 
parishioners felt that, because we had publicly voiced our loyalty to the UCC, the senior 
pastor and I must also condone gay marriage. Others thought that by advocating 
continued relationship with the denomination, the pastoral staff was, at the very least, 
trying to force the church to be part of something with which many of its members 
disagreed. In short, these parishioners seem to have been unable to tolerate any 
theological complexity within their pastoral leaders. In other words, they could not 
reconcile the fact that they respected and admired many things about their pastors, while 
at the same time disagreeing so vehemently with the pastors’ (assumed) position on gay 
marriage. As a result, these congregants seem to have split off the positive aspects of 
myself and the senior pastor, and focused instead on what they perceived to be our 
attempts to make the congregation support something that they felt to be biblically and 
morally unacceptable.  
This is not to say that only those who wished to leave the denomination engaged 
in splitting. In fact, it is possible to understand some parishioners' staunch support of the 
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pastors as “idealizing” behavior—i.e., imagining the pastors as all-good and splitting off 
any negative or ambiguous traits from their representations of their leaders. As I 
mentioned above, many of those who wished to remain in the UCC actually opposed gay 
marriage and/or felt conflicted about the issue of homosexuality in general. At the same 
time, these parishioners strongly supported the senior pastor and me in our advocacy for 
continued denominational affiliation. The awareness that the senior pastor and I might 
actually support gay marriage could have produced anxiety for some of these 
congregants, and caused them to split that aspect off from their overall positive images of 
us. In fact, on more than one occasion, parishioners said things like, “It really doesn't 
matter what our pastors believe personally; staying in the UCC is best for the 
congregation, so that's what we should do.” These kinds of statements imply that for 
some church members, it felt more comfortable not to reflect on the pastors' personal 
views related to gay marriage, because such reflection might reveal significant 
theological differences with which they were not prepared to cope. 
This way of understanding the events at Grace UCC highlights another common 
characteristic of collective splitting: namely, the inability to tolerate ambiguity or 
complexity. Rather than seeing the opposing group as a collection of diverse individuals 
with varying viewpoints on a wide range of issues, the groups at Grace UCC quickly 
began to react to each other based on whether they wished to stay in the denomination or 
leave it. This kind of splitting occurs quite commonly within congregational conflict, and 
often results in caricaturing those with opposing viewpoints as having “cartoonish” 
intentions and feelings.
258
 In fact, such splitting serves to protect the self or a beloved 
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sub-group, not only from unwanted characteristics but also from awareness of its own 
bad behavior: 
. . . while each subgroup is aware of the insults it experiences from the other, it 
tends to be unaware of the injurious character of its own behavior toward the 
other subgroup or toward the pastor. The experience is more that of warding off 
threats to the self or valued others (including, for both subgroups, the beloved 
congregation) than having engaged in behavior that might potentially merit guilt 
or remorse.
259
 
Such a dynamic certainly seems to have been present at Grace UCC, in that at different 
times, proponents of both “sides” of the conflict used very contentious tactics and 
language in their approach to one another. Indeed, one member described the business 
meeting where the conflict initially erupted as “venomous” in its tone and in its effect on 
those present.  
My interpretation of the events at Grace UCC—read through the lens of the 
aforementioned psychological theory—is that both sides were, in effect, scapegoating 
each other, in that each group seemed to blame the conflict on the other’s unwillingness 
to change. Those who wanted to stay in the UCC felt that if the others would simply “let 
it go,” and be satisfied with writing a letter of complaint to the denomination, everything 
would be fine. Similarly, those who wished to dissociate argued that if the congregation 
left the UCC, they could keep me and the senior pastor on; they said that they would find 
a way to pay our pension and our insurance, and “nothing would have to change” other 
than our denominational affiliation. These positions fail to acknowledge any real merit in 
the convictions held by the other side, and tend to cast the opponents as “the problem” 
that would be solved, if only “they” would be reasonable. As a result, the congregation 
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began to see its conflict as a game with only one possible “winner”; we failed to imagine 
a way to stay together and still contain sharply opposing ideas about something as 
visceral as sexuality. Just as individuals, at times, struggle to contain conflicting ideas or 
feelings within themselves, Grace UCC was unable to contain conflicting positions 
within its “group self.” Consequently, these positions were split apart and pitted against 
each other. 
 At First UMC, the phenomenon of splitting was still present, but in a much less 
virulent form. As I mentioned in Chapter Three, the splitting of the congregation into 
three distinct groups according to worship service was most obvious at the initial meeting 
of the worship committee, in which individuals identified themselves physically by 
sitting with other members of their preferred service. Yet, at First UMC, the 
characterization of particular sub-groups as “good” or “bad” was less apparent. Instead, 
the impression I got from the interviewees was that the situation felt more complex, and 
as a result, it was difficult to choose one service to eliminate altogether. For example, in 
describing the committee’s approach to its decision-making process, Simon, a middle-
aged man who had attended the contemporary service since its inception, stated, 
I guess the main thing was we didn't want to basically just ignore a group and just 
say, hey, 8:30 and 11:00, you're identical. You've got the choir and high organ. 
We just didn't want to say, boom, you guys are gone; just jump up to 11:00 and 
go, because this other service is totally different. So I guess the feeling was you 
wanted to make all three groups accept a little of the pain that would be involved 
in consolidating services.  
That said, it was also apparent from my interviews that, at least at first, members of each 
worship service went into the decision-making process with an inclination to fight for 
their particular service. Indeed, Nancy, another devoted contemporary worshipper, 
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claimed that many of the members of the worship committee felt, “This is our chance to 
convince everybody that our service is the most important and the best.” Such an attitude 
reveals some of the same “in-group/out-group” dynamics that frequently appear within 
collective splitting, since each sub-group felt compelled to advocate for its own survival. 
Within this process, individuals began to split off negative characteristics from their self-
representation and project them onto other individuals or sub-groups as a way of 
protecting the self from perceived threats. 
This happened at First UMC, though in a much more limited way than at Grace 
UCC. For instance, the senior pastor of First UMC told me that over the years, there were 
a few individuals in the congregation who experienced the contemporary service as an 
“irritant,” and would have liked for it to disappear. Likewise, Roy, the founder of the 
contemporary service, shared that some in the congregation stereotyped the contemporary 
worshippers as outsiders who did not have deep roots in the congregation, and who did 
not adequately support the congregation with financial resources. At least one person told 
Roy that he saw the contemporary service as practicing “cheap worship.” These 
characterizations may be interpreted as attempts on the part of more traditional 
worshippers to project onto others their anxieties about something that they experienced 
as very different, and potentially threatening to their sense of First UMC’s identity.  
Similarly, some of the contemporary worshippers I interviewed tended to describe 
the traditional worship service as “high church,” “awestruck,” or “separate.” These 
interviewees also shared that the contemporary service felt much more “warm” to them, 
and that they could sense God’s presence much more easily in the contemporary service. 
While these statements do not directly characterize traditional worshippers in negative 
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terms, they do carry a subtle implication that those in the traditional service were not as 
friendly, and that their worship was not as closely connected with a very immanent sense 
of the Holy Spirit’s presence. Thus, I maintain that a more subtle kind of splitting was 
going on through the description of the different worship services with opposing sets of 
terms: “warm” vs. “reverent,” “casual” vs. “formal,” “cozy” vs. “awestruck,” 
“conversation” vs. “silence,” etc. These pairs of opposites, though not necessarily 
negative, suggest that each service contains only one side of the pair; thus, the 
contemporary service is somehow only warm, casual, and cozy, but not transcendent or 
reverent. Dividing the worship services into particular categories represents another form 
of the intolerance of complexity that so frequently accompanies collective splitting, and 
that may have contributed to the initial tensions between members of these different 
groups when it came time to address the worship issues at First UMC. 
 Still, although these more subtle forms of splitting were evident at First UMC, it 
would seem that the threat to the individuals’ sense of selfhood—and, thus, their 
anxiety—was not nearly as powerful as at Grace UCC. People identified strongly with 
their preferred worship service, but by and large they identified more with the church as a 
whole; in fact, most of them said in their interviews that they wanted what was “best” for 
First UMC. For instance, “Arthur,”260 a committed member of the 11:00 traditional 
service, said, “there was a sense that we're all in this together and it's not about me; it's 
about the church and its success. So that seemed to be the ultimate conclusion of most of 
the people.” Similarly, Roy claimed that he would have agreed to eliminate the 
contemporary service altogether if it would have contributed to the overall health of the 
congregation:  
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I just felt like we were at a crossroads as a church, that it was gonna go south 
quick, and just – if we had to give the whole [contemporary] service up and never 
do it – to me, it would have been the right thing to do. You know? For the 
betterment of the larger church.  
These reflections from members of First UMC suggest that although they felt strongly 
about maintaining the integrity of their own worship service, they felt even more strongly 
about keeping the congregation intact and resolving the conflict peacefully. In other 
words, the conflict at First UMC likely posed less of a threat to parishioners’ sense of 
self, perhaps because they ultimately identified more as members of First UMC than as 
members of a particular worship service. Psychodynamic psychology suggests that a 
decreased sense of threat to selfhood or identity means decreased anxiety, and thus less of 
a need for splitting and projection. This may help to explain, at least in part, why First 
UMC experienced greater success in resolving their conflict than did Grace UCC. 
 
The Alter Ego Need and the Desire for Sameness 
 As I showed in the previous section, the ORT concepts of defensive splitting and 
projection illustrate how, in a group setting, members divide the community into smaller 
sub-groups as a means of protecting themselves against anxiety. Self-representations are 
closely tied to representations of the groups to which individuals belong; for this reason, 
people may experience too much complexity or heterogeneity within these groups as 
threats to their identity . Such threats—if they grow too intense—can generate strong 
splitting/projection responses. For example, suppose that a person’s sense of identity is 
closely tied with mental representations of the congregation to which he or she belongs. 
If the congregation then experiences a conflict that highlights the diversity contained 
within it, or that causes it to begin dividing into smaller sub-groups, this can become a 
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threat to that person’s identity. The person may begin to ask questions like, “I thought 
that this congregation stood for X; now I see that many people here stand for Y instead. 
Where does that leave me?” As the individual’s object representation of the congregation 
becomes more complex, or even broken into disparate parts, the person may experience 
increased anxiety and feel a need to identify only with one part of the object 
representation and reject the rest—often through processes of splitting and projection. 
This helps to explain why congregations, which are voluntary associations of individuals 
who share deep relational bonds, can so quickly become embroiled in conflict 
characterized by either/or thinking and destructive affective exchanges.  
 I have also argued that splitting and projection were more operative at Grace UCC 
than at First UMC. I speculated that the reason for this disparity lies in the fact that 
splitting and projection are defensive in nature. Thus, when the self feels less threatened, 
individuals feel less compelled to split off unwanted traits and project them onto others. 
Given the difference in strength of the splitting/projection responses between the case 
studies, I want to return to resources in psychodynamic psychology—resources less based 
in a framework of pathology and more rooted in the basic development of the human 
person. That is, rather than relying solely on concepts like splitting and projection, which 
are defined as “primitive” ego defense mechanisms,261 I wish to examine the case studies 
through a psychological lens that views the pull toward sameness as a normal human 
need throughout the lifespan. In what follows, I argue that Heinz Kohut’s concept of the 
alter ego need offers such a lens. Kohut’s work “shares with object relations theories an 
emphasis on relationship and a retreat from the Freudian drive model.”262 However, 
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Kohut also differs from ORT in an important way: namely, in his emphasis on how early 
relationships help to form the structure of a person’s developing self. As I explain below, 
the alter ego need represents one facet of Kohut’s vision of human selfhood. Exploring 
this facet in more detail sheds light on the issue of congregational conflict because of its 
focus on the self’s need for similar others. 
 
Heinz Kohut and the Bipolar Self 
 Heinz Kohut was an Austrian-born psychoanalyst, trained in the classical 
Freudian tradition, who immigrated to the United States in 1940 to escape the Nazi 
regime. Although steeped in Freudian theories of the mind and the methods of 
psychoanalysis, Kohut eventually became convinced that traditional drive theory proved 
inadequate to explain the phenomena he was observing in clinical work with his patients, 
many of whom suffered from narcissistic disturbances.
263
 Departing from Freud, Kohut 
ultimately theorized an understanding of the self that de-emphasizes the drive to release 
libidinal energy, and instead focuses on the cohesiveness of the self as the primary 
psychological goal for human beings.  
 Over time, Kohut also moved away from Freud’s notion of the “tripartite self” (id, 
ego, and superego) and posited his own conceptualization of the self as “the core of the 
personality, the nucleus of initiative for the unfolding of an individual’s unique ambitions 
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and purposes, skills, and talents, ideals and values.”264 Furthermore, through his 
therapeutic practice, Kohut, like ORT theorists, became convinced that the key period for 
healthy psychological development lay not, as psychoanalytic theory had claimed, in the 
oedipal phase (3-5 years of age, with a focus on the mother/father/child triad), but in the 
pre-oedipal phase of infancy (birth to 2-3 years of age, with a focus on the relationship 
between the primary caregiver(s) and infant). It is during this period, Kohut argued, that 
the fundamental processes of self-development occur.
265
  
According to Kohut, the self develops primarily in relationship to important 
persons, who are experienced as extensions of the self. As we have seen, psychological 
theorists in the school of object relations theory tend to refer to such persons as “objects,” 
but Kohut prefers the term “selfobjects” as a way of designating that the caring persons 
perform vital functions for the child’s developing self.266 In this sense, these caring 
figures are not only “objects” in the child’s psychological world, but “selfobjects” who 
are closely linked with the emerging selfhood of the child. Ideally, the individual’s 
relationships with his or her selfobjects constitute an “empathic responsive matrix,” 
which proves crucial for the person’s psychological survival and maturation.267 Kohut 
further theorized that within this relational matrix, the self develops within the framework 
of two main “poles”: the pole of healthy ambitions and the pole of healthy ideals. Each of 
these two poles corresponds to a key need that persons experience intensely in early 
childhood: the “mirroring need” and the “idealizing need.” The mirroring need involves 
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the self’s need to be admired, and to have an important selfobject communicate that “it is 
good you [the self] are here and I acknowledge your being here and I am uplifted by your 
presence.”268 Conversely, the idealizing need involves having “somebody strong and 
knowledgeable and calm around with whom I can temporarily merge, who will uplift me 
when I am upset.”269 The idealizing need, then, focuses on the self’s need to admire the 
selfobject, whereas the mirroring need involves the self’s need for admiration by the 
selfobject. 
   Originally, Kohut’s theory only recognized the existence of these two basic needs 
within the developing self. Thus Kohut proposed the model of the “bipolar self,” with the 
mirroring and idealizing selfobject needs forming the two poles.
270
 Kohut theorized that 
in healthy individuals, the mirroring pole leads to mature and healthy ambitions; the 
idealizing pole, in turn, yields mature and healthy ideals.
271
 In later conceptualizations of 
self psychology, however, Kohut theorized that between the mirroring and idealizing 
poles exists a “tension gradient” (also called a “tension arc”) of psychological activity 
that flows between the poles, and that forms the core of the self.
272
 According to Kohut, 
this “nuclear self” represents the sense a person has of being a center of initiative that is 
continuous in space and time and cohesively organized.
273
 Out of the tension arc develops 
a related set of talents and skills, which the person can use to accomplish those things 
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toward which he or she is driven by ambition and led by ideals. As a result of this new 
theoretical construct, Kohut came to recognize a third narcissistic need—the need for 
“alter ego” or “twinship” selfobject responses. This need involves experiencing the 
selfobject as “essentially the same as the person’s own self” or as one’s “psychological 
twin.”274 Thus, the healthy fulfillment of the alter ego need results in the development of 
mature skills and talents, and the self’s feeling of worth in the company of others who are 
experienced as “like me.” 
   Kohut based many of his ideas about the alter ego need on his therapeutic 
experience with patients who had suffered severe deficits in this area. For instance, in 
recounting his relationship with a particular client, Kohut observes that “Her self was 
sustained simply by the presence of someone she knew was sufficiently like her to 
understand her and be understood by her.”275 Similarly, pastoral psychotherapist Robert 
Randall describes Kohut’s conception of the alter ego need as follows: “Being 
surrounded by others the child experiences as ‘the same as me’ gives the child a sense of 
being ‘normal,’ anchors the child’s self-continuity, and provides the sustaining power of 
knowing one belongs, to particular groups and to the human family.”276 In Kohut’s view, 
the very psychological capacity for a healthy sense of belonging depends on adequate 
resolution of the alter ego need during the preoedipal phase of development. In this sense, 
the alter ego need is also closely tied to a person’s developing sense of identity. As 
Randall notes, the basic feeling of belonging to a group of similar others “can help 
sustain a person when, by force or other circumstances, the person is placed in a foreign 
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environment that threatens his personal and social identity.”277 In other words, the sense 
of belonging created by fulfilled alter ego needs can help to soothe the anxiety that results 
from threats to one’s identity. Thus, Kohut’s conceptualization of the alter ego need 
clearly posits the desire for “essential alikeness” with others not as a pathological defect, 
but rather as a central, and potentially adaptive, facet of the human person.
278
  
 
Archaic v. Mature Alter Ego Needs 
The preceding discussion has shown that Kohut’s concept of the alter ego need 
points to the sense of sameness with others as a vital component of normal psychic 
development. However, the usefulness of this concept does not end with its emphasis on 
the need for “similar others” in the life of the developing child.279 In fact, Kohut’s theory 
recognizes both “archaic” and “mature” narcissistic needs throughout the lifespan. Kohut 
posits the existence of both “archaic selfobjects that are the normal requirement of early 
life” and “the mature selfobjects that all of us need for our psychological survival from 
birth to death.”280 In other words, Kohut understands the needs for mirroring, idealizing, 
and alter ego responses as normal and healthy at all stages of life, with archaic needs 
being transformed into mature ones over time.  
   In terms of the alter ego need specifically, Kohut theorizes that over the course of 
healthy psychological development, archaic alter ego needs become transformed into 
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mature alter ego needs, which include “inclinations to seek out others who reflect and 
reinforce the essential qualities of the self.”281 Kohut describes this process as follows:  
 . . . in normal development the baby’s reassuring awareness of being surrounded 
by the voices and smells of a human environment leads to the older child’s sense 
of strength . . . and subsequently leads to the adult’s reassuring experience of 
being surrounded by other persons who are (nationally, professionally, etc.) 
essentially identical to him.
282
  
According to Kohut, then, the archaic needs for belonging experienced in childhood 
never disappear; instead they simply give way to more mature ones. If, however, archaic 
narcissistic needs are not adequately addressed in the preoedipal phase, “defects, 
distortions, and weaknesses in the structure of the self occur.”283 When this happens, 
archaic alter ego needs may continue into adulthood, and may manifest themselves in 
unhealthy ways. For instance, individuals who reach adulthood with unmet archaic alter 
ego needs may rigidly insist that others feel and think exactly as they do, or may 
experience panic or rage when others “fail to function as available, empathic ‘twins.’”284 
These manifestations of archaic alter ego needs in adulthood point to the intense power of 
such needs, and thus carry important implications for the ways in which the need to 
experience sameness with others may affect human relationships across the lifespan. 
 
Anxiety and the Alter Ego Need 
 Because I have chosen the concept of anxiety as the organizing principle for this 
project, it is important to reflect explicitly on what role anxiety may play in Kohut's 
understanding of the alter ego need. Admittedly, Kohut does not often use the term 
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“anxiety” in his theorizing about the specific notion of the alter ego need. However, in 
The Restoration of the Self (1977), Kohut speaks in more general terms about the two 
types of anxiety that persons experience. The first, Kohut explains, occurs in an 
individual “whose self is more or less cohesive,” and involves “fears of specific danger 
situations.”285 Kohut describes the second type as follows:  
The second [type] comprises the anxieties experienced by a person who is 
becoming aware that his self is beginning to disintegrate; whatever the trigger that 
ushered in or reinforced the progressive dissolution of the self, the emphasis of 
the experience lies in essence on the precarious state of the self . . . 
286
 
In his later work, How Does Analysis Cure? (1984), Kohut calls this latter type 
“disintegration anxiety,” which he further defines as an intense fear of “the destruction of 
one’s human self because of the unavailability of psychological oxygen, the response of 
the empathic selfobject without which we cannot psychologically survive.”287  
 This second type of anxiety thus has a much more diffuse quality than the first, 
and involves a feeling of overall threat to the self's cohesiveness.
288
 It is important to 
reiterate that according to Kohut, disintegration anxiety arises within individuals who 
have suffered severe empathic failures in their early lives, and who, as a result, struggle 
to have any sense of a unified self. Consequently, the constant threat of the self's 
disintegration causes such individuals to experience depression and diffuse narcissistic 
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rage. It seems obvious that people with such severe defects in self structure would 
represent only a small fraction of any given population. How, then, can we helpfully use 
this concept to address an issue like congregational conflict, which presumably involves 
persons along the entire spectrum of personality development? 
 Even acknowledging that “disintegration anxiety” refers to a very specific 
response within narcissistically disturbed individuals, it is worth noting that Kohut's 
description of this response shares much in common with the central notion of anxiety I 
use throughout this project—namely, as a basic threat to the survival of the self. Building 
on this broader definition, I argue that the concept of anxiety contributes to a richer 
understanding of how the alter ego need might function within situations of 
congregational conflict. In the section that follows, I show how anxiety interlocks with 
the alter ego need in two specific ways in each of the case studies under consideration 
here. First, given that anxiety represents a basic threat to the self, it stands to reason that 
encountering significant differences with others in a group could intensify anxiety and 
make the pull toward sameness even stronger. Furthermore, recalling that Kohut 
theorized both archaic and mature forms of the alter ego need, one might imagine that 
higher levels of chronic anxiety within an organization could cause individuals to 
experience their needs for sameness in archaic (i.e., intense and rigid), rather than mature, 
forms. As I explain below, this seems to be what occurred at Grace UCC. 
 Alternatively, if we understand the need for similar others as a natural human 
need throughout life, we can see that strong, mature relationships with others “like me” 
might function as a way of soothing the anxiety raised by conflict or change. That is, 
when a group experiences an acute anxiety-producing event, one way of coping with that 
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event is to seek the presence of similar others who reinforce the self through alter ego 
need fulfillment. In this sense, the need for sameness is a part of normal development, 
and, if it is expressed in mature forms, can contribute to human health and flourishing. If, 
however, something threatens to interrupt people's relationships with their similar others 
and thereby force more contact with difference, this can itself generate intense anxiety 
and cause groups to become more entrenched in their needs for “essential alikeness.”289 
This description meshes well with the events that unfolded at First UMC, particularly in 
terms of the grief parishioners experienced at the thought of losing the similar others to 
whom they had become so attached. 
 
Application to the Case Studies 
 In the preceding section, I showed just how central the desire for sameness 
becomes in the overall picture of Kohut’s theory. If we understand Kohut’s conception of 
the alter ego need as a powerful need for others “like me,” we begin to see how this need 
may have operated at Grace UCC. In the events that unfolded at Grace UCC, individuals 
on both sides of the conflict felt most comfortable with those who shared their position, 
and were deeply disturbed by the differences they uncovered between themselves and 
others in the congregation. In fact, in the midst of the conflict, one parishioner remarked 
to me that she was “shocked” by some of her fellow Sunday School class members’ 
views on homosexuality because, although she had gone to church with these people for 
over thirty years, she had “never known they felt this way.” For this parishioner, 
discovering such a vast difference between her own views and those of her peers felt like 
a threat to her own identity and to her understanding of the congregation’s identity. In 
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other words, this parishioner seemed particularly surprised and troubled by the lack of 
sameness between herself and her fellow church members.  
For clarity: I do not wish to suggest that members of Grace UCC interpreted the 
desire for sameness in a purely literal way. Although those who wished to leave the UCC 
seemed, from the outside, completely unified in their belief that homosexuality is sinful, 
certain members of that group actually were not quite sure what they believed about 
homosexuality. However, these same members were certain about their opposition to gay 
marriage and their conviction that the congregation should disassociate from the UCC. It 
appeared that the desire for sameness manifested itself more in terms of opposition to gay 
marriage and the preferred approach to resolving the conflict than in a unified belief 
about homosexuality itself.
290
  
Similarly, the Grace UCC parishioners who wished to stay in the UCC actually 
held a wide variety of beliefs about homosexuality and gay marriage. However, two 
specific factors bound this group together, and provided the “sameness” so many were 
seeking: commitment to a position of tolerance and a desire to retain the pastoral 
leadership of the congregation. First, members of the group that wished to remain in the 
denomination valued a stance of tolerance over perceived exclusivity—a stance they 
believed could best be accomplished by remaining in the UCC. Charles summarized this 
commitment well:  
That’s why I’m happy being a part of [the] UCC . . . I believe at looking at all 
people the same, no matter what gender or their sexual preference . . I know 
they’re God’s children just like I would consider myself, and God really cares for 
them just as much as he does me. 
                                                          
290
 As I will show in Chapter Five, the reasons why parishioners at Grace UCC formed the particular kinds 
of groups they did are more helpfully explained by social psychology than by psychodynamic theories. 
201 
 
Many of the other people I interviewed at Grace UCC echoed Charles’ perspective. For 
example, Christine put it this way: “I think that it’s not up to us to determine who can be 
a part of our church and who can’t . . . I think the moment that when we stop welcoming 
people, we stop leading a faithful life.” Leah, who struggled with her own views about 
homosexuality, was similarly dismayed by what she experienced as a condemnatory 
attitude on the part of those who wanted Grace UCC to leave the UCC:  
I think we need to honor everyone and we need to agree that we can disagree. But 
I felt in my heart of hearts that a lot of these people were acting in a very un-
Christ-like way, and that really concerned me, because I thought that they were 
being very judgmental of other people.  
Evidently, for Leah, Christine, and Charles, the need to believe exactly the same thing 
about homosexuality proved less important than the need to share a basic attitude of 
openness and hospitality toward others. 
In addition to this shared support for a position of welcome, Grace UCC 
parishioners who advocated for staying in the denomination also shared a fervent desire 
to retain their pastoral leaders, who had made it clear that they would have to leave if the 
church chose to disassociate itself from the UCC. When I asked “Alice,”291 who was 
fairly new to Grace UCC in 2005, what felt important to her about staying in the UCC, 
she replied, “I just felt like it’s important to stay, because I supported Bill [the senior 
pastor] and I supported you.” Similarly, Lily, a long-time member of Grace UCC with 
several children in the youth program, indicated that loyalty to the UCC itself was not the 
key factor in her decision to vote for remaining in the denomination, but rather loyalty to 
the pastoral staff: “it’s not so much based on staying in the UCC as much as it was the 
benefit of staying with [and] having the benefits for our ministers.” Thus, although the 
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group of Grace UCC parishioners who advocated for staying in the UCC held a diversity 
of views on homosexuality and gay marriage, they seem to have found a level of comfort 
in the sameness they shared with others in the group by emphasizing a position of 
tolerance and through their commitment to retaining their pastoral leaders. 
These examples from the case study of Grace UCC highlight how the alter ego 
need—or the need to experience sameness with others—may have been operating for 
each of the groups involved. In addition to Kohut’s description of the alter ego need 
itself, his understanding of archaic and mature alter ego needs also provides a helpful 
analytical tool in this case. As noted above, Kohut theorized that if archaic alter ego 
needs are not adequately met in childhood, they may persist into adulthood in unhealthy 
forms. Such forms could include a rigid insistence on uniformity between the self and 
others, as well as expressions of panic or rage when others refuse to play the role of 
“available, empathic ‘twins.’”292  
It is unrealistic to suggest, however, that all of the members of Grace UCC—or 
even a majority of them—would display archaic alter ego needs due to severe disorders 
of the self. What, then, could account for the strong needs for sameness that surfaced 
among parishioners at Grace UCC? Randall notes that while archaic alter ego needs are 
“chronically present” in individuals with severe defects of the self, they are also 
“passingly present in periods of special stress in those free of self pathology.”293 In other 
words, when individuals experience intensely stress-inducing events, they are more likely 
to regress to archaic forms of their alter ego needs. This way of understanding the return 
to archaic alter ego needs in adulthood thus helps to de-pathologize it. Instead of seeing 
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this phenomenon as limited to persons with significant personality disorders, it is now 
possible to understand it as falling within the range of normal human responses to stress. 
Furthermore, this perspective provides a helpful tool for interpreting what happened in 
many of the Grace UCC meetings, particularly in terms of the extreme emotional 
volatility displayed in the initial business session when the conflict erupted: when 
parishioners encountered a lack of sameness between themselves and their peers on an 
issue as fundamental (from their point of view) as homosexuality, they experienced 
intense anxiety. As a result, their archaic alter ego needs surfaced in the form of rage and 
an intense desire to convert others to their point of view. 
Admittedly, the powerful emotional reactions expressed during the initial meeting 
at Grace UCC came primarily from those who were arguing for disassociation from the 
UCC. It is tempting to assume that only this group experienced archaic alter ego need 
responses in the course of this conflict. However, the theory would suggest that those in 
the so-called “pro-UCC” group also experienced archaic alter ego needs for sameness, 
but along different lines. I make this suggestion based on the observation that those who 
wished to stay in the UCC were especially offended by remarks made by many in the 
other group, who stated that they would leave if the vote did not go their way. While 
many in the “pro-UCC” group were initially willing to try to work toward a compromise, 
the other group’s threat to leave became “the straw that broke the camel’s back.” 
Members of this group also seemed to experience a strong desire for sameness—not in 
terms of beliefs about homosexuality, but in terms of what they perceived as loyalty to 
the congregation itself, as well as loyalty to the church’s pastoral leaders. When these 
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parishioners discovered that others did not share this loyalty, they became more anxious 
and were consequently more willing to sever their relational bonds.  
 Because the conflict at First UMC played out so differently, the expression of the 
alter ego need took on a very different form there. At First UMC, most people stated that 
they did not necessarily want everyone to be “the same” in terms of worship preferences, 
even as they expressed a strong desire to keep their own worship service intact. For 
example, when I interviewed Roy, the founder of the contemporary service, he made 
clear that his intention in starting a new service was never to replace the traditional 
worship that was already going on at First UMC. According to Roy, his message to the 
leaders of the traditional service was, “I want you to have the greatest traditional [service] 
you can have; I’m not saying let’s don’t do that . . . I don’t want to compete with you.” 
Yet, at the beginning of the period for decision-making about worship changes at First 
UMC, individuals’ anxiety seems to have risen dramatically. Why was this the case? 
 One could speculate that any major change has the potential to raise fears among 
people, particularly when that change affects the ways in which individuals experience 
their connection with God. It is also possible, however, that the anxiety that developed at 
First UMC relates specifically to the alter ego need through the fear of losing the “similar 
others” that congregants had found through their participation in their chosen service. In 
other words, by choosing their particular service, individuals managed to identify others 
with whom they experienced a great deal of sameness in terms of their preferred worship 
style. Simon, a long-time member of the contemporary service, put it this way: “We each 
have our own service and we go to it because that’s where we’ve decided to go. We like 
the people that go to it.” Also, as I noted in Chapter Three, affinity for a particular 
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worship service involved more than just superficial preferences; in many cases it 
reflected different ways of experiencing God’s presence depending on the worship style 
used in those services. Worshippers shared not only preferences for particular types of 
music or times for worship, but strong theological resonances with others in their groups. 
If substantial changes were made to the worship structure, these “similar others” might 
disappear, which would be experienced as an important loss. 
 Understanding the events at First UMC in this way helps to explain why those 
participating in the 11:00 worship service felt the lowest level of anxiety – they felt 
confident that a traditional, late morning service would continue to be a feature of First 
UMC’s common life, and thus they were at less risk of losing contact with the similar 
others from their service. By contrast, the highest level of anxiety existed among the 8:30 
worshippers, who believed they were the most likely to lose their service altogether, and, 
with their service, the similar others with whom they had been in relationship for so long. 
For their part, the contemporary worshippers also expressed grief about the potential loss 
of the special quality of relationships that had developed in the context of their worship 
service. Indeed, for many of them, these relationships were what had drawn them to that 
service most powerfully in the first place. When the decision was made to move the 
service to 5:00 on Sundays, these parishioners recognized that aspects of this service 
would never again be quite the same, because the mix of people would necessarily be 
different. Nancy captured this sense of grief well when she remarked, 
. . . the last few services of that 8:45 service when we knew we were going to 
night time, it was just sad because we just didn't like it, it was sad and we were 
giving up friendships and things that we'd established and it was kind of like 
having to leave town, move to a new city or something. 
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In this sense, we can understand the difficulties posed by the decision-making process at 
First UMC not simply as resistance to change itself, but rather as resistance to the 
potential loss of similar others who had been performing important alter ego needs for 
worship participants at all three of the congregation’s worship services. 
 
Conclusion 
 As I have shown in this chapter, the discipline of psychodynamic psychology 
contributes to a deeper exploration of intrapsychic elements that may play a role in 
congregational conflict. From a psychodynamic perspective, the anxiety raised by 
difference and the desire for sameness are impulses that originate as a normal part of 
human development. However, these natural inclinations can also become defensive or 
regressive, and can often lead to the adoption of destructive behaviors designed to ward 
off threats to the self or to enforce uniformity throughout a group. Yet, even though these 
phenomena frequently produce social consequences, their nature remains intrapsychic. 
That is to say: the splitting/projection and alter ego responses described by 
psychodynamic theory ultimately originate in the minds of individual persons. 
Furthermore, psychodynamic psychology understands the sense of self primarily in 
individual terms and pays scant attention to the role of group memberships in identity 
formation. Because congregational conflict, by definition, is a social phenomenon, it now 
seems vital to seek additional theoretical resources that can address its communal 
aspects—both in terms of social identity and in terms of general group dynamics. The 
discipline of social psychology provides just these kinds of resources, which I will 
explore in Chapter Five. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
COLLECTIVE IDENTIFICATION, POLARIZATION, & STRATEGIC CHOICE: 
ENGAGING SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
  
Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, I used insights from object relations theory and self 
psychology to demonstrate that from a psychodynamic perspective, the anxiety raised by 
difference begins as a normal part of human maturation. According to ORT, developing 
infants naturally split self- and object-representations into all-good and all-bad categories 
as a means of coping with the complexity of their world. Likewise, through the notion of 
the alter ego need, self psychology posits that the drive to seek out similar others is a 
fundamental requirement for developing selves throughout the lifespan. Both of these 
schools of thought, however, also describe ways in which the natural anxiety provoked 
by difference may become defensive or regressive, and thus impair optimal psychological 
functioning. As I have shown, intense anxiety may produce defensive splitting and/or 
projection, both of which damage individuals' ability to integrate contradictory elements 
into cohesive images of themselves, others, or groups. Such anxiety may also cause 
individuals to express archaic alter ego needs through rigid demands for sameness, or to 
react strongly against perceived differences that threaten their relationships with similar 
others. These psychodynamic concepts help to explain why, in seemingly unified groups 
like congregations, conflict can erupt so suddenly among clearly defined sub-groups.  
Despite these important insights, however, a psychodynamic approach to 
congregational conflict fails to answer two important questions: 1) Why do these sub-
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groups develop in the first place? Or, put another way, what role do individuals’ group 
memberships play in the development of conflict, and what does this help us to see about 
conflict that a purely individual approach might miss? 2) Once they have formed, why do 
sub-groups within a congregation choose one particular strategy over another? In other 
words, why do groups choose to fight, to yield, or to work together toward a mutually 
agreeable solution? Admittedly, the discussion of collective splitting in Chapter Four 
touched on the role of group affiliation in terms of associated self-representations, and 
how such self-representations might contribute to defensive psychological processes 
designed to protect one’s sense of identity. However, self-representations are, by 
definition, intrapsychic entities; as such, psychodynamic interpretations of how they 
function remain individualistic in their focus. In this sense, psychodynamic tools tend to 
examine congregational conflict as a problem that emerges primarily from dynamics 
related to the growth or pathology of individual selves.  
By contrast, the discipline of social psychology helps to explain what happens in 
the social sphere of human interaction, in a way that is not adequately addressed with 
psychodynamic tools only. In its broadest sense, social psychology may be defined as 
“the branch of psychology that deals with social interactions, including their origins and 
their effects on the individual.”294 This definition points to the importance of looking to 
the realm of social contact as a key source for understanding how individuals relate to 
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one another and to society as a whole. Furthermore, as I have shown in the preceding 
chapter, psychodynamic approaches trace the origins of conflict to intrapsychic dynamics 
that affect the ways in which persons then relate to one another. While this is an 
important consideration, social psychology offers a different way of understanding how 
people relate to one another: namely, as members of groups whose interaction in the 
social sphere shapes behavior and identity. Like psychodynamic psychology, social 
psychology presents identification with groups of similar others as a natural social 
process, and offers theoretical explanations for the ways in which social groups behave 
toward one another. For instance, social identity theory and self-categorization theory 
offer frameworks for understanding why and how social groups form, and what role 
group memberships play in social interaction. Similarly, strategic choice theory describes 
conflict in terms of specific behaviors, and provides an explanation for why individuals 
and groups choose particular strategies in their relations with one another.  
In this chapter, I draw on particular aspects of these social psychological 
resources to examine the complex relationships between anxiety, identity, and conflict in 
the congregational case studies. I should note from the outset that, generally speaking, the 
discipline of social psychology does not use the term “anxiety” as an analytic tool. 
Nonetheless, I argue that bringing the concept of anxiety into conversation with social 
psychological insights illuminates the issue of congregational conflict in a uniquely 
helpful way. Specifically, I contend that while identification with social groups is a 
normal outcome of human interaction, the development of highly polarized groups may 
itself function to raise levels of anxiety among group members. Increased levels of 
anxiety may then propel group members to react to one another in more hostile ways, 
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such as through contentious tactics. Conversely, I argue that when groups are able to 
maintain lower levels of anxiety in their midst, they may be more likely to engage in 
cooperative behaviors and to seek integrative solutions to their problems. 
 
Collective Identification 
Before engaging a detailed analysis of the case studies, it is necessary first to 
establish how social psychology understands the development of identity within a social 
context, as well as the unique characteristics of intergroup relations. In what follows, I 
argue that the notion of collective identification provides a broad theoretical framework 
in which to understand the nuances of the case studies at hand. To illustrate the 
importance of collective identification within situations of intergroup conflict, I examine 
two major social psychological theories that have devoted sustained attention to this 
dimension of human life: social identity theory and self-categorization theory. According 
to these theories, the realm of social interaction creates a space in which social 
comparison is always taking place; this process not only involves individuals 
categorizing others, but also categorizing themselves as alike or different from others. 
These theories further argue that social identities are no less “real” than individual 
identities, and must always be taken into account in any kind of social interaction. The 
relationship between individual and collective identity is thus dialectical, with each 
element both reflecting and influencing the other. As I will show, these insights provide a 
pathway for analyzing congregational conflict from a broader perspective that addresses 
the social identities—in addition to the intrapsychic and interpersonal dimensions—of the 
individuals involved. 
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Social Identity Theory 
One of the earliest articulations of social identity theory appeared in a 1986 article 
entitled “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior” by Henri Tajfel and John C. 
Turner.
295
 In this article, Tajfel and Turner make two central claims that clearly 
distinguish their position from previous approaches to identity. First of all, they argue 
that in addition to individual traits, identity can also refer to the ways in which an 
individual identifies with a certain group. This claim stands in marked contrast to many 
earlier social psychological theories, which had attempted to explain intergroup dynamics 
in terms of “intraindividual or interpersonal psychological processes.”296 In fact, by 
focusing on the individual or interpersonal aspects of identity that contribute to conflict, 
previous theories had failed adequately to attend to the “complex interweaving” of these 
aspects with larger social processes.
297
  
Secondly, actual conflict of interest between groups is not necessary to produce 
“in-group bias” or “the tendency to favor the in-group over the out-group in evaluations 
and behavior.”298 A now-famous 1971 experiment demonstrated this concept by dividing 
subjects into two groups along completely arbitrary lines and asking them to allocate 
rewards to other individuals identified only by group membership. The results of this 
experiment showed that “even these most minimal of conditions were sufficient to 
produce in-group bias: subjects tended to assign more money to individuals who were 
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members of the same group as themselves.”299 In other words, the fact that subjects in the 
study acted in accordance with their arbitrary group membership, even when they 
received no actual benefit for doing so, shows that “real” conflict of interest need not 
exist for in-group identification and bias to develop. Furthermore, Tajfel’s experiment 
demonstrates that collective, not individual, identification functioned as the key 
motivating factor in this context. Based on these experimental findings (which have since 
been replicated many times), Tajfel and Turner argue for a conception of identity that 
gives adequate consideration to individuals’ group identifications, and that functions even 
in the absence of actual conflicts of interest between such groups. 
This notion of in-group bias represents a key component of Tajfel and Turner’s 
articulation of social identity theory. In fact, based on the empirical study mentioned 
above, Tajfel and Turner claim that “in-group bias is a remarkably omnipresent feature of 
intergroup relations.”300 Furthermore, these authors argue that “pressures to evaluate 
one’s own group positively through in-group/out-group comparisons lead social groups to 
attempt to differentiate themselves from each other.”301 This statement highlights the 
importance of social comparison within social identity theory, since individuals must 
compare groups against one another to find the one that most appropriately matches 
themselves on relevant dimensions. In this way, Tajfel and Turner arrive at a definition of 
social identity as “those aspects of an individual’s self-image that derive from the social 
categories to which he [sic] perceives himself as belonging.”302  
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   Given that social identity theory views identity as comprised of both individual 
traits and group identifications, I contend that the conflicts described in the case studies 
represent not simply a clash of individual viewpoints, but rather a conflict between 
collective identities. As I have noted, at Grace UCC, the conflict quickly became 
polarized into a struggle between two clearly defined “sides.” Although it would be 
tempting to characterize the identities involved in this situation as “pro gay marriage” and 
“anti gay marriage,” this would be misleading. In fact, many of the parishioners who 
voted to stay in the UCC also opposed gay marriage, but felt it was important for the 
congregation to maintain its covenant relationship with the UCC. Furthermore, some of 
the parishioners in this group actually held no particular affection for the denomination 
itself or its positions on social issues. Yet, these congregants still believed that being part 
of a larger organization would provide practical benefits, and so they advocated for 
continued affiliation with the UCC.  
Thus, the central factor at Grace UCC became identification with the larger 
denomination, and not simply with one side of a political or theological issue. 
Admittedly, from the participants’ perspective, the conflict probably did seem to break 
down along theological lines: those who wanted to stay in the UCC were seen as more 
“liberal,” and those who wished to leave it as more “conservative.” As I have noted, 
however, the defending group
303
 actually included a significant number of people who 
were theologically conservative and who opposed gay marriage. These members’ 
decision to identify with the defending group thus lay in their commitment to the 
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denomination, rather than to a specific political or theological perspective on gay 
marriage itself. Bearing these caveats in mind, one could therefore describe the collective 
identities involved in this congregational conflict as “pro-UCC” and “anti-UCC,” with 
each group defining itself as the in-group, and the opposing identity as the relevant out-
group.  
Describing the situation in this way also allows one to see how social comparison 
may have been operating in this context to produce collective identification. In this 
particular scenario, all of the individuals involved were originally identified with the 
United Church of Christ by virtue of their church membership. However, once the 
theological debate erupted, parishioners had to decide whether to identify with the group 
advocating continued UCC affiliation, or with the group urging separation from the 
denomination. Given that the two groups did not break down along rigid theological or 
political lines, one can infer that church members made comparisons between the two 
groups in an attempt to decide which one most closely matched the social categories to 
which they already perceived themselves as belonging. 
At First UMC, by contrast, the group identities that emerged during the conflict 
were, in some sense, set up by the nature of the problem. In other words, because the 
congregational issue centered on changes to worship structure, people naturally divided 
themselves according to their participation at the 8:30, 8:45, or 11:00 service. Even 
though people in all three of these groups shared many important bonds (especially 
through Sunday School class membership), they were asked to serve on the worship 
committee based on their identities as participants in one of the three worship services. In 
this regard, it is easy to see how and why individuals ended up in the groups they did. 
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And, at least at first, these group memberships took on great importance – so much so 
that at the first worship committee meeting, individuals sat with others from their same 
worship group, and came prepared to advocate for what they saw as “their” service. 
However, it is also important to remember that these group identities tapped pre-
existing categories to which individuals had already committed themselves. That is, prior 
to the formation of the worship committee, parishioners at First UMC had already 
divided themselves according to the worship service they most preferred, and that they 
attended most regularly. In this sense, parishioners had already been involved in a 
process of social comparison by measuring the different services against one another to 
find the one that most closely matched their theological commitments and personal 
preferences. As the case study revealed, individuals who held a more immanent 
understanding of God’s presence in worship tended to gravitate toward the contemporary 
service, while those who valued transcendence and reverence chose a traditional worship 
style. Furthermore, individuals who valued a feeling of intimacy in worship tended to 
attend the smaller 8:30 or 8:45 service, while those who were attracted to a sense of being 
“one among many” chose the larger 11:00 worship opportunity. Thus, while all of the 
parishioners at First UMC held a group identity associated with the congregation at large, 
they also chose to associate with particular worship groups depending on how they 
compared those groups with themselves on relevant dimensions. In this sense, the 
different worship services became not only alternatives for how to spend time on Sunday 
morning, but key aspects of First UMC parishioners’ social identities within the context 
of their church membership. 
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Self-Categorization Theory 
As the preceding section has shown, social identity theory highlights the 
importance of social comparison processes in forming individual identity; however, it 
proves less successful in explaining why particular social categories emerge in particular 
contexts. In an attempt to provide a more thorough explanation of this phenomenon, John 
C. Turner later developed self-categorization theory, which built upon many of the tenets 
originally stipulated by social identity theory. Self-categorization theory provides a 
broader framework in which to understand the complexities of individual identity 
development within social contexts. In his 1991 book entitled Social Influence, Turner 
notes that  
the crucial fact about the public setting is that it is shared with others and 
provides a comparative context within which people can categorize themselves as 
identical to or different from others. Such contexts, therefore, change the level 
and content of self-identity in terms of how people perceive themselves and not 
merely how they look to others.
304
  
Within self-categorization theory, then, the focus shifts from categorizing other 
individuals or groups, to categorizing oneself as like or unlike other individuals or 
groups. Social psychologists further characterize the theoretical shift from social identity 
to self-categorization in terms of moving “from Tajfel’s conception of social identity as 
reflecting group affiliations, to the idea that social identity comprised social 
categorizations of the self which caused group phenomena.”305 From this perspective, 
then, the relationship between individual and collective identity is dialectical, with each 
element both reflecting and influencing the other.  
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Here it is important to provide a summary of key theoretical concepts that 
illuminate the applicability of this theory to the specific context of intergroup conflict. 
First, self-categorization theory “emphasizes the fact that categorization is a dynamic, 
context-dependent process, determined by comparative relations within a given 
context.”306 Categorization, then, is a process of social comparison not only between 
groups, but between differences between groups. This concept, known as the “meta-
contrast principle,” states that “a given set of items is more likely to be categorized as a 
single entity to the degree that differences within that set of items are less than the 
differences between that set and others within the comparative context.”307 For instance, 
if I am in a public place and notice a group of people who are all wearing firefighter 
uniforms, and another group of people wearing business suits, I am likely to categorize 
these groups as “firefighters” and “executives.” This is because even though each group 
may contain differences within it (men and women, people of different ethnicities, etc.), 
these differences appear less important than the differences between the two groups. This 
principle helps to explain the process of categorization in general, and social 
categorization in particular, by delineating the specific criteria that are used to mark the 
boundaries between categories—again, the perception of greater differences between 
groups than among them. 
Additionally, Oakes, Haslam, and Turner describe the notions of salience, 
accessibility, and fit as important determining factors in the categorization process. 
Category salience refers to the “psychological significance” of a category within a given 
context; thus, in order for a category to become a basis for social comparison, it must 
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prove highly relevant for the person doing the comparing.
308
 Accessibility refers to a 
perceiver’s ability and readiness to use a particular category, while fit refers to the degree 
of match between perceptual input and categories that have already been stored in the 
perceiver’s memory. Oakes, Haslam, and Turner delineate two specific kinds of fit which 
operate to produce social category salience. Comparative fit refers to the conditions in 
which a perceiver would be likely to view persons as members of a particular group, 
rather than as unique individuals. Such fit often depends on a high meta-contrast ratio 
between intergroup and intragroup differences. Thus, if differences between groups are 
perceived as greater than differences within groups, social categories are more likely to 
become salient.  
In addition to the relationship between groups, categorization also depends on the 
social meaning of similarities and differences between people. This concept, known as 
normative fit, refers to “the match between category and reality in terms of content.”309 In 
other words, simply observing that intergroup differences outweigh intragroup 
differences may not lead to a particular social categorization if the content of those 
differences is not congruent with the categories involved. For example, if I self-identify 
as a Democrat, but find myself in the company of a group of Democrats who all support 
the war and the death penalty, whereas the Republicans in the room all support higher 
taxes and health care reform, I would probably find my group identification as a 
Democrat less relevant because the content of that identity for me does not match the 
content of the (ostensibly same) group identity being presented by others. 
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 When considering the nature of the conflict that erupted at Grace UCC, one must 
ask: why did church members develop separate collective identities of pro-UCC versus 
anti-UCC, instead of maintaining the larger category of “UCC members” to which they 
all originally belonged? Why did the categories of pro- or anti-denomination become 
salient in this context? Although the two collective identities involved in this situation did 
not break down along strict theological or political lines, it is important to remember that 
this conflict arose in response to a particular action by the United Church of Christ—an 
action which proved highly controversial. As a result, those members of the congregation 
who already had ambivalent feelings about the UCC became quite hostile toward it, 
whereas those who were more strongly identified with the denomination - either because 
of their own values or their feelings toward the pastors –argued for preserving the 
relationship. I maintain that the very contentious and public action of the UCC made 
identification with it, or opposition to it, a much more salient category within the 
congregation. In fact, in the midst of this congregational conflict, I was surprised by the 
vehemence with which certain individuals argued against continued affiliation with the 
UCC because, prior to that time, they had never expressed any opinion at all about the 
denomination. It would seem, then, that these individuals associated identity categories 
with the UCC, but that these categories had simply never become salient before. 
The fact that the UCC’s 2005 equal marriage resolution made national news and 
was discussed in a variety of public forums also suggests that the categories of 
denominational affiliation or opposition became especially accessible in the situation I 
described.
310
 Because the unique characteristics of the UCC suddenly emerged into 
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public view, individuals would be more likely to utilize their sense of identification with 
or difference from the denomination as categories for comparison with one another. The 
notion of fit also proves particularly helpful in analyzing the dynamics of this 
congregation’s conflict. As mentioned earlier, comparative fit often depends on a high 
meta-contrast ratio, in which the differences between groups appear greater than the 
differences within them. This principle seems to have been borne out in the situation at 
Grace UCC, since both the pro- and anti-UCC groups included individuals who differed 
greatly on many other dimensions. However, when it came to the question of whether to 
remain with the UCC, there was a great deal of uniformity within the groups, and a high 
level of difference between them.  
Finally, the concept of normative fit also proves useful in examining the nature of 
the intergroup conflict that occurred at Grace UCC. As noted above, normative fit refers 
to the “match between category and reality in terms of content.”311 Thus, for the category 
of denominational affiliation to become salient, the makeup of the pro- and anti-UCC 
groups had to match prior expectations of those categories. In this situation, both the 
senior pastor and I clearly advocated for maintaining the church’s relationship with the 
UCC, as did the majority of the congregation’s lay leaders. In contrast, those who 
identified as anti-UCC had typically shown very little interest in denominational 
activities, or even knowledge of the UCC’s position on important issues. I contend that 
these factors contributed toward establishing a high degree of normative fit for the 
categories of denominational affiliation or opposition: if the congregation’s clergy and 
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leadership had identified as anti-UCC, or if those who had previously demonstrated little 
connection with the denomination had suddenly become extremely supportive of it, this 
likely would have contradicted expectations and decreased the overall salience of these 
categories for social comparison.  
Again, because the nature of the conflict at First UMC differed markedly from the 
one at Grace UCC, the role of self-categorization in identity formation also took a 
different form. As I noted above, the fact that First UMC deliberately sought to change its 
worship structure meant that participation in particular worship services automatically 
became a relevant category for parishioners. In other words, the administrative board’s 
directive to alter First UMC’s worship structure made the category of worship 
participation much more salient. Prior to that time, it is unlikely that most people at First 
UMC would have identified themselves by saying, “I attend the contemporary service at 
First United Methodist.” Instead, they would simply have said, “I attend First United 
Methodist.” Thus, before the debate about worship changes arose, general church 
membership would likely have been a more relevant category for most parishioners than 
participation in a particular service. Similarly, because the discussion at First UMC was 
focused on worship, parishioners were much more likely to use the 8:30, 8:45, and 11:00 
categories to define themselves and others. This is why, when I asked the pastors for 
referrals for my interviews, they would say things like, “You can call Mr. X; he’s an 8:30 
person.” Or “Ms. Y. would be a good person to talk to; she’s an 8:45-er.” In essence, the 
different services had become identity markers that took on particular meanings within 
the context of the congregation’s struggles. 
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The notion of fit was also operative in shaping the group identities that came into 
play during the conflict at First UMC. Once the issue of worship had become salient in 
the congregation, differences between the groups became more relevant than differences 
among them. First UMC parishioners shared a variety of bonds that cut across all three 
groups; they also differed sharply with others in their worship group on many other 
issues. Yet, within the context of changes to the worship structure, the differences 
between the worship services were the most pronounced because that was the issue under 
discussion. As the case study of First UMC showed, parishioners initially identified quite 
strongly with the 8:30, 8:45, or 11:00 worship groups. They brought these identifications 
with them into the worship committee meetings, and held on to them for most of the 
decision-making process. In the end, though, these parishioners identified more with the 
congregation as a whole than with their individual worship services. Why might this be 
so? First of all, as I have noted above, these parishioners held pre-existing relationships 
with each other and with others outside the committee that cut across the entire 
congregation. Through Sunday School classes, work on various committees, mission 
groups, and other church activities, these congregants had developed relationships with 
many other people besides those in their preferred worship service. As a result of these 
relationships, members of the worship committee thought a great deal about what impact 
their choices might have on the entire congregation. 
Additionally, certain actions on the part of the pastors and the worship committee 
chair helped to reinforce the identity that individuals from all three services shared in 
common—namely, their membership in First UMC and, more broadly, in the Christian 
Church. The fact that each meeting began with a devotional time—including prayer, 
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Scripture reading, and reflection—served as a reminder to committee participants of the 
spiritual bond they shared. This bond was even more strongly emphasized at the last 
committee meeting, when the devotional time included an opportunity for individuals to 
serve communion to one another. This sacred act of liturgy again reminded committee 
members of their relationships with each other as fellow church members, and as fellow 
Christians. Roy described the importance of the worshipful atmosphere in the last 
meeting as follows: 
the way we did it was really good, Bob did it really good. He . . . made it 
sacramental, you know, did communion, let people start really having community 
together. But the bottom line was the power of God was unleashed in there and 
people were willing to step back from their own way. 
Over time, then, the relational bonds between parishioners at First UMC—both those 
forged within the worship committee and those that pre-existed the conflict—mitigated 
the strength of the smaller identity groups that had originally formed based on allegiance 
to a particular worship service. As a result, the members of the worship committee 
ultimately identified primarily with the congregation as a whole rather than with their 
preferred service. This identification became especially visible through the committee’s 
willingness to engage in problem solving and to seek a solution that they believed would 
most benefit the entire faith community.  
 
Group Polarization 
In addition to the notions of social identity discussed above, self-categorization 
theory offers a particularly helpful interpretation of group polarization that can also 
contribute to greater understanding of intergroup conflicts such as the ones that occurred 
within these congregations. Group polarization is  
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the finding that group discussion or some related group manipulation tends to 
strengthen the prevailing response tendency within a group. The mean response of 
members tends to become more extreme after group interaction in the same 
direction as the mean response before interaction.
312
  
This phenomenon, identified by James Stoner in 1961, became known as the “risky shift” 
and contradicted earlier assumptions that groups will typically converge on the average 
position of their members. Consequently, various social psychological theories developed 
in an attempt to explain group polarization. However, social psychologist John C. Turner 
maintains that none of these theories adequately explains why certain groups converge on 
the pre-test mean, while others polarize to an extreme. 
Instead, a self-categorization theory of group polarization overcomes this problem 
by positing that “people are conforming to a shared in-group norm, but that the norm is 
not the pre-test average but rather the prototypical position of the group.”313 In this view, 
the “prototype” is the position that most clearly represents the commonalities within the 
group as compared to members of an out-group. This approach helps to explain both 
convergence on the mean and polarization within groups: in both cases, “members are 
moving towards what they see as the consensual position of their group.”314 The primary 
benefit of this approach is that it takes into account the importance of intergroup relations 
in polarization, rather than simply offering an explanation of why individuals move to 
one position or another within group contexts.  
This interpretation of group polarization seems especially applicable to the case 
studies presented in Chapter Three. At Grace UCC, for instance, both identity groups 
moved toward more extreme positions than they had displayed before the conflict 
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erupted, thus providing a classic example of polarization. While the members of the pro-
UCC group identified positively with the denomination before the conflict erupted, these 
identifications became much stronger as they compared themselves against and entered 
into conflict with the out-group. Similarly, the anti-UCC group members had previously 
exhibited ambivalent or slightly negative feelings toward the denomination, but when the 
congregation became embroiled in debate, they moved to a much more extreme, hostile 
position—one that posited disassociation from the UCC as the only viable solution. 
Using Turner’s perspective on polarization, one could argue that each group was moving 
toward what their members perceived as the “prototypical” position—namely, the 
position that most clearly represented each group’s commonalities as compared to the 
relevant out-group. Since the main issue at stake for both groups revolved around 
denominational affiliation, each group moved toward an extreme position at opposite 
ends of the spectrum.  
Similarly, at First UMC, polarization was operating in the early part of the 
decision-making process. Considering that the issue under discussion focused on worship 
changes, the various sub-groups formed according to their commonalities—i.e., their 
worship preferences. This helps to explain why the three worship groups were so clearly 
defined at the first committee meeting, to the point where individuals physically 
identified themselves by sitting with members from their own service. Nancy, a devoted 
member of the 8:45 service, noted that from her perspective, each group went into the 
process thinking, “This is our chance to convince everybody that our service is the most 
important and the best.” However, many interviewees observed that as the decision-
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making process went on, group identities softened as individuals began to understand and 
appreciate one another more.  
When it came time to make actual decisions about worship changes, however, 
these group identities surfaced again and caused sharp divisions between members of the 
different services. These divisions became especially apparent at the penultimate 
committee meeting, when many of the members began to “dig in their heels” and resist 
agreeing to any major changes to their own services. Again, a self-categorization 
approach to group polarization explains this movement back toward more rigid positions 
by showing how individuals move toward what they see as the prototypical position of 
their group as compared to a relevant out-group. So, if a person identifies primarily with 
the 8:30 traditional service, and perceives the consensual position of his or her group as 
an insistence on maintaining an early worship time with traditional liturgical elements, he 
or she will move more strongly in that direction rather than moving toward a more 
middle-ground position. This happened at the third committee meeting, to the point 
where many members left the meeting feeling hopeless about the possibility of ever 
reaching a solution. 
As the case study showed, however, the final committee meeting ended with all 
members agreeing to an integrative solution that involved both gains and losses for all 
parties. How can we explain this outcome given the tendency to polarization that 
occurred at the previous meeting? Self-categorization theory suggests that the key factor 
in both cases is the notion of the prototypical group position. As I noted above, when 
polarization was happening among the First UMC committee members, individuals were 
likely conforming to what they saw as the prototypical position of their group as opposed 
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to the other two out-groups. Yet, as I explained earlier, the committee members at First 
UMC ultimately identified more strongly with the congregation as a whole than with 
their individual worship services. This means that, in the end, a more encompassing 
social identity took precedence for committee members, and they were able to move 
toward a solution that was located at the intersection of all three groups’ interests, rather 
than remaining rigidly focused on an extreme position that refused to give any ground. 
 
Collective Identification, Polarization, and Anxiety 
In this chapter, I have utilized concepts from both social identity theory and self-
categorization theory to illustrate how collective identification and group polarization 
were operating in the conflicts I described in the case studies. Such concepts, I contend, 
shed light on the ways in which individuals within these congregations acted according to 
their group identities, rather than simply as unique individuals with a variety of diverse 
viewpoints. While this analysis is useful in its own right, returning to the theme of 
anxiety at this point provides another helpful lens through which to understand the events 
that unfolded in these faith communities. Throughout this project I have established a 
definition of anxiety as diffuse fear related to feelings of threat to the self. I now argue 
that just as threats to one's individual identity create anxiety, so do threats to one's social 
identity.  
Recall from the previous chapter that self-representations include representations 
of groups to which the self belongs; consequently, when those groups become too 
heterogeneous and thus too threatening, anxiety develops. In the same way, social 
identity theory and self-categorization theory help to explain why particular groups form 
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in specific social settings, and why individuals may affiliate with particular groups at any 
given time. According to social psychological theorists, these dimensions of social 
identity are no less “real” than individual identity. It stands to reason, then, that if people 
experience significant challenges to their social identities through conflict, they could 
interpret such challenges as threats to their selfhood and, as a result, experience anxiety. 
Given that anxiety is such a pervasive social force, one also wonders what role it 
might play in situations of group polarization such as those described in the case studies. 
I suggest that although anxiety does not necessarily cause group polarization,
315
 it is 
reasonable to assume that group polarization causes anxiety. After all, group polarization 
essentially means that a larger group splits into two or more sub-groups that take 
increasingly extreme positions against one another. Particularly in a setting like a 
congregation, where members have a certain expectation of unity, such polarization feels 
very uncomfortable. For instance, Lily, a member of Grace UCC, described her 
experience of the conflict as follows: “. . . it was just the thought that everybody that I felt 
was family was getting ready to split. It was kind of intimidating, scary.” Lily's words 
encapsulate the anxiety that members of groups often experience when they see smaller, 
more rigid sub-groups forming in their midst. As we have seen, when such anxiety runs 
rampant in a communal setting, destructive behaviors frequently result. Conversely, if 
group members manage to contain their anxiety, they may feel less threatened and be 
able to work together more cooperatively. This distinction helps us to understand why 
different groups take different approaches to one another in the midst of conflict. In the 
final section of this chapter, I utilize social psychological resources related to strategic 
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choice theory to explore more deeply why social groups choose their preferred modes of 
relating to one another, as well as what role anxiety might play in those choices. 
 
Conflict and Strategic Choice 
One way of defining “conflict” from a social psychological perspective is as a 
“perceived divergence of interest, a belief that the parties’ current aspirations are 
incompatible.”316 Throughout this section, I will use this definition as a guide for 
understanding the events presented in the case studies, since the elements of perception 
and incompatibility played key roles in these congregational struggles. In fact, the form 
that the two conflicts took represents a complete divergence of interest because it was 
impossible for all parties to achieve their stated goals. In the case of Grace UCC, the 
congregation had to make a clear choice between staying in the denomination and leaving 
it. For First UMC, the choice was a bit more complex since it required reducing the 
number of worship services from three to two. In this sense, the choice was not “either-
or” in nature, but the choice still meant that at least one of the three worship services 
would cease to exist in the same form. Thus, in both of these congregations, a divergence 
of interest arose that required action to resolve. As the case studies have shown, these two 
communities of faith took very different approaches toward the conflicts that emerged in 
their midst. Social psychological theories related to strategic choice describe these varied 
approaches, and illuminate some of the reasons why these congregations acted as they 
did. 
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One of the most pressing questions raised by the case studies presented in Chapter 
Three is “Why did the involved parties choose to approach the conflict in a particular 
way?” In other words, why did the members of Grace UCC choose such a contentious 
approach, while the members of First UMC chose something much closer to cooperation? 
Parties in a given conflict may choose between at least four basic strategies: contending, 
yielding, avoiding, or problem solving.
317
 Contending involves trying to resolve a conflict 
on one’s own terms without considering the interests of the other party. Yielding, in 
contrast, occurs when one lowers one’s own aspirations, and makes partial or total 
concessions to the other in order to keep the peace.  
Avoiding refers to the choice not to engage the conflict at all, whereas problem 
solving “entails an effort to identify the issues dividing the parties and to develop and 
move toward a solution that appeals to both sides.”318 When parties choose either 
contending or problem solving as their preferred strategy, the result is “overt 
confrontation, a behavioral form of conflict.”319 Such confrontation need not be 
destructive, and may actually serve many positive functions, unless it is allowed to 
escalate. Based on the case studies presented in Chapter Three, the members of Grace 
UCC appeared to choose a strategy of contending that escalated to the point of 
destructiveness. In contrast, the parishioners at First UMC chose problem solving as their 
primary approach. In what follows, I will describe the various group behaviors exhibited 
by each congregation, and then analyze them as a means for understanding why each 
church chose its preferred strategy. Alongside this social psychological analysis, I will 
again introduce the theme of anxiety as a conceptual tool that further clarifies the 
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particular choices made by the members of Grace UCC and First UMC in the midst of 
their respective conflicts. 
 
Grace UCC 
As the case studies in Chapter Three made clear, the conflict at Grace UCC 
became extremely hostile and divisive. In view of this fact, I argue that the members of 
Grace UCC (including those on both sides of the conflict) made a strategic choice to 
engage primarily in contending, rather than yielding, avoiding, or problem solving. This 
choice is evident in the particular conflict behaviors—especially the adoption of 
contentious tactics and the development of escalation—that emerged during the course of 
the conflict. In this section I describe the specific conflict behaviors that emerged at 
Grace UCC, supporting my argument that contending became the strategy of choice 
there. I then turn to social psychological frameworks involving the dual concern model 
and departures from rational choice to explore why the members of Grace UCC chose to 
contend with one another.  
 
Contentious Tactics 
When an individual or group chooses contending as its primary strategy in a 
conflict, the aim is very clear: namely, to impose one’s own wishes on the other. To 
accomplish this aim, one can select from a wide variety of “contentious tactics,” all of 
which are designed to persuade or force the other party in the conflict to yield. 
Contentious tactics include a wide range of behavioral responses, which exist along a 
continuum from “light” to “heavy.” “Light” tactics refer to acts “whose consequences for 
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Other
320
 are favorable or neutral,” while “heavy” tactics “impose, or threaten to impose, 
unfavorable or costly consequences on Other.”321 In the conflict at Grace UCC, both 
groups employed light and heavy tactics in an effort to achieve their goals.  
 For instance, one light tactic is promises, which are “messages from Party 
announcing its intention to reward Other if Other complies with Party’s wishes.”322 At 
Grace UCC, each side used promises in an attempt to convince the other side to yield. 
When arguing for disassociation from the denomination, the complaining group promised 
that the professional staff would keep their jobs, along with their retirement and insurance 
benefits, and that “nothing would have to change” within the congregation’s day-to-day 
life. Conversely, the defending group promised that if the complainants agreed to stay in 
the UCC, they would be supported in their desire to voice their grievances to regional and 
national church bodies.  
Promises are considered “preparatory tactics” because they “erode Other’s 
resistance to lowering aspirations.”323 Other tactics, however, aim to lower the other 
party’s aspirations in a direct and forceful manner. Persuasive argumentation represents 
one such tactic, which uses logical appeals in an attempt to convince the other party to 
back away from its objectives.
324
 In the conflict described above, the light tactic of 
promises failed to achieve the desired result for either party. Consequently, each side 
turned to persuasive argumentation to challenge the other’s goals more directly. The 
complaining group for example, made arguments closely related to their promises: they 
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argued that even if the congregation left the UCC, it would still be feasible to pay the 
ministers their current salary and benefits. Additionally, this group asked parishioners to 
consider the moral consequences of remaining within a theologically radical 
denomination, and the effects such a choice might have on future church membership and 
giving.  
The defending party responded primarily with logical arguments about practical 
matters, such as how difficult it would be for the congregation to function without pastors 
or denominational support. They also argued that since gay marriage was not recognized 
by the state, the Synod resolution would have no actual effect on the congregation’s 
functioning. As such, the Synod resolution was essentially a non-issue for Grace UCC. 
Considerable skill is required to achieve success through persuasive argumentation, 
because “Party must convince Other to surrender something that it holds dear and that 
Party covets.”325 In the case of Grace UCC, the “something” that each party held dear 
was the power to determine the direction that the church would go in terms of its 
denominational affiliation. Not surprisingly, neither party in the conflict at Grace UCC 
was able to use persuasive argumentation successfully. As a result, both parties moved 
toward heavier contentious tactics aimed at levying specific costs on each other.  
 Threats represent one of the “classic” heavy tactics used within social conflict. 
Whereas persuasive argumentation relies on facts in an effort to convince others of one’s 
own position, threats move beyond logical appeals to communicate “the intention to hurt 
Other if Other fails to comply with Party’s wishes.”326 Threats are considered “heavy” 
tactics because the threatening party is asserting its own right to control the situation; 
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thus, threats are, by nature, coercive. In the situation at Grace UCC, both groups engaged 
in threats in different ways. For those who wished to leave the denomination, the threat 
was clear: if they did not achieve this goal, they would leave the congregation. This threat 
made a strong impression on those in the opposing party, many of whom mentioned it in 
their interviews with me.  
By contrast, those who thought Grace UCC should remain in the denomination 
expressed threats in a slightly different way. A few members of this group did threaten to 
move their membership if Grace UCC voted to leave. However, most of these 
parishioners seemed unwilling to make such a threat, perhaps in part because they had 
been so offended by the complaining group’s use of it. Instead of direct threats, members 
of this group instead expressed a warning, which is “a prediction that Other will get hurt 
if it fails to act in a particular way.”327 This group expressed warnings mainly by 
emphasizing what they saw as the inevitable consequences of a choice to leave the 
UCC—namely, the loss of the congregation’s ministers. In other words, instead of 
saying, “If you make this choice, I will impose this punishment on you,” the pro-UCC 
group communicated something more akin to: “If you make this choice, we will lose our 
ministers, and we will all suffer.” The key difference between threats and warnings is that 
unlike threats, the party issuing the warning does not control whether the other party gets 
hurt. Nonetheless, within the context of social conflict, warnings may also fall into the 
category of contentious tactics. Although the parishioners in the defending group may not 
have thought they were using contentious tactics, those in the opposing group clearly 
experienced their behavior as threatening, which made them become even more rigid in 
their position. 
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The preceding discussion has shown that within the congregational conflict at 
Grace UCC, both the complaining and the defending groups employed several different 
contentious tactics in an attempt to achieve their aspirations. At first, the groups used 
lighter tactics such as promises and persuasive argumentation, but when these approaches 
failed, they began using threats and warnings to lower each other’s aspirations. This 
movement from lighter to heavier tactics reveals a pattern of escalation, or an increase in 
the conflict’s intensity, over time. The following section explores the various ways in 
which this conflict escalated, both within the original business meeting, as well as during 
the period between the meeting and the vote. 
 
Escalation 
As I noted above, overt confrontation that results from the use of contending 
strategies is not necessarily destructive, and may serve many positive functions within a 
community by providing a catalyst for change. However, when such confrontation 
escalates, these positive functions are often overshadowed by the negative consequences 
that result. During the escalation of a conflict, various kinds of “incremental 
transformations” take place.328 These transformations typically are mirrored by each 
party involved, and frequently cause the conflict to intensify “in ways that are sometimes 
exceedingly difficult to undo.”329 In addition to the progression from light to heavy 
tactics described above, three other transformations may be identified within the conflict 
depicted in the case study.  
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The first of these involves the movement from specific to general issues. For 
example, the complaining group moved from particular grievances about the equal 
marriage resolution toward more general complaints about the denomination as a whole. 
Similarly, the defending group progressed from arguing against the complaining group’s 
wish to leave the UCC, to discussing the complainants’ role in previous church conflicts. 
In other words, both groups moved from focusing on the matter at hand to a much wider 
variety of contested issues. Unfortunately, when this kind of transformation takes place, 
“the overall relationship between the parties deteriorates” and is often replaced with “a 
general intolerance of the other side.”330 The complete lack of communication that 
ultimately developed between the two parties in this conflict implies that such 
deterioration did occur as a result of specific-to-general transformations within the 
relationship. 
Another kind of transformation that may take place during escalation involves 
each party’s progression from wanting to do well, to wanting to win, to wanting to hurt 
the other. This pattern appears clearly in both sides of this congregational conflict, since 
both groups originally focused on having their perspectives heard and respected. As the 
debate continued and grew more heated, however, the atmosphere became more 
contentious, and each side became more determined to win. Ultimately, with the use of 
threats and warnings intended to impose costs on the other side, the transformation to a 
desire to hurt the other party was achieved.  
One final transformation that may occur during escalation is the movement from 
few to many participants. Although this conflict began with a significant number of 
parishioners involved, over time it came to encompass many other people who were not 
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present at the original business meeting. In fact, members of both parties in the conflict 
attempted to enlist previously uncommitted parishioners in their cause, hoping that their 
side would ultimately have the largest number of votes. The purpose of this kind of 
transformation is for each group to draw neutral third parties into the fray in an effort to 
insure that its own aspirations will prevail.  
 
The Dual Concern Model 
In an effort to understand why individuals or groups choose one strategy over 
another, social psychologists have proposed the dual concern model, which posits that the 
relative strength of self-concern or other-concern will contribute significantly to strategic 
choice. According to this model, when self-concern is high and other-concern is low, 
contending will be the preferred strategy; when both self- and other-concern are high, 
problem solving will usually take place.
331
 Given this model, one must wonder why, in a 
congregation of people who ostensibly cared about each other, contending quickly 
overtook problem solving as the strategy of choice. 
One answer to this question may lie in the four conditions that tend to promote 
high self-concern: fear, a high value on the outcome of the conflict, a high emotional 
investment in the conflict, and the involvement of social identities.
332
 I suggest that all of 
these conditions were met in the case of Grace UCC. First of all, fear seems to have been 
operating on both sides of the conflict: the complaining group feared the moral and social 
consequences of remaining in the UCC, while the defending group feared what would 
happen if the congregation severed its denominational ties. Both parties consequently 
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placed a high value on the outcome of the conflict, so much so that at least some 
members in each group were willing to leave the congregation altogether if they did not 
achieve their goals. As evidenced by the tone of the initial business meeting, as well as 
the conflict that took place in subsequent weeks, both groups were emotionally invested 
in the conflict itself. Finally, both groups seemed to be operating out of a sense of social 
identity—as either pro- or anti-denomination—that took precedence over the identity 
they both shared (i.e., as members of the same congregation). 
One must bear in mind, however, that the dual concern model also takes other-
concern into consideration; thus, even if self-concern is high, a simultaneously high 
other-concern will typically lead to problem solving rather than contending. Given the 
fact that the two groups involved in this conflict were members of the same congregation, 
and that many church members were also related by blood or marriage, one would 
assume that the level of other-concern between the groups would have remained fairly 
high. What, then, could account for the lack of problem solving strategies within this 
conflict? According to Pruitt and Kim,  
Although [interpersonal] bonds and dependencies usually foster other-concern, 
under certain conditions they can produce exactly the opposite reaction: 
antagonism toward Other and the use of contentious tactics. This reaction is 
especially likely when people to whom we are bonded . . . fail to fulfill their 
minimum obligations or severely frustrate us.
333
  
This observation offers a clue to why the parties involved in this conflict quickly adopted 
contending, rather than problem solving, as their preferred strategy: namely, because 
members of both groups felt intensely disappointed or frustrated by those in the opposing 
group.  
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While frustration and disappointment undoubtedly played a role in how the 
conflict at Grace UCC developed, I suggest that anxiety provides an additional tool for 
understanding why members of this congregation chose contending over problem 
solving. First, recall that according to the dual concern model, two of the conditions that 
typically produce contending behavior are fear and the involvement of social identities, 
both of which were met at Grace UCC. In fact, the fears that surfaced in the conflict at 
Grace UCC—i.e., fears about what would happen if the congregation chose to stay in or 
leave the denomination - appear to be closely linked with both anxiety and social 
identity. For instance, I have stated that the complaining group at Grace UCC feared the 
moral and social consequences of remaining within the denomination. Likewise, the 
defending group feared what would happen to if the congregation were to have to 
function without the organizing structure of the UCC. These fears, though 
understandable, took the form of diffuse anxiety because they primarily involved fears of 
the unknown. Neither group could know exactly what would happen if Grace UCC chose 
one course of action over another; as a result, their fears focused on what might happen in 
particular sets of circumstances.  
Furthermore, for both groups, this generalized anxiety was closely linked to their 
social identities. Members of the complaining group were deeply disturbed about the 
prospect of being part of an organization that was perceived in the community as 
supporting gay marriage. In their view, remaining within the UCC would mean espousing 
values to which they were deeply opposed, and would reflect badly on them as persons. 
In contrast, members of the defending group worried about how the congregation would 
define itself in the absence of a denominational identity. At one meeting, someone asked, 
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“Well, if we stop being UCC, what will we be? Nothing?” Additionally, as I have noted, 
many members of the defending group did not want to be associated with what they saw 
as bigoted attitudes, or with disrespectful behavior toward the pastors. Because these 
social identities took on such importance in the midst of the conflict at Grace UCC, it 
stands to reason that having those identities repeatedly challenged by others in the 
community would create more intense feelings of threat, and thus more anxiety for all 
involved. And, as I showed in Chapter Four, the greater the sense of threat to the self, the 
more likely it is that destructive behaviors will result. Thus, I maintain that in the case of 
Grace UCC, fears of the unknown and threats to social identity caused members' anxiety 
to be raised. This anxiety then contributed to the opposing groups' adoption of 
contentious tactics, and to the pattern of escalation that ultimately developed—both of 
which, in turn, created additional anxiety and made the conflict even more intractable. 
 
Departures from Rational Choice 
In addition to the dual concern model, social psychology offers another way to 
understand the move toward contending and away from problem solving: namely, as 
departures from rational choice within the decision-maker. In other words, simply 
because problem solving seems like the “rational” strategy to adopt within a group that 
shares social and religious bonds, this does not mean that the actors involved will 
necessarily choose that strategy. Instead, individuals and groups often choose less 
rational strategies because of certain biases that exist within decision-making processes, 
and these choices affect the relative strength of self- or other-concern. The concept of 
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framing as a particularly powerful bias within the context of conflict negotiation is useful 
here. Framing involves  
evaluating an alternative (vis à vis some referent point) as a potential gain or a 
potential loss. Negotiators behave in a more risk-averse fashion when evaluating 
potential gains, and in a more risk-seeking manner when evaluating potential 
losses.
334
  
Negative framing tends to generate more self-concern than does positive framing.
335
 I 
maintain that in the conflict at Grace UCC, both parties were framing the dispute in terms 
of potential losses—the complaining group focused on moral concessions and a loss of 
face in the community, while the defending group emphasized the loss of their clergy and 
the benefits of denominational support. As a result of this negative framing, both sides 
seemed more willing to engage in the “risky” behavior of using contentious tactics, 
despite the potential for destroying their relationships with church members in the 
opposing group.  
An additional factor that may influence individuals or groups to depart from 
rational choices in decision-making is the “fixed-pie myth,” also known as “zero-sum 
thinking.” According to the fixed-pie myth, any gain for one party represents a loss for 
the other, and vice versa.
336
 Admittedly, in cases of scarce physical resources, the fixed-
pie model is accurate; however, in many conflicts that involve less tangible stakes, zero-
sum thinking simply represents the way in which the parties have chosen to view the 
conflict. In this case, zero-sum thinking is actually “a faulty belief. In actuality, the 
parties do have compatible interests, but they are blind to this fact.”337 At Grace UCC, 
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both sides of the conflict engaged in negative framing, which led them to view the 
dispute in terms of a fixed-pie model. Once this had happened, each side began to see any 
gain for the other as a loss for itself, which blinded them both to the common interests 
they shared: namely, the benefits of keeping the congregation intact. If this common 
interest had remained at the forefront of the discussion, perhaps both groups would have 
been more willing to move toward an integrative solution. 
The “departures from rational choice” framework is useful because it allows us to 
understand conflict through the lens of cognitive biases. However, like the dual concern 
model, this framework becomes even more valuable when viewed through the lens of 
anxiety. Notions such as negative framing and zero-sum thinking helpfully explain why 
certain social groups may choose contending over problem solving, but they do not 
explain why such groups engage in negative framing and zero-sum thinking in the first 
place. We know, for example, that people tend to behave in a more risk-seeking manner 
when evaluating potential losses.
338
 This begs the question: why, at Grace UCC, did 
parishioners frame the conflict in terms of potential losses instead of potential gains? 
I suggest that because the congregation was experiencing such an elevated level 
of anxiety members tended to focus on only what they stood to lose from any given 
outcome. In other words, they were functioning in a self-protective manner that sought to 
keep intact those things about the congregation that felt most important to them. Any 
perceived threat to keeping those things intact consequently raised individuals' anxiety 
even further, and made the conflict escalate. In the same way, I argue that increased 
levels of anxiety also contributed to parishioners' tendency to rely on zero-sum thinking. 
As the conflict developed, social identities were increasingly threatened and anxiety 
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continued to increase. Over time, a process of polarization took place, increasing anxiety 
levels even further and widening the gap between the two groups. In such a situation, it is 
not difficult to understand why members of each group would have begun thinking of the 
situation as a zero-sum game. After all, if individuals are experiencing increased levels of 
threat to their personal or social identities, it is less likely that they will attempt to 
problem-solve with those who are threatening them. Instead, they will likely adopt a self-
protective stance designed to hold on to the social resources they feel they need to 
maintain their group identifications. 
 
First UMC 
As I have shown, the conflict at Grace UCC proved deeply divisive. Both parties 
engaged in contentious tactics such as promises, persuasive argumentation, and threats, 
and both parties seem to have operated primarily from a position of high self-concern 
driven by increased levels of anxiety within the congregation. At First UMC, the picture 
was quite different. Admittedly, some of the same tactics were used, though in a more 
indirect way than at Grace UCC. Judith Murray, the chair of the worship work area at 
First UMC, told me that although the actual committee meetings were always respectful 
in tone, some individuals still sent e-mail messages to her and others expressing their 
displeasure with the process. Judith described these e-mails as “motivated out of 
frustration and fear,” and as “devastating” for those who received them. Also, according 
to other interviewees, some of the worship committee meetings were quite tense, and all 
three groups seem to have come to the negotiating table with fairly rigid aspirations – 
namely, to keep their particular worship services intact. 
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Ultimately, though, the process at First UMC was much more akin to problem 
solving than contending. Within the context of social conflict, problem solving may be 
described as follows: 
At its best, problem solving involves a joint effort to find a mutually acceptable 
solution. The parties or their representatives talk freely to one another. They 
exchange information about their interests and priorities, work together to identify 
the true issues dividing them, brainstorm in search of alternatives that bridge their 
opposing interests, and collectively evaluate these alternatives from the viewpoint 
of their mutual welfare.
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The events that unfolded at First UMC match this description quite well. When the 
administrative board decided to reduce the number of worship services at First UMC, the 
pastors put into place an intentional decision-making process that they hoped would lead 
to an integrative solution. This process was developed in conversation with a professional 
church consultant, and was designed to allow representatives from each of the three 
worship services to participate equally. According to the committee members that I 
interviewed, the aim of the process was to allow each person to voice his or her 
preferences and concerns, and ultimately to move the group toward finding a solution 
with which they could all live. Despite the tensions that occasionally developed, 
interviewees described the overall experience as deeply respectful and rewarding. Judith, 
the chair of the worship committee, described the process as follows:  
And there were some tense moments, but never was anything said out of out of 
hatred or out of disdain for each other . . . the actual process was a process of 
integrity, I feel, in that one group was not favored over the other and we sat 
together as the body. 
Similarly, Ann, who was new to First UMC at the time of the conflict, said, 
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And I think the key to the whole meeting and the key to the whole change was 
that people were listened to. Every single person was listened to. And whether it 
turned out how they wanted it to turn out or not, I think that was secondary to the 
fact that they had a chance to say what they needed to say and they were listened 
to without interruption. 
These characteristics of the process at First UMC, along with the relative lack of 
contentious tactics used during the process, suggest that the committee members were 
able to focus on problem solving as their primary strategy for coping with a potentially 
divisive change in their worship structure. 
One particular approach to problem solving that proves especially applicable in 
this case is the concept of bridging. In bridging, “neither party achieves its initial 
demands, but a new option is devised that satisfies the most important interests 
underlying those demands.”340 Each group at First UMC started out with the desire to 
keep its own service intact, with no major changes to it; clearly, then, no group was able 
to obtain its original goal. Yet, the worship committee at First UMC was able to settle on 
a solution that was acceptable to all parties involved, even though it required all parties to 
make certain sacrifices. The committee was able to achieve this result because it found an 
integrative solution that still satisfied all parties’ major interests. From my interviews 
with First UMC parishioners, I would describe the key interests for all three groups as 
follows: access to a worship service that contained elements (particularly music) with 
which they were familiar; the opportunity to worship in a style that helped them feel 
close to God; and the maintenance of strong relational bonds with others in their 
preferred worship service and in the wider church. From this perspective, the solution 
reached by the First UMC worship committee bridged all of these interests by integrating 
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worship elements important to all three groups into the two new services, and by making 
sure to provide both traditional and contemporary opportunities for worship every 
Sunday. In this way, all three groups got many of their needs met, although no group got 
everything it wanted. 
As I noted in the case study, a crucial element in the worship committee’s ability 
to move toward this integrative solution was Roy Sanderson’s suggestion to move the 
contemporary service to 5:00 PM. Some would interpret Roy’s action as an instance of 
yielding rather than problem solving, since it seemed to involve lowering the aspirations 
of the contemporary worshippers as a way of making peace with the other two groups. In 
fact, at least one of the individuals I interviewed stated that he believed Roy made this 
choice in order to avoid further conflict with others on the committee. However, 
considering the key interests that I noted above, the “out of the box” solution Roy devised 
helped to meet all of those criteria. The contemporary worshippers would still have 
access to a worship service that fit their style and theological commitments, while 
maintaining a positive relationship with others in the congregation. Each of the 
contemporary worshippers I interviewed—even those who did not like the 5:00 PM 
worship time—agreed that it was important for the contemporary service-goers to show 
their willingness to “sacrifice” along with everyone else. These interviewees stated that if 
they had “dug in their heels” and refused to make any concessions, they would have 
damaged the relational fabric of the church. This shows that for many of the worship 
committee members, maintaining relationships with others in their church proved just as 
important as their theological understanding of worship. 
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These descriptions of the events that unfolded at First UMC show that this 
congregation chose to approach conflict through problem solving rather than contending. 
Why would this be the case? As I have shown, strategic choice theory offers several 
explanatory frameworks for the reasons groups choose one approach over another. First, I 
argue that in terms of the dual concern model, the parishioners at First UMC 
demonstrated both high self-concern and high other-concern. Like Grace UCC, First 
UMC met the criteria for conditions that tend to produce high self-concern: fear, a high 
value on the outcome of the conflict, high emotional investment in the conflict, and the 
involvement of social identities. As the case study revealed, interviewees from First 
UMC cared a great deal about the outcome of this conflict because of its potential effect 
on their participation in worship, which they defined as an activity with deep spiritual 
relevance. Many of the people I interviewed at First UMC experienced much fear and 
anxiety related to the prospect of losing their preferred worship service, and they 
identified strongly with the particular group of worshippers with whom they had come to 
associate.  
However, the dual concern model also posits that when high self-concern is 
accompanied by high other-concern, problem solving will usually prevail as the preferred 
strategy for addressing conflict. At First UMC, almost everyone I interviewed—even 
those who felt very strongly about keeping their worship service intact—expressed deep 
concern about how any proposed worship changes might affect others in the 
congregation. This strong other-concern was grounded in the relationships First UMC 
parishioners shared with each other, both within and outside the confines of the worship 
committee. For instance, several of the individuals I interviewed noted that although they 
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primarily identified with one particular worship service, they shared important bonds 
with people from other services through their participation in other aspects of 
congregational life—especially Sunday School classes. Esther, a devoted contemporary 
worshipper, highlighted the importance of such bonds when she stated, “I think that's 
probably what kept our church successful at having two kinds of worship, because in 
individual Sunday school classes there were people from both services. It was people 
from the church, not from the service.”  
In addition to the relationships that already existed among parishioners throughout 
First UMC, further bonds were built in the context of the worship committee itself. Roy 
described the relational impact of the committee’s meetings this way:  
Well, when people started hearing – oh, man! These are just, these are good folk, 
who just worship in a different way . . . people were starting to understand each 
other, and people were starting to like each other, there was a closeness.  
This “closeness” was instrumental in moving the parishioners at First UMC toward a 
position of problem solving rather than contending. Although members of all three 
services were deeply concerned about maintaining the integrity of their worship 
experience, this self-concern was balanced by a concern for those who worshipped 
somewhat differently, but were still valued members of the same faith community. In 
fact, throughout the process at First UMC, parishioners expressed concern not only for 
other individual members, but for the well-being of the congregation as a whole. It was 
out of such concern that the leaders of the 8:45 contemporary service made the decision 
to volunteer to move their worship to the evening. Simon, a middle-aged man who had 
been part of the contemporary service since its inception, described that decision as 
follows: “So basically, the group of us that went to the contemporary service got together 
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and said, hey, we've got to think of what's best for the church, not for us.” Roy even went 
so far as to say that he would have agreed to the complete elimination of the 
contemporary service if he thought it would contribute positively to the health of First 
UMC: 
You know there’s a quote says that “The needs of the many outweigh the needs of 
the few.” And, I just felt like we were at a crossroads as a church, that it was 
gonna go south quick, and just – if we had to give the whole service up and never 
do it – to me, it would have been the right thing to do. You know? For the 
betterment of the larger church. 
One could argue, however, that prior to the conflict, members at Grace UCC also 
shared high levels of closeness, especially since many of them were related to one 
another through blood or marriage and had been attending church together for decades. 
Yet, this closeness ultimately was not enough to produce the other-concern needed to 
lead that congregation toward problem solving and away from contending. As I argued 
above, the notion of anxiety helps to explain why members at Grace UCC engaged in 
specific behaviors—such as negative framing and zero-sum thinking—that social 
psychology understands in terms of “departures from rational choice.” Likewise, I argue 
that at First UMC, lower levels of anxiety allowed parishioners to build on the strength of 
their relationships and develop additional closeness, which helped to mitigate the conflict 
and make it more manageable. In other words, because First UMC members felt less 
threatened, they were able to focus on their common interests and to engage in problem 
solving techniques to further those interests.  
Lower levels of anxiety at First UMC also contributed to that congregation's 
ability to embrace the opposite approach represented by the departures from rational 
choice exhibited at Grace UCC. For instance, instead of negative framing, members of 
250 
 
First UMC were able to engage in positive framing as a means of approaching the 
conflict in their midst. As I noted above, it has been shown that negotiators behave in a 
more risk-averse fashion when evaluating an outcome in terms of potential gains as 
opposed to potential losses. Admittedly, at the beginning of the process, members of the 
First UMC worship committee experienced a great deal of anxiety, and many of them 
told me about their fear of “losing” their worship service. In this sense, many of them 
began the decision-making process with negative framing, focusing primarily on what 
they stood to lose. However, as the intentional decision-making process was implemented 
within the committee, more emphasis was placed on preserving and honoring those 
elements of the different worship services that parishioners most valued. “Simon” noted 
the importance of this emphasis when he said, 
To me it was important that everyone laid out why they liked each of their 
services and then what we could do to continue to do those things that made you 
feel at home at this church, made you want to come to this church. We don't want 
to lose any of that. We don't want to drive people away because we're making 
time changes. So we wanted to make sure that everyone was able to get those 
ideas out, those reasons out as to why they wanted to come to their service. 
I suggest that this focus on keeping the most valued aspects of the various worship 
services intact helped lower anxiety among First UMC members, because they 
experienced less threat to the social identities involved with their preferred services. As a 
result, instead of focusing on what they might lose from their worship services, 
parishioners became able to think about their situation in terms of potential gains—i.e., 
retaining important elements of worship, as well as keeping the relational fabric of the 
congregation intact. 
Finally, I suggest that because they were able to maintain relatively low levels of 
anxiety during the conflict, members at First UMC moved away from zero-sum thinking, 
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and toward positive-sum thinking. Positive-sum thinking is “the view that the two 
parties’ interests are not totally opposed and hence that problem solving is feasible.”341 
Because the committee members at First UMC experienced lower levels of personal and 
communal threat, they were able to engage in problem solving strategies and ultimately 
agree on a solution that involved both gains and losses for all parties involved. Indeed, 
almost every person I interviewed from First UMC mentioned how important it was that 
participants from each of the three worship services make some “sacrifices” in order for 
the group to move toward an acceptable resolution to the conflict. In this sense, the 
committee members became able to see that a fixed-pie approach would actually 
overlook the fact that they all shared an interest in maintaining the health and well-being 
of the church as a whole. This move toward positive-sum thinking is especially evident in 
the “out of the box” solution suggested by Roy and other members of the contemporary 
service. By proposing an approach that had not yet been entertained in the committee, the 
contemporary worshippers moved the discussion from a focus on what each service 
would lose to a reframing of the entire issue in terms of the common interests that all 
parishioners shared.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have broadened my analysis of the congregational case studies to 
include social psychological as well as psychodynamic resources. Admittedly, these case 
studies are highly complex, and many different factors likely contributed to the disputes 
that occurred within these congregations. Yet, my contention remains that the discipline 
of social psychology—particularly through its understandings of collective identification, 
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polarization, and strategic choice—offers new frameworks in which to examine the 
patterns of interaction between groups. Theories related to collective identification and 
group polarization, for instance, shed light on how and why social groups form, while 
concepts related to strategic choice help explain why groups choose particular approaches 
for engaging each other in conflict. Such theories thus allow one to see intergroup 
conflicts not simply as products of individual disagreements, but rather as a complex 
intermingling of interpersonal and social processes in which collective identities become 
strongly engaged.  
I have further argued that viewing these social psychological theories through the 
basic lens of anxiety clarifies why the intergroup conflicts under discussion here 
developed as they did. I have suggested that, at Grace UCC, threats to parishioners' social 
identities and the resulting group polarization raised anxiety levels and propelled sub-
groups toward contentious tactics with one another. At First UMC, by contrast, lower 
levels of anxiety allowed members to focus on the social identity they shared, and thus to 
move more easily toward problem solving and integrative solutions. As helpful as these 
resources are, they are primarily intended to be descriptive in nature; that is, they seek to 
describe how individuals and groups actually behave, but not necessarily the way they 
“should” behave. For prescriptive reflection on the nature of healing and transformation 
within congregations, a different set of resources is required. Those resources may be 
found in the language of theology, which provides ways of talking about brokenness, 
health, and community that include both the “is” and the “ought” dimensions of human 
life. Thus, in the next chapter, I take up theology as another lens through which to 
explore congregational conflict. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
TRAGEDY, VULNERABILITY, AND HOSPITALITY: 
ENGAGING CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
 In the last two chapters I have brought the resources of psychodynamic 
psychology and social psychology to bear on the problem of congregational conflict, in 
an effort to understand how and why such conflict originates. Both of these disciplines 
maintain that the tendency to resist difference and gravitate toward similar others and 
groups is a natural part of human development. In certain circumstances, however, these 
tendencies become intensely defensive or aggressive, resulting in destructive behaviors 
like splitting and projection, rigid demands for sameness, polarization, or contentious 
tactics. I have argued that anxiety plays a key role in such developments, either as a 
catalyst for or as a result of their emergence. More specifically, I have claimed that 
increased anxiety produces an increased sense of threat, and destructive behaviors 
frequently result. In contrast, lower levels of anxiety yield a decreased sense of threat, 
and thus a greater likelihood of problem solving within conflicted communities. 
 When combined with the insights provided by family systems theory—described 
in Chapter One—these social scientific resources help to illuminate how human beings 
relate to each other, both interpersonally and as members of groups. These resources also 
offer very concrete descriptions of how interpersonal and communal relationships 
become disordered and damaged in response to the anxiety stirred by difference. 
Furthermore, each of the theoretical frameworks I have reviewed in this project—
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including family systems theory, object relations theory, self psychology, and social 
psychology—gestures toward ways in which this basic anxiety might be soothed. Such 
ways include differentiation (especially for leaders of organizations), resisting splitting, 
developing tolerance for ambiguity, releasing rigid needs for sameness, and adopting 
cooperative or problem-solving approaches to conflict. Despite these important 
suggestions, however, in each case the “default” assumption remains the same: namely, 
that human beings seek to protect themselves from the anxiety produced by encounters 
with difference. As I have shown, this idea seems completely justified, based on what 
social scientific theory tells us about human functioning. Yet, such an assumption also 
implies that difference represents, at best, a basic challenge with which human beings 
must cope, rather than an important resource for the self’s development and relationships.  
 Given the anthropology suggested by the social scientific resources I have 
reviewed, I argue that an additional step is needed here: namely, a theological reframing 
of difference and conflict. According to the perspective I advance in this chapter, 
theology provides a way to see difference as both challenge and gift. In this way of 
thinking, resisting difference is, as social science suggests, a fundamental aspect of the 
way human beings operate. At the same time, however, resources in theology also make 
it possible to see difference as a result of God’s enlivening, creative power. Reframing 
difference in this way serves to normalize the anxiety provoked by the diversity 
encountered in community, but also goes a step further to claim diversity itself as a good 
created by God. Within this framework, then, difference becomes a resource to be 
cherished rather than a bane to be eradicated. I maintain that such an alternative 
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theological perspective could potentially lower levels of anxiety in conflicted 
congregations and ultimately contribute to communal healing. 
 To build my argument, I make the following theological moves. First, I argue that 
conflicting human aims and needs represent a basic fact of human existence. 
Consequently, individuals and communities will always experience a certain amount of 
incompatibility due to “alterity,” which is part of the “tragic” structure of human life.342 I 
then move beyond this conceptualization, arguing that “irreducibility”343 is not only a 
tragic feature of existence, but also an outgrowth of God's creative power, which reveals 
itself through diversity in nature, religious diversity among human beings, and 
theological diversity within faith traditions. Further, I contend that this diversity 
represents not only the way things are, but also the way things should be. In other words, 
I make an argument for diversity as a desirable theological norm, claiming that to 
eradicate difference is to eradicate a part of the diversity that God intended for the world 
and for the church. In this way, it becomes possible to understand diversity theologically 
as gift rather than problem. 
 I recognize that presenting a theological argument for diversity as a desirable 
norm does not necessarily make it less anxiety-provoking. Thus, I suggest that the way 
forward for congregations torn by conflict lies in learning to “sit with” the anxiety 
generated by encounters with difference. I frame this idea theologically by adopting a 
notion of vulnerability to difference—i.e., remaining open to difference despite the 
anxiety and discomfort it produces. Building on this theme, I then argue for a vision of 
ecclesial hospitality that aims toward finding ways to remain connected across difference 
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without attempting to change it. By establishing strong theological rationales for 
vulnerability and hospitality, I lay the groundwork for exploring, in the final chapter, 
what these commitments might look like within the concrete context of congregational 
conflict.  
 
Human Being and the “Tragic” 
 Given my emphasis on the theme of anxiety throughout this project, one might 
assume that Paul Tillich would be the most obvious theological writer for me to engage 
in this chapter. As I noted in Chapter Two, Tillich conceptualized the fundamental human 
problem in terms of “existential anxiety,” or the “threat of nonbeing.”344 In this sense, his 
work resonates with much that I have already said in this dissertation about the role of 
anxiety in conflict. However, in exploring the problem of congregational conflict, I have 
tried to maintain a focus on the anxiety raised by encounters with difference. In contrast, 
Tillich describes existential anxiety primarily as a human response to the awareness of 
one's own finitude. For this reason, Tillich's work is, in my estimation, not as well-suited 
to address the particular anxiety-producing threat of difference as it is experienced by 
individuals and groups in conflicted congregations. Instead, I draw here upon the work of 
philosophical theologian Edward Farley, who specifically addresses the role that 
difference plays in human life. In fact, as I will show below, Farley offers a theological 
answer to the question of why conflict is so common in human communities: namely, 
because it is part of the “tragic” structure of human existence, which will always include 
an element of basic incompatibility.  
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In his 1990 text Good and Evil: Interpreting a Human Condition, Farley offers a 
compelling framework for understanding the fundamental brokenness of human 
existence. However, instead of “brokenness,” Farley uses the term “the tragic” to 
describe the nature of human life, which he further characterizes with words like 
vulnerability, incompatibility, and alienation. In fact, the tragic proves the “most general 
and unifying feature”345 of the human condition, and provides the basic structure for all 
human experience. Within this conceptual structure, the tragic is “a situation in which the 
conditions of well-being require and are interdependent with situations of limitation, 
frustration, challenge, and suffering.”346 Yet, the presence of suffering itself is not what 
renders human existence tragic; instead, it is tragic “because sufferings of various sorts 
are necessary conditions of creativity, affection, the experience of beauty, etc.”347 Farley 
thus uses the term “tragic” not simply to acknowledge the reality of suffering in human 
life, but also to signal that the positive goods human beings experience cannot be 
achieved without some suffering. The structure of existence means that humans can never 
be freed from their limitations as created beings, and that to experience joy, hope, and 
peace they must also expect, at times, to experience sadness, despair, and turmoil.  
While Farley describes the human condition primarily in terms of “the tragic,” 
this does not mean that he neglects the category of sin. Indeed, later in the text, Farley 
analyzes sin through a variety of conceptual lenses, including bondage of the will, 
idolatry, and oppression. These lenses all contribute to an understanding of sin as 
something that distorts human agency in a myriad of ways. However, inclinations to sin 
are not the same as basic human vulnerabilities and limitations. Instead, sin is a 
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“distinctive dynamic,” while “the tragic character of our condition” provides the “primary 
motivating background of sin’s origin.”348 Thus, in this view, the tragic—not sin—is the 
most basic feature of human being. In fact, the tragic is the backdrop against which the 
realities of sin are played out among individuals and throughout human societies.  
This way of understanding the human condition differs quite markedly from more 
traditional theological approaches, which tend to identify sin—as symbolized by Adam 
and Eve’s transgression in Eden—as the origin of all that ails humanity. Within Farley’s 
framework, by contrast, the potential for such transgression is written into the structure of 
created beings that have been given the freedom to make their own choices. Of course, 
too often these choices increase suffering through acts of violation or oppression, and 
thus are sinful. Yet, the tragic structure of existence means that human beings will be 
subject to a certain amount of suffering no matter what choices they make. Suffering, 
then, is simply part of being human. How human beings deal with suffering, however, 
sets the stage for experiencing both the burden of sin and the release of redemption. 
To see how this perspective applies to the issue of congregational conflict, it is 
necessary to delve more deeply into its theological framework. In this text, Farley 
sketches a view of human reality as made up of three main elements: individual agents, 
the social, and the “interhuman,” which he defines as “the sphere of face-to-face relation 
or being-together in relation.”349 While all three of these elements form interlocking 
components of human existence, the interhuman remains primary because it is the sphere 
that forms the foundation for the workings of the others. That is, individual agents cannot 
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be known to one another without the dimension of the interhuman, and, likewise, the 
sphere of the social is made up of many different interhuman relationships.  
Furthermore, within each of these three spheres of reality, the tragic structure of 
human life creates particular types of vulnerability, defined as “the capacity of a living 
creature to undergo harm. Harm means both the frustration of the needs and desires of 
that creature and the pain and suffering that accompany that frustration.”350 The 
interhuman sphere of relations thus engenders two distinctive kinds of vulnerability: 
interpersonal suffering and benign alienation. The first of these, interpersonal suffering, 
“occurs in two primary forms: the suffering that comes from commiseration with the 
other’s suffering; and, the suffering that occurs when interpersonal relations themselves 
are wounded.”351 This, then, is suffering experienced within the context of specific 
interpersonal relationships, whether as a result of compassionate empathy or of the grief 
that accompanies death, discord, or any other form of human fragility. 
Unlike interpersonal suffering, which occurs within particular human 
relationships, benign alienation refers to the more general “incompatibility” between 
individuals, which results in the “impossibility of harmonizing the perspectives, aims, 
desires, and agendas of self-initiating persons.”352 Such incompatibility arises from 
“alterity,” defined as “both the uninterchangeability and irreducibility of the other and a 
resistance and challenge to my autonomy and its claims.”353 In other words, because each 
person is a unique and irreducible center of needs, thoughts, and experiences, there will 
inevitably arise occasions in which these elements come into conflict with one another 
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and cannot be easily resolved. In making this claim, Farley wishes to paint a realistic 
picture of the human condition as falling along a spectrum between the extremes of 
sentimental goodness, on the one hand, and complete destructiveness, on the other.
354
 
Instead, individuals’ needs and desires are profoundly shaped by the tragic nature of 
human being, and as such they often lead to brokenness in human relationships—not 
because of evil intentions, but because of the basic given-ness of human incompatibility:  
Our interests prompt us to resent, suspect, or accuse those whose aims and efforts 
are incompatible with ours. Thus, benign alienation and its antipathies is neither a 
struggle of tooth and claw nor a simple harmony but rather a sign of the finitude 
of interhuman being-together.
355
 
 To the reader, the relevance of this theological framework for a discussion of 
congregational conflict may not be immediately clear. I submit, however, that this 
understanding of the human condition contributes to a pastoral theological approach to 
this issue in three particular ways. First of all, Farley offers a view of human being that is 
neither all-good nor all-bad; rather, it is both complex and ambiguous. Such a vision of 
the human condition is more true to lived human experience, and thus more relevant to 
any attempt to reflect on what makes people act the way they do toward one another. As I 
argued in Chapter Four, this recognition of complexity proves especially important in an 
investigation of conflict, in which increased anxiety may spur individuals to identify 
contending groups as either “good” or “bad” through defensive processes of splitting and 
projection. This theological framework offers a more nuanced approach to human being 
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that troubles these neat categories, thereby highlighting the basic fragility and finitude 
that likely contribute to all instances of human conflict. 
Second, Farley's work offers a way of understanding conflict not as an “evil” to 
be avoided, but as a foreseeable consequence of living in relationship with one another. 
The description of the human condition as basically tragic, with the potential to move 
toward good or evil, maps well onto what I wish to claim about conflict: namely, that it is 
a given part of human relationships that, depending on how it is engaged, can produce 
positive or negative results. That is, within the basic “incompatibility” of the interhuman, 
human beings can make particular choices about how to engage conflict in ways that 
either increase or decrease individual and communal suffering.
356
 Indeed, it is on this 
basis that I will later argue for an approach to congregational conflict that emphasizes 
vulnerability and hospitality.  
Finally, by emphasizing the interhuman dimension of experience, Farley’s 
theology complements my desire to focus on the space between individuals (and, by 
extension, between members of a community) as a key place where human beings 
experience brokenness. As I explained in Chapter One, pastoral theology as an academic 
discipline has only recently begun to reclaim its historic roots by re-focusing on the 
experience of ecclesial communities as an important source for new theological 
knowledge. Farley’s focus on the interhuman—which might be described as a “middle” 
area between an individual care-seeker and society as a whole—meshes well with my 
interest in the brokenness that can occur through conflict in congregational settings. 
Despite these important contributions, however, Farley’s conceptualization of the 
nature of human being also invites some constructive critique. I have noted above the 
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helpfulness of a conception of human beings as individual centers of needs and desires, 
which are, by definition, incompatible with one another at times. In this sense, Farley’s 
theological anthropology confirms what we already know through conventional 
wisdom—namely, that conflict is simply a fact of human life, and that attempts to 
eradicate it completely are doomed to failure. However, in framing his theological vision 
of humanity with terms like “tragic” and “incompatible,” Farley implies that these are 
essentially negative realities with which human beings must cope. The fact that human 
beings are all unique, and possess unique needs and desires that cannot all be easily 
reconciled, is simply a given that must be tolerated. Farley’s view thus suggests that 
negotiating the diversity of human life is part of the cost for attaining other, more positive 
aspects of life—such as joy, beauty, and creativity.  
For instance, in his discussion of alterity, Farley claims that the acknowledgment 
of difference involves not only an awareness of our inability to understand fully what is 
in another's mind, but also a recognition of the other's basic autonomy in the face of our 
own—a recognition that brings with it a specific kind of vulnerability. Farley writes,  
. . . this clash of resistances and contestings is at the same time a co-disclosure of 
fragility. I experience the other as not only centered and autonomous but as fragile 
before my interpretations and actions even as I experience my own autonomy as 
fragile to the interpretations and actions of the other.
357
 
Farley's reflection on the mutual fragility of autonomous selves certainly rings true, in the 
sense that relationality and freedom make human beings vulnerable to physical and 
emotional harm from one another.  
 Farley further claims that the reality of alterity brings with it a certain kind of 
suffering, in the form of alienation. This alienation arises from each person's awareness 
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that his or her world-view conflicts with the world-view held by others: “. . . the other is 
experienced as one who is in the world alongside me but who contests my version of it . . 
. at the heart of the interhuman is vast set of incompatibilities that originate in the 
irreducible otherness of the participants.”358 Here, again, Farley names a reality that 
resonates with much of human experience: it is, indeed, painful to recognize that one is 
not the center of the universe, and that one's understandings of the world are limited. In 
framing human alterity and incompatibility primarily in terms of fragility and loss, 
however, Farley indirectly suggests that it would be preferable for all human beings not 
to be irreducibly unique. In other words, Farley implies that the radical differences 
between human beings contribute only to human brokenness, and not to human healing.  
 This is not to say that Farley recognizes no positive value at all in human 
differences. In fact, he acknowledges that without an “other,” the interhuman sphere itself 
would not exist, since “dialogue, intimacy, and empathy all require a genuine other.”359 
Despite this acknowledgment, however, Farley continues to speak of alterity primarily in 
terms of the tragic nature of human life, rather than in terms of a condition that makes the 
joys of human relationship possible. This perspective overlooks the possibility that the 
negotiation of difference through conflict—which many people experience as a form of 
suffering—may itself become a source of creativity and renewed relationship.  
 That is, instead of seeing humans’ unique needs and desires only as incompatible, 
and thus only as a challenge to be negotiated through compromise, it is possible also to 
see such diversity as a good created by God—a good that can itself yield further goods of 
creativity, joy, and beauty. This is not to minimize the power of conflicting human aims 
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to wreak division and brokenness in relationships and communities. Indeed, one of the 
case studies I have described in this project provides a representative example of how 
damaging such conflicting aims can be. I fully agree that in one sense, the nature of 
human beings as having vastly diverse goals and desires, which cannot all be smoothly 
reconciled, represents a tragic dimension of our existence. To argue—as some humanist 
psychologists do—that if each person simply works toward his or her own self-
actualization, human communities will grow and thrive strikes me as deeply naïve. Yet, 
to limit our understanding of human being such that the tragic becomes its most essential 
characteristic also seems to close down the possibilities of human potential. 
Instead, I propose a theological anthropology that is paradoxical in nature—one 
that sees human being as both profoundly broken and participating in healing at any 
given moment. This vision understands human beings as individual centers of needs and 
desires that are often incompatible with one another, a fact which constitutes a tragic 
dimension to human life. At the same time, I suggest that this tragic dimension may also 
contain within it the source for healing and wholeness. The fact that all of our needs and 
desires are incompatible is, in one sense, tragic; the fact that we all have unique needs 
and desires, I will maintain, is a result of God’s creative process, which values difference 
over sameness or seamless agreement. In what follows, I make an argument for diversity 
as both a created good and as a desirable norm for faith communities. Such an 
understanding of diversity, in turn, creates a pathway for understanding the friction 
created by difference as both challenge and gift.  
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Diversity as a Created Good 
 This theological anthropology contributes meaningfully to an understanding of 
congregational conflict because it moves the discussion from a view of conflict as rooted 
only in human selfishness and greed (sinfulness) to seeing conflict as an inevitable 
consequence of life among a diverse human population (the tragic). Within this 
framework, conflict becomes a reality that is, in some sense, unavoidable. In other words, 
if one understands conflict as part of the “tragic” structure of human existence, one can 
no longer say that conflict could be eradicated if everyone would simply cultivate 
kindness and compassion. To be sure, some forms of violent conflict might be avoided 
this way, but recall that within this conceptual structure, violence falls into the category 
of sinfulness. It is played out against the backdrop of the tragic, but violence goes a step 
further. That is, violence does not constitute a foregone conclusion in the same way as 
incompatibility among conflicting human needs. This is an important theological point 
because it dispels the illusion that conflict is somehow, by definition, imbued with 
destructive connotations that must be avoided at all costs.  
 However, to posit a theological anthropology that sees conflicting human aims as 
only a part of the tragic structure of human existence misses a theological opportunity to 
explore the notion that conflict could represent both challenge and gift to human beings. 
In what follows, I argue instead for a theological understanding of diversity both as a 
good created by God, and as a desirable norm for faith communities. To build this 
argument, I present a way of interpreting diversity—as it is seen in creation, in human 
religious diversity, and in theological diversity within faith traditions—not only as a fact 
of life on this planet, but as a vital part of God's will for the world. I then extend this 
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interpretation, applying it to the particular issue of theological diversity within individual 
communities of faith. In this way, I make a specific case for recognizing such diversity as 
a desirable norm which faith communities are called not only to tolerate, but to embrace 
as a defining feature of the ecclesia. 
 
Diversity in Creation 
 Within Christian theology, the concept of diversity as a created good is most 
commonly found in discussions of creation as a whole. Such discussions frequently 
describe the sheer teeming diversity of the world as the incarnation of God's “power of 
differentiation and relationship.”360 Novelty and difference are thus cherished as 
illustrations of God's never-ending ability to create increasingly varied forms of life. This 
view has its origins in the early Trinitarian theology of the Christian Church:  
From the early years of Christianity, Christian traditions have suggested 
that the diversity of creatures reflects the immeasurable richness of their 
Creator. Creation is good because all created entities mirror, in some way, 
the divine Trinity and its infinite goodness.
361
 
The importance of the Trinity to a discussion of creation lies in the relationality shared 
among the three Trinitarian persons. This relationality becomes the wellspring from 
which flow the abundant and interdependent forms of life on earth. Indeed, within this 
perspective, the profusion of life on this planet “springs ultimately from the abundance of 
the divine communion. It expresses the ecstatic nature of the divine life.”362  
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 This Trinitarian basis for understanding the created order thus entails a 
recognition of relationship—both among the persons of the Trinity and between God and 
the world—as “the primary metaphysical category.”363 By extension, then, difference and 
diversity become positive theological attributes because relationship cannot exist without 
distinctions. Put simply, relating to another person or creature requires that the other be 
different from oneself. Thus, for God to love the world, the world must be—in some 
significant sense—distinguishable from God’s own being. Such distinction constitutes a 
theological good, since it is what makes possible an intimate, loving relationship between 
God and world: “. . . God is difference making, empowering the household of a world 
teeming with diversity. That creation is affirmed good requires that it be distinct, 
different from God.”364 Ultimately, then, diversity lies at the heart of God’s good 
creation; without difference, there would be no creation at all.    
 In addition to the Trinitarian perspective outlined above, it is also possible to 
argue for diversity as a created good by focusing on the intimate relationship between the 
Creator and the world. For instance, process theologians like Marjorie Suchocki have 
posited an understanding of creation that involves a “call and response” relationship 
between God and the world:  
God calls the world into being, and the world's order exists in and through 
its response to God. God responds to the world, evaluating and integrating 
what the world has done with the last call into the divine self. God then 
calls a new form into existence, with this new form made possible by the 
last response.
365
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In this way of thinking, the relationship between Creator and created becomes a never-
ending cycle of mutual response—a cycle originally initiated by God, but the shape of 
whose progression crucially depends on the many and varied responses of the created 
order. Within this model, the teeming diversity of the world is not an accident or a 
divergence from God’s intentions, but rather a direct result of God’s invitation.366 In this 
sense, the diversity of creation is not only a theological good, but also a logical 
inevitability given the way that God has chosen to create the world. That is, God's 
decision to engage the world in a call-and-response relationship means that the world will 
necessarily include increasingly diverse forms of life. Since this system is one of God's 
own choosing, it must, by definition, be good. 
 
Religious Diversity Among Human Beings 
 In this project, I am arguing for a view of the world's diversity as a created good. 
This diversity may be understood as resulting from the overflow of Trinitarian 
relationality, or as a logical consequence of the mutuality between God and the world. In 
either case, the theological conclusion is the same: “Because creation's variety reflects its 
divine origins, that variety is good.”367 To take this argument a step further, the inherent 
goodness of creation's variety implies an inherent goodness in the diversity of humanity 
as well. After all, if the innumerable differences among all life forms on the planet point 
to the goodness of God, it stands to reason that the differences among human beings point 
to this same goodness. Therefore, if it is good that God created so many different species 
                                                          
366
 Ibid., 30-31. 
367
 Yordy,  174. 
269 
 
of plants and animals, it must also be good that God created human beings with different 
genders, and with a wide variety of skin tones, body types, cultures, and languages.  
 Yet, the question of whether religious diversity is a good created by God or an 
example of human waywardness has been debated by theologians for decades. Those 
who argue for the former have developed a variety of theological approaches to support 
this claim. Some theologians espouse what might be termed a classic position of 
pluralism, articulated most famously by British philosopher John Hick.
368
 This 
perspective understands various religious traditions as different “paths” up the same 
mountain, all of which lead to the same ultimate reality and all of which seek the same 
healing end. Indeed, within this brand of pluralism, “ . . . various religious traditions are 
soteriological vehicles that lead us from self-centeredness to reality centeredness . . . 
Hence, all paths lead to the summit and none more efficaciously than any other.”369   
 Such a pluralist position hinges on a philosophical commitment to the idea of a 
“noumenal Real” that can never be fully known by human beings because their minds 
and imaginations simply cannot contain it.
 370
 As a result, the only way in which one may 
experience the Real is in the form of one’s own “particular, historical, social, and 
psychological categories,” or “phenomena.”371 This points to the central role of human 
culture in the development of religious experience, since human beings can only 
apprehend ultimate reality through a wide variety of different—and even conflicting—
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religious phenomena. Thus, through this emphasis on culture, the pluralist position 
provides a way to expand the notion of diversity as a created good to include religious 
diversity among humans as well: if the diversity of human cultures is a good created by 
God, then by extension the religious diversity among humans is also such a good. Put 
simply, this approach interprets the vast differences among human beings—including 
religious differences—as a logical consequence of the particular way God has chosen to 
create the world.  
 While classic pluralism has been pivotal in the argument for religious diversity as 
a created good, it is not without problems of its own. One of the most important critiques 
of this position is that in positing a “noumenal Real” that can only be known indirectly, 
classic pluralism essentially collapses all religious traditions into one another. In other 
words, if all religions are simply different paths up a single mountain, then each path is 
essentially interchangeable with every other. Ironically, by attempting to create a 
theological position that makes room for the diversity of religious traditions, classic 
pluralism discounts the real differences between traditions as ultimately unimportant.  
 In lieu of this approach, I argue instead for a perspective that honors human 
diversity as it is expressed through religious pluralism, but that simultaneously insists that 
the differences between traditions are meaningful and may point to different truths. One 
compelling argument supporting this approach is that distinctions already exist within the 
divine life itself—an idea which has deep historical roots in the doctrine of the Trinity as 
a profoundly relational reality. This relationality characterizes the interaction between 
the three persons of the Trinity, and makes possible a variety of ways of experiencing the 
divine. In other words, understanding the divine life as containing plenitude enables an 
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understanding of various religious traditions as apprehending distinct dimensions of that 
plenitude: “Since Trinity is constituted by an enduring set of relations, the divine life has 
varied dimensions. So human interaction with the triune God may take different 
forms.”372  
 Given that God's very Trinitarian nature makes varied human relationships with 
the divine possible, it follows that religious diversity is a good that God both creates and 
affirms. Within this theological framework, then, the existence of religious pluralism is 
not a divergence from God's ideal plan for humanity, but rather a natural outgrowth of the 
ways in which God has chosen to relate to human beings. That is to say: diversity—
including religious diversity—has its roots in the multiplicity of the divine. Different 
religious traditions thus point to different aspects of the divine, which in turn enrich and 
complement each other. Consequently, differences between religions become “more life-
giving and more God-revealing than similarities,”373 because it is only through the varied 
strands of religious experience that human beings can glimpse the manifold nature of 
divine truth.
374
 Within this discussion, then, a broad Trinitarian approach to religious 
pluralism helpfully contributes to an argument for diversity as a created good. Unlike 
traditional pluralist approaches, which imagine various religious traditions as paths up the 
same mountain, this framework suggests that different religious experiences actually 
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apprehend different aspects of divinity, precisely because divinity is not a unitary entity. 
By employing the doctrine of the Trinity as a means for grasping the multiplicity of the 
divine life, it thus becomes possible to argue for the goodness of religious diversity 
among human beings in a way that maintains respect for the real differences among them. 
 However, it is also important to acknowledge here that Trinitarian notions do not 
provide a “neat solution” to all questions raised by religious pluralism, precisely because 
real distinctions still exist among traditions—distinctions that cannot be easily 
reconciled.
375
 This fact points to the inevitable tension between two important theological 
impulses: on the one hand, the desire to affirm the goodness of religious diversity; and on 
the other, the acknowledgment that any statement of religious conviction also includes a 
claim of truth—truth that may appear diametrically opposed to the claims of other 
traditions. Theological conflicts within individual faith communities frequently involve a 
similar tension between the desire to remain open to diverse viewpoints and the felt need 
to assert a uniform theological identity. In the remainder of this chapter I argue that, like 
religious diversity, theological diversity within faith communities is a created good—
albeit one that presents unique challenges to congregations struggling with conflict in 
their midst. 
 
Theological Diversity in Faith Communities 
 In the preceding section, I made an argument for human diversity—as it is 
experienced through religious pluralism—as a created good. But what about theological 
diversity within religious traditions, or even within individual congregations? As the case 
studies in Chapter Three showed, it proved just as difficult for people to accept 
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differences within their own congregations than it might have been for them to talk about 
religion with Jews or Hindus or Buddhists. In the course of researching the topic of 
congregational conflict, however, I discovered that very few resources address the 
dilemma caused by theological pluralism within a single religious tradition, 
denomination, or congregation. Many theological texts now grapple with how Christians 
should approach people of other faiths, and as I showed in Chapter One, much practical 
literature exists to help congregations cope with conflict of various types. Still, very few 
resources reflect on the unique problem experienced by the parishioners in the case 
studies: namely, how best to enter into theological conversation with members of their 
own faith communities. Why would this be? 
 One way to explain this lacuna in the theological literature is that when it comes 
to practitioners of other religions, individuals expect to encounter difference; but, within 
their own faith communities, they do not expect to find such vast theological 
dissimilarities. Could it be, then, that theological diversity within faith communities is so 
threatening because it reveals difference where there appeared to be only sameness? After 
all, as I showed in Chapter Four, the basic human desire for sameness often compels 
individuals to seek others who can function as “psychological twins.” In my view, this 
desire leads many religious practitioners to seek out communities where they expect to 
experience a high degree of theological sameness between themselves and their fellow 
parishioners. As the case studies revealed, even when such sameness is not truly present, 
many parishioners assume that it is, and are both surprised and dismayed to discover 
significant theological differences between themselves and other members of the faith 
community.  
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 Closely related to this desire for and/or assumption of sameness within 
congregations is a pervasive tendency for Christians to cling to a particular notion of 
“unity” that seeks to smooth over or eliminate differences in the interest of “getting 
along” or “keeping the peace.” For instance, in the conflict that I witnessed at Grace 
UCC, several members told me that they wished that Peter Vance—who put forward the 
original motion to leave the UCC—would simply “drop” his request or “let it go.” Such a 
sentiment implies that it would have been better to pretend that disagreement did not exist 
between the members of Grace UCC than to engage the very real differences of opinion 
that surfaced within the congregation. This kind of approach, though very common in 
faith communities, puts forward a vision of unity that really means undifferentiated 
sameness, or that simply ignores true differences in an effort to maintain the 
congregation's status quo. 
 In the remainder of this chapter I present a conceptual framework designed to 
address theological diversity within faith communities. First, I make a case for 
understanding identity as hybrid and pluralistic. Such an understanding opens a path 
toward recognizing the ways in which all religious communities—and the individuals 
within them—are shaped by multiple forces and contain pluralities. I then argue that such 
multiplicity is not only the way things are, but also the way things ought to be. I make 
this claim by extending the argument for diversity as a created good to apply to 
differences experienced within individual religious traditions and communities. 
Acknowledging that a theological justification of diversity may not sufficiently address 
the visceral human reaction to it, I then present vulnerability to difference as a key 
category that grounds the process of negotiating theological diversity within faith 
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communities. Finally, building on this notion of vulnerability, I commend a commitment 
to ecclesial hospitality as a theological foundation for congregations experiencing 
conflict.  
 
Identity as Hybrid and Plural 
 Encountering difference can prove especially threatening when it occurs in 
unexpected places, such as within faith communities that were previously assumed to be 
homogeneous. Contemporary theologian Michele Saracino explores this idea in her book 
entitled Being About Borders: A Christian Anthropology of Difference. In this work, 
Saracino observes that within postmodern culture, people generally assume that borders 
are constantly disappearing. The advent of globalization and the rapid development of 
certain technologies (such as the Internet) are interpreted to mean that boundaries have 
been broken down and that “in the midst of human diversity we are all part of one unified 
world.”376 However, such an interpretation “obscures the lived reality that borders are 
present everywhere—within interpersonal relationships, interreligious communities, and 
the international panorama.”377  
 For many people, the idea of living in a “borderless” world holds strong appeal, 
because in such a world no one would ever have to engage troubling differences. 
However, differences do exist among human beings, and coping with such difference—
even within faith communities—proves extremely difficult at times. I suggest that part of 
what made the experiences of Grace UCC and First UMC so challenging was the 
discovery of differences where people thought there were none. Because individuals 
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belonged to the same religious community and held certain beliefs and practices in 
common, they assumed that they would also agree on other theological issues like 
homosexuality or worship. When they realized that they did not, the resulting differences 
felt like border lines dividing community members from one another. As a result, people 
experienced increased levels of anxiety, and began to see these differences as threats to 
be eradicated.  
 One way to help Christians cope with the reality of anxiety-provoking differences 
in their midst is to encourage an understanding of “hybrid existence.”378 Such an 
understanding recognizes that “our identities are comprised of many different stories, 
including those related to our gender, ethnicity, class, race, sexual orientation, ability, and 
religion.”379 All human beings experience such hybrid existence; yet, individuals may not 
truly appreciate the nature of this hybridity until they come face-to-face with a person 
whose “stories” differ dramatically from their own. When this happens, the stories that 
previously seemed like unassailable truth are suddenly called into question, and the 
boundaries that had once existed between individuals' identities begin to “overlap and 
intertwine with one another.”380  
 For most people, recognizing one's own existence as hybrid feels threatening, 
because neat categories of identity abruptly become messy. As a result, relationships with 
others also become much more complicated. In Chapter Four, I noted that the more 
intimate a relationship is, the more complex and ambiguous parties will seem to one 
another. In turn, increased complexity and ambiguity create increased anxiety, which 
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makes it more challenging for individuals to maintain integrated images of themselves or 
those with whom they frequently relate: 
If people acknowledge their identity as hybrid, they have to admit to having plural 
stories as well as to the reality that some of their stories overlap and perhaps 
conflict with others. They have to surrender and mourn the “one true story” they 
often use as a security blanket when dealing with others.
381
 
Within the context of congregational conflict, the “one true story” may be the particular 
understanding of Christianity that individuals hold, and which they (mistakenly) assume 
is shared by all others in their faith communities. Consequently, human beings need ways 
to acknowledge hybridity—both within their own personal identities, but also within the 
identities of their religious communities. Recognizing the theological diversity that exists 
within communities of faith might help parishioners to be more comfortable with and less 
“emotionally undone” by the differences they discover there.382 
 This requires a recognition of religious traditions as containing a plurality of 
theological positions, rather than as monolithic entities. In my experience, individuals 
tend to view theological differences among Christians as negligible when compared to 
differences between Christians and adherents of other faiths.
383
 Consequently, people 
may assume that there is a single “Christian viewpoint” (or “Protestant viewpoint” or 
“UCC viewpoint,” etc.) that decisively defines the parameters for theological 
conversation. In contrast to such a view of religious communities as unitary, “self-
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contained” entities, I argue that, in actuality, faith communities “constantly interact, 
overlap, and modify one another.”384 The continual interaction that exists among 
congregations, denominations, and the wider culture thus highlights the multi-traditioned 
nature of all religious communities, and indeed, all individual adherents within them. 
This is a crucial point because it dispels rigid notions of doctrinal “purity” or “loyalty” to 
a tradition, and exposes such doctrines and traditions as themselves shaped by a variety 
of factors.
385
 
 Closely related to a view of religious communities as fluid and multiply formed is 
the notion of internal pluralism. This term points to the fact that, all too frequently, 
“differences within [religious] traditions are as sharp as differences across them.”386 In 
fact, even the use of the term “tradition”—as if it were a completely unitary entity—may 
be a misleading way of understanding religious practice:  
 . . . despite its linguistic ease of use, “the Christian tradition” does not refer to a 
singular lineage, nor do Christians speak with one voice even (or especially) when 
they attend to the same line of scripture. In this sense, the Christian tradition is 
always already polydox; it is irreducible to any one voice or lineage that may 
claim exhaustively to represent Christian faith, thought, and practice.
387
 
  
This notion of internal pluralism is further confirmed by the prevalence of theological 
conflict within individual denominations and congregations, as in the case studies 
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presented earlier in this project. Given the irrefutable fact of theological diversity within 
religious communities, an internally pluralistic understanding of traditions is more in 
keeping with the actual circumstances in which congregational conflict takes place. I 
argue that recognizing individual and communal identity as hybrid and pluralistic 
provides a basis for acknowledging the real theological differences that exist in the midst 
of faith communities, even in those that seem quite homogeneous in other important 
ways.  
 
Theological Diversity as a Created Good 
 In the preceding section, I argued that faith communities are multiply formed and 
internally pluralistic, and that they are made up of individuals whose identities are 
similarly hybrid. As I have shown, such an understanding of identity serves an important 
purpose within a discussion of theological diversity: it helps to explain why discovering 
theological differences within a single tradition or faith community can prove so 
disorienting. Encountering difference in unexpected places can profoundly threaten an 
individual or group's sense of identity; consequently, embracing notions of hybridity and 
pluralism might mitigate the impact of difference when it arises in surprising contexts. 
Within the argument I am making in this chapter, however, the theological differences 
within religious traditions and communities not only represent what is, but also what 
ought to be. The prescriptive tone of my argument here is necessary to avoid idealizing 
theological uniformity as God's true intention for the church. As I have shown above, it is 
already possible to make this argument in regards to religious pluralism. Now, I extend 
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that argument to theological diversity within individual religious traditions and 
congregations, claiming that such diversity is also a good intended and created by God. 
 The groundwork for this argument has already been laid by theologians who 
maintain that differences among creatures permit a fuller representation of God's being. 
Put simply, “ . . . it is in the differences that we see the glory of God.”388 In the same way, 
it is possible to affirm diversity as part of God's will for the world as it is realized within 
the specific context of the Christian church. The church has, from its very birth, included 
a diversity of outlooks—a diversity created by God’s abundant Spirit, which has been 
poured out and enacted through a multiplicity of beliefs and practices that ultimately 
enrich the church as a whole.
389
 Such a vision of the church lends theological weight to 
the notion of diversity as gift: because God has created diversity, an encounter with 
difference means an encounter with a unique part of God’s creation. Thus, human 
diversity points not to a departure from God's intention for the world, but rather to a 
concrete embodiment of it. 
  From this perspective, the theological plurality that inevitably exists within 
Christianity serves a vital purpose: it empowers the Church to incarnate its identity as the 
body of Christ. As evangelical theologian John R. Franke argues, God has created and 
sustained this complex identity for the purpose of doing God's work in the world:  
The diversity of the Christian faith is not, as some approaches to church and 
theology might seem to suggest, a problem that needs to be overcome. Instead, 
this diversity is part of the divine design and intention for the church as the image 
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of God and the body of Christ in the world. Christian plurality is a good thing, not 
something that needs to be struggled against and overturned.
390
 
Indeed, given the church's status as the living body of Christ in the world, all of the 
different “parts” of the body are needed in order for God's purposes to be accomplished. 
To exclude any of these parts (i.e., particular Christian traditions or understandings) from 
the Church's identity and mission is to hamper the ability of the body to participate fully 
in “the plurality of truth lived out in the eternal life of God.”391 Without the multiplicity 
contained within the different parts of Christianity, the Church would no longer represent 
the living body of Christ, but only individual pieces that no longer constitute a whole. 
Instead, the Church is called to be a manifold reality that contains plural understandings 
of truth, and that bases its unity not in uniformity of belief or practice, but in its 
commitment to the “liberating and reconciling mission of God.”392 In turn, this makes it 
possible to understand the diversity within Christianity as an inherent good, created by 
God and reflective of the relational multiplicity contained within the divine life itself.  
  This approach contributes helpfully to a discussion of theological diversity within 
faith communities because it extends the argument for diversity as a created good and 
applies it to practitioners within one particular religious tradition. Given that the focus of 
this project is theological disagreement between members of a single faith community, it 
makes sense to extend this argument even further. Thus, I argue for a robust ecclesiology 
founded on the metaphor of Christ's body—a body made up of many different parts, all 
of which are required for the body to function properly. Seeing theological diversity 
within individual faith communities as a created good affirms that God intentionally 
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created all the parts of the body to function differently. In other words, God never 
intended that all parts of the body would eventually become the same.  
 Of course, this idea has its origin in the words of Scripture, which offers a 
powerful image of the importance of diversity among the parts of Christ's body:  
If the whole body were an eye, where would the hearing be? If the whole body 
were hearing, where would the sense of smell be? But as it is, God arranged the 
members in the body, each one of them, as he chose. If all were a single member, 
where would the body be?
393
 
This New Testament image has profound implications for a discussion of congregational 
conflict, because it allows us to shift our understanding of what actually poses the 
greatest threat to the body's continued cohesion. Perhaps what “breaks” Christ's body is 
not conflict itself, but the attempt to erase difference—difference which is, by definition, 
part of being human and part of living in Christian community. What breaks Christ's 
body is the attempt to make all of its parts look exactly the same. Thus, in this way of 
thinking, theological diversity represents not only a reality with which we must cope, but 
an inherent good that, when eliminated from our common life together, harms churches' 
ability faithfully to incarnate Christ's body in the world.   
For those in congregations torn by conflict, however, this position may appear 
naive at best, and completely untenable at worst. After all, to claim that theological 
diversity within communities of faith is a good created by God suggests that there is no 
final “answer” to the complex questions with which such communities currently wrestle. 
At Grace UCC, for example, the crux of the conflict rested on individuals' understanding 
of homosexuality within the context of Christian faith. It is not possible, some might say, 
for homosexuality to be both wrong and right at the same time. Thus, is it not important 
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for communities of faith to strive toward theological uniformity on particularly important 
issues? 
 In response to this question, I offer two observations. First, I maintain that even 
within communities that seem to have achieved such uniformity, theological diversity 
likely still exists. Indeed, as I have already argued, religious traditions are both internally 
pluralistic and influenced by multiple factors, including a variety of cultures in which the 
tradition itself may be situated. Thus, it cannot be assumed that the established doctrines 
and practices of a particular religious community are “givens” that no longer require 
critical scrutiny. The example of slavery offers an illustration of how previous “givens” 
within a faith tradition may later be recognized as theologically indefensible: 
There may, indeed, at any one point in time be certain practices that all 
Christians immediately perceive to be incompatible with their faith (for 
instance, judgments about slavery are now of that sort) . . . One cannot 
assume from these easy cases that hard ones are rare. Nor can one assume 
that easy cases now were not hard ones earlier. These easy cases in fact 
became so by way of earlier disputations among Christians who 
deliberated differently about what their faith required.
394
  
In emphasizing the importance of “disputations” to the process of refining Christian 
practices over time, this example points to the crucial roles of dialogue and debate, even 
within one particular tradition or congregation. In ecclesial terms, this is known as 
discernment, in which members of a faith community work together to assess whether 
previous theological commitments still seem to reflect the will of God and faithfulness to 
the Church’s mission. 
Second, I suggest that it is still possible to understand theology as a search for 
truth without demanding theological uniformity within a faith community. As I have 
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already argued, the quest for uniformity in congregations often translates into an attempt 
to extinguish real theological differences between individuals. Such an attempt actually 
results in a diminishment of the Church because it masks the true diversity of Christ's 
body—a diversity which, I contend, represents God's will for creation in general and for 
human beings in particular. Yet, to affirm the goodness of theological diversity within 
faith communities does not necessarily entail a relativistic, “anything goes” mentality. In 
fact, wrestling with theological claims in the context of a congregation involves testing 
those claims against the historic witness of the tradition. While at times that witness may 
itself require correction, a respect for theological diversity must also include willingness 
to accord generosity to one’s own spiritual ancestors.  
Within this process, the theological judgments one ultimately makes must in turn 
render themselves vulnerable to the same kind of correction: “One’s own judgments then 
make a similar claim on others; they are submitted, in the same way, for the consideration 
and judgment of others who are also concerned to establish the meaning of Christian 
discipleship.”395 In this way, Christians within a given faith community may submit their 
theological claims to one another for scrutiny and correction, while remaining flexible 
enough to maintain normative claims that their religious forebears have tested and refined 
over time. This approach makes it possible for congregations to hold in tension the notion 
of theological diversity as a desirable norm, on the one hand, and the commitment to 
theology as a search for truth, on the other. 
 In order to see internal theological pluralism as a positive resource for 
congregations coping with conflict, it is now vital to re-define the ultimate goal of 
theological reflection. In many religious contexts the assumed goal of theology is 
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uniform agreement on a set of beliefs or doctrines that are normative for the community. 
In this view, theology’s task lies simply in articulating the concepts that already 
implicitly define the community’s perceived boundaries. While such articulation may 
play a pivotal role in faith groups’ identity formation, the true task of theology is not the 
achievement of agreement, but rather, reflection on “what is ultimately important and 
valuable.”396 This definition of theology remains purposefully vague; in so doing, it 
allows for a maximum number of viewpoints to contend with one another about what 
qualifies as ultimately important or valuable. In this process, truth is ever more closely 
approximated as theological propositions are systematically weighed and tested against 
each other. In other words, this understanding of theology allows for theological 
perspectives to converse with one another on the same level, but without necessarily 
coming to full agreement. Indeed, the very notion of theology as reflection on “what is 
ultimately important and valuable” marks out space for interpretation and argument 
rather than easy consensus.
397
  
Despite the importance of re-defining theology’s goal away from notions of 
complete agreement, however, it is also important to avoid the opposite extreme of 
complete fragmentation. Such fragmentation is often what religious practitioners fear 
when they consider engaging theological diversity within their own faith communities. 
As the congregational case studies showed, the threat of fragmentation is real, and 
preventing its emergence is not always possible. Thus, I propose that the primary goal of 
theology as a search for truth must now be modified to include the related goals of 
productive dialogue and openness to disagreement. Such an understanding means that 
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parishioners will inevitably face the fact of theological pluralism and will be challenged 
to assume a posture of remaining open to the differences in their midst—a posture that 
itself requires a solid theological foundation. In what follows, I argue that a theological 
vision of vulnerability to difference can provide just such a foundation, thereby creating 
solidarity in the midst of irreducible diversity.  
 
Vulnerability to Difference 
  Thus far, I have argued for understanding individual and communal identity as 
hybrid and pluralistic, and for viewing such diversity within faith communities as a good 
created by God. Yet, acknowledging that difference exists in our midst, and embracing 
the idea that God intended the church to contain a “plurality of truth,”398 are only the first 
steps toward a vision of theological diversity within faith communities. While these are 
important ideas, they do not necessarily temper the visceral reaction that so often arises in 
the encounter with difference, especially when it arises in unexpected places. As a means 
of addressing the anxiety often produced by such encounters, I propose a theological 
understanding of vulnerability to difference as key to the creation of true community. 
This vision of vulnerability supplements the theological anthropology already advanced 
in this chapter by framing contingency not only as part of the “tragic” structure of human 
existence, but also as that which makes loving relationships and communities of 
“abundant hospitality” possible.399  
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 I have argued that vulnerability, defined as “the capacity of a living creature to 
undergo harm,”400 represents a primary component of the “tragic” nature of human life. 
The fact that human beings have the power to hurt one another—whether through overt 
acts of sinfulness or through the “benign alienation” of competing needs and desires—is 
simply part of the way we are made. Our freedom carries with it the capacity to harm; 
likewise, our ability to experience joy and beauty also opens us to the possibility of 
experiencing sorrow and loss. Vulnerability is thus a defining condition of human being 
that is more akin to brokenness than to sinfulness or evil. As I have noted, however, this 
understanding of vulnerability emphasizes its role in human pain and suffering. 
  A different way of understanding vulnerability is to see it less as a part of the 
human condition that simply must be accepted, and more as a crucial factor in human 
connectedness that should be respected and embraced.
401
 This vision of vulnerability 
emphasizes openness to difference as the key to human connection and community, thus 
making it the “starting point” for all true relationship.402 In this way, vulnerability 
becomes a term that encompasses the whole reality of human contingency. That is, 
instead of comprising only one element of “the tragic,” vulnerability itself is the core of 
being human. Such vulnerability not only describes human beings' capacity to suffer, but 
also highlights the myriad ways in which humans are dependent upon and connected with 
one another. Therefore, to deny such dependence and connection is to deny the truth of 
our basic vulnerability.  
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 Earlier in this chapter, I argued that the irreducible uniqueness of human beings 
is, in one sense, tragic, but that it is also a consequence of God’s creative power. As such, 
it is possible to understand the incredible diversity produced in creation—and particularly 
among human beings—as both challenge and gift. In the same way, I now argue that 
human vulnerability encompasses not only our susceptibility to harm, but also our very 
capacity to be in mutual relationship with others. In fact, the human condition that allows 
us to be hurt by one another is the very same condition that makes intimacy and 
interdependence possible. If we avoid vulnerability with others, we may protect ourselves 
from being hurt, but in so doing we also protect ourselves from being truly known. 
 The importance of recasting vulnerability in this way lies in its relevance to the 
themes of anxiety and identity with which I have been working throughout this project. 
As I have shown, the encounter with difference frequently produces anxiety because, as 
human beings, difference subjects us to the ways others may disagree with us, hurt us, or 
contest our views of the world. Our natural human inclination is to defend against the 
threats produced by vulnerability, either by gravitating toward sameness in our 
relationships and communities, and/or by behaving defensively or aggressively toward 
those we experience as different and strange. Thus, if we understand vulnerability only in 
terms of our capacity to be harmed, we will continue to operate in a defensive mode that 
seeks, at all costs, to protect our sense of self from anxiety-producing encounters with 
difference. But this is a double-edged sword: if we protect ourselves from the 
disconcerting presence of difference, we also close ourselves off from the ways in which 
we might be enriched or enlivened through relationship with those who do not 
necessarily think, believe, or act as we do. 
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 In contrast, the vision of vulnerability I am commending here seeks not to 
eliminate difference, but to recognize it as the starting point for all true relationship. 
Instead of assuming sameness, vulnerability steps back and tries to see the other for who 
he or she truly is. Vulnerability thus requires a willingness to be hurt, challenged, or 
changed by difference. It also requires a willingness to endure the anxiety produced by 
difference, which can threaten our perceptions that our own ways of living and thinking 
may not be the only “right” ways. In this way of thinking, then, it is no longer adequate 
simply to acknowledge and tolerate the existence of difference. Instead, this theology 
demands a posture of “embrace” that “receives the other’s difference as contributive, 
valuable, and good.”403 Thus, in a very real sense, to try to avoid the vulnerability 
generated by an encounter with difference is to avoid relationship altogether. It is, in fact, 
to avoid the possibility of giving and receiving love, because love is rooted in “an 
openness that suffers the other, that undergoes its difference and vulnerability.”404 From 
this perspective, then, vulnerability includes the ability to produce both suffering and 
loving relationship in the lives of human beings. 
 Within the context of the church, loving relationships between individuals 
contribute to the relationality experienced throughout the community of faith. As a result, 
trying to erase the conditions that lead to vulnerability (i.e., difference) actually erases the 
conditions that create and define the Christian community. Indeed, as I have argued 
above, what breaks Christ's body is not the existence of difference itself, nor even the 
conflict that inevitably arises in the midst of differences. Instead, what breaks Christ's 
body is the attempt to eliminate difference, because such an attempt impairs the Church's 
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ability to function in the way that God intended—namely, as an embodiment of God's 
love for the world. I argue that instead of resisting vulnerability, Christians are called to 
embrace it and remain open to true relationship with one another, even across serious 
theological differences. Bringing such a vision to fruition is no easy task. Yet, as I argue 
in the final section of this chapter, remaining connected across differences through 
ecclesial hospitality proves one vitally important way of doing so.  
 
Remaining Connected Across Difference: Ecclesial Hospitality 
 Through case studies and theoretical analysis, this project has illustrated just how 
powerfully human beings resist becoming vulnerable to difference. The disciplines of 
psychodynamic psychology, social psychology, and theology all help to explain the 
origins and development of such resistance. However, congregations in conflict need 
ways to counteract this tendency, and to move toward vulnerability as part of becoming 
more fully human and more fully connected in community. I suggest that congregations 
might achieve this through a vision of ecclesial hospitality that seeks to remain connected 
across difference—even significant theological difference. In the concluding section of 
this chapter, I offer a brief sketch of how one might understand such hospitality 
theologically. 
 Within the Jewish and Christian traditions, hospitality is an ancient concept rooted 
in the religious experience of the people of Israel. This tradition of hospitality continued 
to grow and thrive in the context of early Christianity, appearing as a central theme in the 
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writings of St. Paul, John Chyrsostom, Martin Luther, John Calvin, and many other 
Christian leaders.
405
 Indeed, for most of the church's history, hospitality was  
 . . . understood to encompass physical, social, and spiritual dimensions of human 
existence and relationships. It meant response to the physical needs of strangers 
for food, shelter, and protection, but also a recognition of their worth and common 
humanity.
406
 
In the context of this discussion, I use the term hospitality to emphasize this latter 
dimension—namely, a posture of relationship that recognizes the basic human dignity of 
others, and that embraces apparent differences. Such a posture of dignity entails “a 
welcoming of one's neighbor that bears and invites him or her into a shared space of 
mutuality, a household.”407 I ground this understanding of hospitality in a concept for 
which I have already argued in this chapter: namely, vulnerability to difference as central 
to the creation of community. In so doing, I argue for a theological understanding of 
hospitality that sees difference not as a difficulty to be overcome, but as a defining mark 
of the Church that embodies loving relationship.  
 To make this argument, I advance an ecclesiology that sees vulnerability to 
difference as the heart of Christian community. Within the context of the Church, 
difference should not be seen as a problem to be overcome or eradicated. Instead, it 
should become “constitutive of the new community, which is a koinonia [communion] 
through and not in spite of diversity.”408 In making this claim, I reinforce my arguments 
for diversity (of all kinds) as a desirable norm, and puts forward a vision of hospitality 
that could help make the acceptance of such diversity a reality within faith communities. 
Committing to this vision of hospitality—one that seeks to remain connected across 
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difference, rather than ignoring or trying to erase it—provides an important theological 
resource for congregations experiencing conflict in their midst. Such a vision points the 
way toward an understanding of community that, through shared vulnerability, “creates 
space for identifying with and receiving the stranger as oneself.”409  
 Here, I intentionally use the language of “remaining connected across difference” 
as a way of theologically reframing the concept of differentiation from family systems 
theory. As I noted in Chapter One, family systems theory (FST) identifies anxiety as the 
primary social force operating within families and organizations, and differentiation as 
the primary path toward soothing anxiety and reducing reactivity. According to FST, 
differentiation involves the ability to “maintain a position and still stay in touch.”410 In 
other words, it is the capacity to define one's own values and goals clearly, and to do so 
in a way that enhances, rather than destroys, connections with others. Because it 
represents a way of holding in tension two competing human needs (i.e., the needs for 
individuality and togetherness), differentiation proves a useful starting point for 
imagining what relationships of hospitality might look like within religious communities.  
 Theologically speaking, members of faith communities experience competing 
needs that demonstrate parallels with the needs for individuality and togetherness: the 
need to stand firmly on one's deeply held religious truths and values, and the need to 
experience connection within a religious community that embodies welcome through its 
diversity. On the surface, these needs seem diametrically opposed; yet, many religious 
resources understand paradox and complexity as basic facts of human life. In the same 
way, I argue that both the quest for truth and the celebration of diversity can be affirmed 
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at the same time within faith communities. In fact, both are required if congregations 
wish to use conflict as a resource for growth and creativity. Admittedly, as the 
congregational case studies showed, keeping these two elements in balance is no easy 
task. Too much emphasis on diversity can cause people to feel as if their fundamental 
religious convictions are being disrespected or ignored, and contribute to fragmentation. 
Conversely, too much emphasis on theological agreement can push some community 
members to the margins and make them feel unwelcome.  
 As a means of bridging this gap, I put forward a vision of ecclesial hospitality that 
seeks to remain connected across differences. Such hospitality requires neither watering 
down one's own convictions in an attempt at establishing “peace” within the community, 
nor considering others' differences as threats to be eradicated. Instead, within this vision 
of hospitality Christians are invited to recognize diversity as a good intended by God, and 
thus to welcome each person as a unique embodiment of the divine creative power. In 
this way, individuals can remain committed to the expression of their own theological 
principles, but are challenged to do so in ways that resist cutting off or castigating those 
who disagree. Instead, members of the faith community must seek ways of understanding 
the search for theological truth as a shared venture that requires compassion, openness, 
and a willingness to remain vulnerable to the discomfort that comes with encountering 
difference. 
 Again, I do not suggest that embodying such hospitality within congregations is 
simple or effortless. Bringing such loving communion to fruition in the midst of real 
human communities is often much more easily said than done. However, in addition to 
recognizing the difficulty of achieving true hospitality, it is also important to emphasize 
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its nature as non-hierarchical. In recent years, numerous writers have problematized the 
use of hospitality as a theological category because of its implication of inequality 
between guest and host, since the guest depends on the host for generosity or even 
survival. Conventional understandings of hospitality remain inadequate because they rely 
on simply assimilating “others” into unaltered systems of power.411 Such views of 
hospitality, which ostensibly aim toward “inclusion,” continue to keep the “host” in the 
powerful position of extending or denying welcome, without critically examining the 
system in which this dynamic operates.
412
 Others have criticized engaging hospitality 
theologically because of the term's association with the hospitality industry. Within that 
context, the relationship between guest and host remains unequal, but the guest is the one 
holding special power because of the economic arrangements involved.
413
 Despite these 
important critiques of hospitality, however, I contend that it still proves useful for a 
discussion of congregational conflict, as long as it is imagined as a relationship of 
mutuality that seeks to remain connected across difference. 
 The acts of Jesus as recounted in Scripture also helpfully contribute to the non-
hierarchical vision of hospitality I wish to commend here. Indeed, in any discussion of 
Christian hospitality, Jesus must serve as the central model because he “represents and 
embodies the hospitality of God.”414 As Pentecostal theologian Amos Yong has shown, in 
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the New Testament (and especially in the Luke-Acts tradition) Jesus becomes a paradigm 
of hospitality not only by offering it to those whom society deemed least deserving, but 
also by receiving it from the most unlikely places: an innkeeper’s manger, a tax 
collector’s home, a borrowed tomb. In this sense, Jesus constantly plays the roles of both 
guest and host, and in so doing, breaks down the hierarchy that might ordinarily 
characterize these roles. Jesus thus becomes a living representation of God’s abundant 
welcome to all who receive him. Because Jesus has set such a powerful example of 
hospitality through his simultaneous roles as guest and host, Christians are now called to 
emulate him by both receiving and offering hospitality to others.  
 Ideally, then, hospitality is a non-hierarchical reality that makes space for 
difference. Furthermore, it is possible to overcome the potential pitfalls of inequality 
between guest and host by emphasizing shared vulnerability as that which draws human 
beings into relationship with one another in the context of community. Even though the 
traditional understanding of hospitality sees the guest as dependent on the host, 
hospitality also makes the host vulnerable in important ways: “ . . . the generosity of 
hospitality . . . also leaves the host vulnerable and dependent. Once the stranger is invited 
in, the host yields stability and control, adjusting the household to accommodate and 
attend to the guest's unique needs as they became apparent.”415 This vision of hospitality 
suggests that members of faith communities remain connected across their differences, 
but not in a unidirectional way by assuming that the other must be “fixed” or tolerated. 
Instead, such hospitality challenges each person to recognize the ways in which one's 
own certainties are challenged by another's presence, and to welcome others as they are 
without needing to change them. Within the context of the faith community, then, all are 
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called to be guests and hosts to one another, in a perpetual relationship of giving and 
receiving welcome.   
 Becoming open to difference in this way, without assigning a higher value to any 
participant in the relationship, goes against many of our natural human inclinations. 
Throughout this project, I have emphasized that the encounter with difference frequently 
provokes anxiety, and can lead to destructive behaviors designed to protect the self from 
threats. Despite the difficulty of remaining open to difference without becoming 
defensive or reactive, I contend that it is only through such vulnerability that we can 
begin to embody the kind of hospitality I have attempted to describe here. In this view, 
hospitality does not pride itself on its generosity, or on its ability to include “others” who 
are defined as deviating from a norm. Instead, those who practice this type of hospitality 
de-center themselves and are willing to be changed by the encounter with difference, 
recognizing that their own dearly held beliefs may be questioned in the process. Those 
who seek to embody the hospitality modeled by Jesus assume the roles of both guest and 
host, understanding that in doing so they make themselves vulnerable to others in a 
variety of ways. It is just this kind of vulnerability that can provide the basis for cohesion 
within faith communities, even in the midst of what may feel like intractable differences. 
In turn, this cohesion can become the “unity” that Christians so often seek with one 
another—not a unity that depends on strict theological uniformity, but a unity that draws 
the faithful together in community, sustained by the love of God and by the power of the 
Holy Spirit.  
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Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have argued that the discipline of theology provides vital 
resources for reflection on congregational conflict. While social scientific theories 
demonstrate that the anxiety stirred by difference represents a natural part of human 
development, they offer few resources for reframing difference itself. Building on a broad 
affirmation of diversity as a created good, I have argued that difference—as it is revealed 
through creation, through human religious pluralism, and through theological diversity in 
faith communities—represents both an aspect of basic human incompatibility and a good 
that God intended. Furthermore, I have argued that such difference proves necessary for 
human beings to be in relationship with one another, and for the Church fully to incarnate 
the body of Christ. Based on these theological proposals, I have commended vulnerability 
and ecclesial hospitality as pathways through which members of congregations torn by 
conflict might seek to remain connected to one another across their differences. 
 As always, however, the question remains: how? How, exactly, can churches and 
their leaders embrace diversity as part of God’s overall creative project, even as they 
acknowledge its anxiety-producing qualities? To answer this question, I turn in the final 
chapter to a description of particular practices that may help communities of faith to 
navigate significant theological conflict in their midst. This move toward concrete 
recommendations is vital, because as a project in pastoral theology, this dissertation 
“seeks to do what theology has done always and everywhere: guide and orient faithful 
practice.”416 In this sense, the pastoral theological circle I have initiated in this project 
cannot be fully closed without explicit reflection on what congregations can do to address 
conflict in their midst. It is to such reflection that I now turn. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
RETURNING TO THE REALM OF PRACTICE:  
STRATEGIES FOR CONGREGATIONS AND THEIR LEADERS 
 
Introduction 
 In this project, I have engaged the resources of psychodynamic psychology, social 
psychology, and theology to show that the anxiety raised by encounters with difference is 
a natural part of being human. I have argued that the social sciences do a particularly 
good job of describing what happens when this normal dimension of human life becomes 
too powerful: it produces destructive behaviors like splitting and projection, rigid needs 
for sameness, or contentious tactics within a group setting. I have further argued that 
theology is especially well-suited to offer a remedy to these destructive effects by 
reframing conflict and difference in ways that can soothe anxiety within a group and 
point toward a new understanding of being together in community. More specifically, I 
have made a case for diversity as a desirable theological norm within faith communities, 
and for a vision of ecclesial hospitality that seeks to help members of congregations be 
vulnerable to and remain connected across difference. 
 With these new psychological and theological understandings in place, I return to 
the realm of practice. Now that we can see more clearly what is happening in conflicted 
congregations—psychologically social psychologically, and theologically—we must ask: 
what difference does this make? How do these understandings help us to imagine what 
faith communities and their leaders might do differently when they encounter conflict in 
their midst? Before attempting to answer these questions, I first want to reflect on an 
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observation made by practical theologian Joyce Ann Mercer in a recent public lecture at 
Vanderbilt Divinity School.
417
 In presenting her ethnographic research on congregations 
experiencing conflict around issues of human sexuality, Mercer noted that these 
situations seem to bear little resemblance to the kind of “interest-based conflicts”—such 
as divorce disputes or disagreements about business practices—that are typically 
addressed through conflict mediation services. Instead, congregational conflicts around 
sexuality are much more similar to the “identity-based” conflicts seen in the realm of 
international peace-making efforts. Such identity-based conflicts are “fueled by a group's 
sense that their very ability to be is at stake.”418 In other words, people begin to fear that 
if they are on the “losing” side of the conflict, their basic sense of identity or selfhood 
will be at risk of annihilation.  
 I mention these insights here because they connect with much that I have been 
saying in this project—namely, that congregational conflict is frequently driven by 
anxiety raised by encounters with difference. Since anxiety represents a basic sense of 
threat to one's selfhood or identity, it stands to reason that in congregations experiencing 
high levels of chronic anxiety, individuals may feel that their identities as persons and as 
members of groups are at risk in some fundamental way. When this happens, the 
conflict—which may have originally arisen as a disagreement about a specific issue—
instead begins to take on the character of identity-based conflicts. Such conflicts tend to 
be “intractable in their amenability to intervention” and “extraordinarily difficult to 
heal.”419 Furthermore, most resources currently available to help congregations cope with 
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conflict are based in problem-solving or mediation models which are designed to deal 
with interest-based, not identity-based, conflicts. As a result, many of these models 
simply do not work for the kinds of volatile and divisive conflicts that many 
congregations are now experiencing.  Also, as I have already shown, congregational 
conflicts around issues of theology touch on deep dimensions of individual and collective 
identity. For this reason, understanding such conflicts through an identity-based 
framework may be more helpful than the typical interest-based approach that most 
current resources offer. Thus, in proposing concrete strategies for congregations in 
conflict, I focus in this chapter on techniques designed to soothe anxiety and facilitate 
healing and transformation in communities, rather than on task-oriented approaches that 
may not address the larger identity issues involved.  
 At this point, I return to reflection on the case studies as a means of moving 
toward such concrete proposals for congregations in conflict. As I argued in Chapter 
Three, examining the two case studies side by side is instructive because it reveals 
similarities that help clarify the dynamics of congregational conflict. However, this 
method is also useful because of the differences it unearths—differences that led to very 
different outcomes in each of the congregations under consideration here. In this 
concluding chapter, I reflect further on these varied outcomes, and build on them to 
suggest three broad strategies for helping conflicted congregations embody ecclesial 
hospitality: 1) acknowledging difference and the anxiety it produces; 2) re-defining unity 
and strengthening relationships; and 3) cultivating calm, connected leadership. 
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Acknowledging Difference and Anxiety 
 Much of this project has been devoted to sketching the ways in which individuals 
and groups respond to the anxiety produced by encounters with difference. I have argued 
that such anxiety is a normal part of being human; as such, it is not something that can 
ever be completely eliminated from group life. However, I have also argued that how 
congregations respond to this anxiety has significant implications for whether conflict in 
their midst proves creative or destructive. My observation of Grace UCC, and many other 
congregations with which I have been associated over the years, has convinced me that 
most faith communities tend to avoid acknowledging the differences in their midst—
particularly if those differences are about “important” things. As I have shown in this 
project, these kinds of differences produce anxiety among church members, who 
frequently respond in one of two ways: either trying to pretend that the differences do not 
really matter, or trying to “convert” others to one's point of view so that the group will 
share a high level of sameness on important issues. In either case, the differences are not 
fully acknowledged, and as a result, the anxiety is never fully relieved. Instead, 
individuals and groups simply cover up the underlying anxiety, and in many cases, they 
make this anxiety worse through their attempts to ignore or eradicate the real differences 
that exist among them. 
 In light of this observation, it seems to me that the first step for congregations in 
conflict is to acknowledge the differences in their midst, as well as the anxiety that 
frequently accompanies those differences. At first glance, this may seem like an unusual 
suggestion. After all, if a congregation is in conflict, don't members already know that 
there are differences of opinion within the group? The answer to this question, I believe, 
302 
 
is both yes and no. Obviously, in a situation of conflict, people are aware that there is a 
disagreement afoot. Yet, in such situations individuals often believe that there is only one 
solution to the problem, or one “right” way to think or believe, and thus their job is to 
convince those on the other side to change their minds. As I noted above, this way of 
dealing with conflict actually refuses to acknowledge the real differences within a faith 
community because it assumes that, ultimately, the goal is for everyone to start thinking 
the same way about a problem or issue. This is a standard of sameness, not diversity. As 
such, in my view, it is not the most effective way of handling conflict within a group, 
which necessarily contains a myriad of different ways of thinking about matters of faith 
and human life. Thus, instead of coping with conflict by trying to ignore difference or 
enforce uniformity, I suggest that congregations start by intentionally acknowledging the 
important distinctions that exist within the group.  
 
Provide Opportunities for All Voices to Be Heard 
 One of the most effective ways of acknowledging differences within a group 
setting is to provide everyone the opportunity to be heard. This kind of open, honest 
discussion helps to dispel the perception of unanimity on any particular issue, and reveals 
the internal diversity that is almost certain to exist in any community of faith. In other 
words, by allowing everyone the opportunity to speak his or her mind in an environment 
that feels safe, the group facilitates the expression of differences in a way that is less 
threatening than the argumentative, adversarial model so frequently used in 
congregations. There is even some evidence that constructive conversation can ease 
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anxiety in groups by functioning as a “fear-reducer” on a neuro-chemical level.420 It 
seems, then, that one of the best ways to help congregations reduce anxiety in their midst 
is simply to encourage them to talk to one another in ways that facilitate understanding 
rather than animosity.  
 The question then becomes: how? Exactly how does one create an environment 
where varying perspectives can be shared in a non-threatening way? One of the most 
striking differences that emerged in the case studies of Grace UCC and First UMC was 
the ways in which their respective opportunities for conversation were structured. At 
Grace UCC, the senior pastor and I were taken aback by the conflict, and thus were put in 
a position of reacting rather than responding to the turmoil unfolding in the church. 
Although we attempted to plan a series of events designed to facilitate “dialogue” among 
parishioners, these large-group conversations ended up being more like verbal wars, with 
very little opportunity for authentic interchange. Our goal was to create a calm 
environment where individuals could listen to each other carefully and speak without fear 
of being attacked. Instead, these gatherings felt tense and anxious, and many participants 
seemed more focused on making their argument as forcefully as possible than on truly 
understanding what others were saying.  
 In fact, many of the Grace UCC parishioners I interviewed commented on how 
ineffective these meetings were. Leah, for instance, remembered the gatherings this way: 
“I think people did a lot of talking, but I don’t think people did a lot of listening . . . 
People stood up and made their point, but there wasn’t a dialogue.” “Stephanie”421 also 
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found these meetings to be ineffective because even with so much “talk” going on, most 
people ultimately did not feel that they had truly been heard:  
I think some of these people that actually did [leave the church], I don’t feel like 
their thoughts and their feelings on the subject matter was really addressed—their 
fears . . . I don’t think the meetings were helpful because to me it flared tempers, 
it raised a lot of tempers . . . that was no different than a brawl . . . I don’t think 
our process was helpful. 
It seems that because the process at Grace UCC was hastily planned with little formal 
structure, it proved ineffective in facilitating the kind of conversations for which we had 
hoped. As a result, parishioners felt disappointed, frustrated, and angry because they did 
not get the chance to be heard on an issue that was extremely important to them. 
 At First UMC, the picture was quite different. Roy described listening to others' 
perspectives as central to the process Rev. Fisher used to facilitate the worship committee 
meetings: 
[The senior pastor] did a great job . . . he did it Scripturally, prayerfully – just 
started letting people talk about this process, you know, to talk about – hearing the 
other person. Why does [the 11:00 service] mean so much to you? You’re 80 
years old, and been singing in the choir for 60 years. Tell us why it means so 
much to you. 
Nancy agreed that First UMC emphasized the importance of having everyone's voice 
heard—even those who may not have been serving on the actual worship committee at 
the time: 
 . . . there were plenty of opportunities to come and speak your mind and say your 
piece and have an opinion and be listened to. So as far as I was concerned, there 
was no excuse for anyone to say, well, nobody asked me. Because they did. You 
were very welcome. 
Ann, a new member at First UMC at the time of the conflict, identified this focus on 
hearing all voices as the key to the congregation's ability to find a resolution to their 
problem: 
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And I think the key to the whole meeting and the key to the whole change was 
that people were listened to. Every single person was listened to. And whether it 
turned out how they wanted it to turn out or not, I think that was secondary to the 
fact that they had a chance to say what they needed to say and they were listened 
to without interruption.
422
  
Ann added that allowing everyone's voice to be heard helped First UMC avoid being split 
into rigid factions or “camps,” because people felt less threatened and thus less compelled 
to stick only with members of their own group. As she put it, “there wasn't really a need 
to go into a camp because you got to say what you needed to say. And the other people 
got to say that I understand you; I hear you.” 
 Based on the experience of these two congregations, it seems clear that healthy 
conflict in communities of faith requires finding a way for all to have their voices heard 
so that differences can be surfaced and engaged in constructive ways. However, this 
admonition is not only a logistical one; it carries psychological and theological weight as 
well. As I have argued throughout this project, people become more anxious in the 
presence of difference because at a basic level, their very sense of selfhood feels 
threatened. Thus, if parishioners are effectively excluded from conversations about 
matters that are of personal and communal import, they feel as if their selves are not 
being fully recognized by the community of which they are a part. When this happens, 
congregations both literally and metaphorically fail to “see” the differences in their midst 
because they do not recognize them in any formal way. This feeling of being “unseen” in 
the midst of one's own community can be extraordinarily painful for church members, 
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who may come to believe that their very personhood is not valued, and that ultimately 
their only option is to leave the congregation.  
 Recognition is an extremely powerful theme in both psychological and 
theological understandings of the human person. As I showed in Chapter Four, the 
“mirroring need” is one of the most basic requirements for healthy human development. 
This is the need that reaches out for affirmation of the self's goodness from an important 
other, who, ideally, responds by saying, “I acknowledge your being here and I am 
uplifted by your presence.”423 It is through this kind of mirroring response from important 
people in a child's emotional world that the self begins to gain strength and to create 
internal structures forming the core of the personality. Similarly, Scripture contains many 
stories that emphasize the importance of recognition from the divine Other for human 
selfhood and purpose—such as when God looks upon human beings and calls them good, 
or when God chooses Moses as the leader of the Israelites, or when God's voice speaks 
from heaven saying, “This is my Son, the Beloved, in whom I am well pleased.”424 In all 
of these stories and many more, human beings come to understand their value and 
vocation more fully when they are afforded the gift of recognition. 
 Conversely, when individuals go unrecognized by people or institutions that are 
important to them, their sense of self is diminished, and deep woundedness may result. 
Mercer observed that in her research with conflicted congregations, “the sense of not 
being acknowledged” proved “so central and so primary” in the stories of many of the 
people she had interviewed in these communities of faith.
425
 This theme struck her 
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powerfully as a researcher because it revealed just how traumatic congregational conflicts 
can be, and how harmful their effects often are in the emotional and spiritual lives of 
those who live through them. It seems to me, then, that in situations of congregational 
conflict, it is crucial to provide ways to insure that all church members have the 
opportunity to bring their concerns to voice—not only as a means of practical problem 
solving, but as a way of formally recognizing the uniquely diverse collection of selves 
that make up any community of faith.  
 
Structured, Small-Group Processes 
 Of course, designing a process that allows everyone to be heard proves a major 
challenge for congregations experiencing conflict. However, members at both Grace 
UCC and First UMC agreed that having a small-group component to any conflict 
resolution process is vital. Grace UCC did not have such a component; all “discussion” 
meetings were in a large-group format which, almost by definition, meant that a large 
proportion of the individuals present did not get a chance to speak. Even if the 
opportunity to speak was available, some parishioners simply did not feel comfortable 
doing so because the atmosphere of the meetings was so hostile. For instance, “Rita,”426 a 
soft-spoken member of Grace UCC, told me that she often was not able to stay through 
the end of the meetings because she became so uneasy. She said, “It was pretty heated, 
and I liked to make my exit.” Rita seems like a person who could have benefited from a 
structured, small group process that would have allowed her to state her views without 
fear of being attacked. Likewise, when I asked Stephanie, also a member of Grace UCC, 
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what she thinks the church could have done to handle the conflict more effectively, she 
said, 
I think it would have been helpful if we had like little small meetings, small group 
meetings and maybe taking a couple people over here that had this opinion . . . 
and people over here and let them discuss why they thought what they were 
thinking. 
This is not to say, however, that all small group processes are created equal. If a small 
group process degenerates into the same kind of arguing and name-calling that happened 
during the large-group meetings at Grace UCC, it will probably not be effective and may 
actually make matters worse. For this reason, congregations must design processes that 
allow differences within a group to be expressed clearly and openly, but in a way that 
minimizes people's sense of threat.   
The pastors at First UMC accomplished this by meeting with a professional 
church consultant, who recommended a process based on a technique known as 
“functional subgrouping.” This technique was created within the broader framework of 
systems-centered therapy (SCT), a particular form of group therapy developed by 
Yvonne Agazarian. Functional subgrouping is a technique that  
 . . . enables a work group to integrate differences, both differences in the 
apparently similar and similarities in the apparently different. This is implemented 
in a work group by organizing the conflicts so they are discussed sequentially in 
two different subgroups. Members in one subgroup explore their perspective 
together, in the environment of similarity where the small differences in their 
similarities are more easily tolerated. As they finish, the second subgroup works, 
bringing in their “difference” and also exploring their similarities until the small 
differences between them surface and are understood 
and accepted.
427
 
To put this in more concrete terms, functional subgrouping is a strategy that provides 
opportunities for individuals who already agree with one another to talk together, while 
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those who hold a different perspective listen in on the conversation. Then, those who 
were on the “outside” of the circle have a chance to talk together, while the others listen. 
The value of this approach lies in its ability to promote free-flowing communication since 
many group discussions tend to volley back and forth between contending ideas without 
fully addressing the concerns of either side. As a result, participants in such groups 
become frustrated because they are constantly interrupted or contradicted.
428
 By contrast, 
functional subgrouping surfaces the different ideas present within a group by allowing 
those who feel similarly on an issue to talk to each other in subgroups without 
interruption. This method halts the “tendency to contend with or convert the differences” 
in a group by encouraging participants to see their differences as an important “resource” 
that everyone can use.
429
  
 
 At First UMC, the worship committee used an adapted version of functional 
subgrouping to structure its dialogical process. The process began with asking members 
of each worship service to converse with each other, while those from other services 
simply listened to the conversation. In turn, each worship group had the opportunity to 
converse together and to be listened to by the members of the other groups. Many of the 
people I interviewed from First UMC commented on how helpful they found this aspect 
of the congregation's process to be. Because the conversation began with members of 
each service talking with others from their own group, the anxiety level remained lower 
and they were able to express their views without trying to convince or argue against 
anyone.  
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 As Arthur noted, those who were in the “outside” circle listening in on these 
conversations “were able to ask clarifying questions but not to make comments about 
what the people in the inner circle were saying, so that it was to allow dialogue and not 
commentary or criticism.” Nancy, a long-time member of the 8:45 service, explained that 
for her, the chance to talk first with members of her own service proved important in 
laying the groundwork for later conversations with those who felt differently: 
So we all sat down and wrote what we liked and what we disliked about that 
service. And then from there, we broadened that format into mixing it up. So then 
you got in another small group, but this time it wasn't just with your buddies that 
you were comfortable with, it was now you got to chat with people about other 
issues and questions. 
Ann reiterated the key value of a process like this one: namely, the opportunity for 
everyone to be heard without being interrupted or debated. She said, “So everybody in 
the whole room that wanted to have a chance to talk were given that opportunity,” adding 
that “That was probably the best church meeting that I've ever been to in my entire life, 
and I've been to a lot of church meetings.” Of course, this is not to suggest that functional 
subgrouping is the only technique that could or should be used in a situation of 
congregational conflict. I simply offer it here as one strategy that seems to hold great 
potential for conflicted faith communities because of its ability to keep anxiety levels 
low, promote open communication, and provide opportunities for all voices to be heard 
and affirmed. What seems most important for congregations in conflict—even more so 
than the particular technique they may choose—is to think carefully about the process 
they will use to engage differences in their midst and to plan accordingly. 
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Skilled, Non-Anxious Facilitators 
 In addition to the importance of a structured, small-group process, numerous 
people at First UMC spoke highly of the facilitation skills of both Bob Fisher, the senior 
pastor, and Judith Murray, the chair of the worship work area. For instance, Ann said,  
. . . Bob was the one that basically had the model for the evening and for the 
conversation. He's the one that presented it and guided us through it. And I think 
he did an excellent, excellent job. I think that kind of a meeting and that kind of 
process and that kind of model takes somebody very skilled.  
Likewise, Nancy stated that Rev. Fisher  
did an absolutely incredible job of being the moderator of all the committee 
meetings . . . I've never been in a situation where I've seen someone trying as hard 
as he tried to be fair, diplomatic, letting everyone's opinions be heard, not cutting 
anybody off, not showing his own prejudices. 
Simon had similar praise for Judith Murray's leadership throughout the committee's 
decision-making process: “I really liked how Judith ran the meetings. She was very 
orderly and very intent in what we did in making sure that everybody had the opportunity 
to speak.” 
 These comments make clear that both Bob and Judith's skills in group facilitation 
contributed to First UMC's ability to resolve their conflict peacefully. Yet, many 
conflicted congregations have members and leaders who are skilled in group facilitation, 
but who are unable to exercise those skills calmly in the midst of a highly anxious group. 
How, then, did Bob and Judith do it?
430
 As I mentioned above, prior to the start of this 
process, Rev. Fisher had received coaching from a professional church consultant about 
how to design and lead a decision-making process that began with a functional sub-
grouping model. Rev. Fisher then shared insights from this coaching with Judith, which 
seems to have helped them both gain confidence in their ability to lead this process from 
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start to finish. Additionally, Bob and Judith worked together to implement spiritual focal 
points at the beginning of each meeting. These short devotional times were designed to 
help break down the barriers between the different groups and to center their attention on 
common elements of their faith through Scripture, prayer, reflection, and ritual. My 
interviews with members at First UMC revealed that this combination of practical skill 
and spiritual focus helped participants to feel more at ease with one another, and allowed 
them to talk about their differences with one another in ways that felt safe, though not 
necessarily free from tension or struggle. 
 Here, then, is what I believe we can learn from First UMC about resolving 
congregational conflict: not only is it important to have a well-planned, structured small-
group process, but it is also crucial to have skilled, non-anxious facilitators available to 
lead such a process. Because the conflict at First UMC was less volatile, the congregation 
was able to draw on its own clergy and lay leaders to moderate their meetings, and these 
leaders wisely sought counsel from a professional consultant to prepare for that 
responsibility. At Grace UCC, however, the pastoral leaders' attempts to facilitate 
gatherings proved ineffective at best, and detrimental at worst. This was due to the fact 
that because of the nature of the conflict (namely, a decision about whether or not to 
leave the denomination), the pastors were unable to remain neutral. Because of our 
denominational commitments, the senior pastor and I were unable to refrain from “taking 
sides” in the conflict. In fact, many parishioners experienced our support for the 
congregation's continued denominational affiliation as a sort of “ultimatum”—i.e., they 
felt that we were saying, “If you don't vote to stay in the UCC, we'll leave.” From our 
perspective, the senior pastor and I were simply stating the logical consequences of a 
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congregational decision to disaffiliate, but some of our parishioners did not see it that 
way. This damaged our ability to lead the church through its decision-making process 
because we were seen as trying to influence the outcome unfairly. 
 Even if the conflict at Grace UCC had centered on an issue that was less clear-cut 
for the clergy, the sheer level of volatility and divisiveness there probably would have 
made it difficult for the pastoral staff to provide the kind of non-anxious leadership 
needed without seeking outside help. In fact, when conflict reaches these kinds of levels, 
“it is usually beyond the ability of the congregational leadership to manage by 
themselves,” and they should seek outside assistance.431 When I interviewed Grace UCC 
members five years after the conflict, one of the questions I asked them was, “Looking 
back, what, if anything, would you like the church to have done differently as it 
approached this important decision?” Several individuals suggested that if professional 
help had been sought early on in Grace UCC's process, it might have made a difference. 
Leah, for instance, said, “ . . . perhaps if we had more experience at negotiation. Perhaps 
if we had had someone who could’ve acted as a mediator, it would’ve helped us work 
together through it instead of allowing it to be something that tore us apart.” Similarly, 
Noelle reflected on the potential usefulness of the entire congregation receiving training 
in skills related to conflict:  
So the other thing I can think of that would be helpful, is that we could really use, 
if we could figure out how to do it . . . some training in managing conflict. 
Understanding conflict, what is it about, how do you work them through, how 
does everybody try to get a little piece of the pie so they go away feeling like they 
were a winner, instead of there was a winner and a loser. 
These comments again highlight the fact that parishioners at Grace UCC experienced the 
leadership of the congregation's conflict resolution process as ineffective and unhelpful. 
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As a result, the process seems to have increased, rather than relieved, the high levels of 
anxiety already present within the congregation. 
 
Sitting with Anxiety 
 Noelle's language of “winners” and “losers” cited above raises another important 
insight from these two case studies: namely, that at times it may be necessary to 
encourage congregations to “sit with” their anxiety for a while, rather than trying to 
resolve it immediately. This is not to suggest that congregations should (or even could) 
put off difficult decisions indefinitely to avoid making conflict more intense. Indeed, as 
important as it is to facilitate parishioners' ability to have their voices heard, at some 
point decisions do have to be made for the good of the church's common life. Simply 
letting every person have his or her say does not necessarily help a congregation move 
forward in its decision-making process. In fact, this is where many faith communities end 
up feeling “stuck” as they try to navigate conflict.  
 Even at First UMC, there came a point during the final meeting when committee 
members began to despair about ever finding a mutually acceptable solution to their 
problem. Roy summarized it this way:  
So, we had four [meetings], and it was really good. But you could see we weren’t 
coming to – people were starting to understand each other, and people were 
starting to like each other, there was a closeness. When it got down to it, though, 
we still had this big elephant in the room: what are we gonna do?  
 
Roy's comment highlights the fact that at certain critical junctures in a congregation's life, 
it is important for a church to be able to make clear decisions. At First UMC, that critical 
juncture came at the end of an intentional and structured group process, which included 
four meetings spread over several months. In contrast to First UMC's experience, most 
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churches tend to move very quickly toward eliminating conflict, usually through a voting 
process that relies on majority rule. The problem with this approach—particularly when it 
concerns a highly controversial issue—is that it often does not allow enough time for all 
members to have their voices heard. Furthermore, as Noelle pointed out, a vote 
automatically creates divisions between “winners” and “losers,” and if the issue at hand is 
an important one, the “losers” may feel as if they can no longer remain in the 
congregation.  
 At this point I return to the theme of anxiety, since anxiety within a congregation 
is especially likely to rise when people feel that a decision “has” to be made about 
something. I hypothesize that this spike in anxiety occurs because as a significant 
congregational decision looms, individuals begin associating with the group or “side” 
with which they agree. This surfaces important differences within the group, and, as I 
have shown throughout this project, encounters with difference naturally produce anxiety. 
One way that congregations attempt to soothe this anxiety is by having a vote; voting, 
they believe, will “settle” the issue, and those who lose will simply have to accept the 
majority's decision. What this perspective misses, though, is that even after a vote, 
anxiety continues to circulate because the differences within the group have often not 
been sufficiently surfaced or engaged, and individuals feel that their voices were not truly 
heard in the process. Furthermore, the “losers” often feel angry and betrayed as well, and 
may come to believe that they have no choice but to discontinue fellowship with other 
church members. 
 When I asked interview subjects at Grace UCC what they thought the church 
could have done differently, some of them said that they thought the congregation should 
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have tried to avoid having a vote, or at least postponed it for several more months. Sean 
put it this way: “ . . . votes tend to, obviously, split things. If it were left up to me, and if I 
saw a vote was inevitable . . . I'd push it back as long as I could, like six months, or a year 
even maybe.” Tom agreed, stating, “regardless of how [the vote] came out, there was 
going to be a split.” Tom added that Grace UCC might also have benefited from a 
different understanding of conflict—not as a purely negative reality, but as holding the 
potential for positive change: “On the surface anyway, conflict-avoidance is sort of the 
name of the game, you know, and that’s not always healthy. Sometimes conflict is good 
and can be creative, but I think at Grace UCC there has been a tendency to avoid it.”  
 These reflections again point to the importance of asking congregations to “sit 
with” their anxiety for a period of time, rather than trying to relieve it prematurely. As I 
have shown, Grace UCC attempted to relieve its anxiety through a voting process which 
many thought would eliminate the conflict by virtue of making a decision about 
denominational affiliation, one way or the other. The result, however, was not a decrease 
in anxiety, but rather the rapid exit of most of those who lost the vote—an event which, 
in itself, created additional anxiety (as well as pain, anger, and grief) among those who 
“won.” In contrast, at First UMC members engaged in an intentional process of “sitting 
together as the body.”432 This allowed them to tolerate their discomfort long enough to be 
able to hear one another clearly, to engage the differences that surfaced in the group, and 
to move toward a solution that, while not perfect, felt acceptable to almost everyone 
involved.  
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 In this section I have outlined concrete ways in which congregations experiencing 
conflict can acknowledge difference within their midst, as well the anxiety such 
difference naturally produces. These ways include making sure everyone's voice is heard 
through structured, small-group processes led by skilled, non-anxious facilitators and 
encouraging congregations to sit with their anxiety for a time instead of moving too 
quickly toward premature “resolution” through voting or other divisive measures. These 
strategies constitute immensely important initial steps that may help congregations avoid 
moving toward the kind of extremely volatile conflict that took place at Grace UCC. Yet, 
as important as these steps are, the challenge of helping individuals within congregations 
remain connected across differences persists. The next step, then, is for congregations to 
find additional strategies for creating the kinds of connection across these differences that 
produce solidarity in the midst of theological dissimilarity.  
 
Re-Defining Unity and Strengthening Relationships 
 Thus far, I have argued that a healthy approach to conflict within congregations 
begins with acknowledging the diversity already contained within communities of faith, 
as well as the natural anxiety that awareness of such diversity produces. However, the 
question remains: once a congregation has fully acknowledged the differences in its 
midst, what should it do with them? This question proves particularly important in those 
cases where diversity (particularly theological diversity) is experienced as a threat to be 
eradicated rather than simply a natural part of living together in community.  
In Chapter Six I made an extended argument for a theological re-framing of 
diversity—not only as an existing attribute of the created order, but as a quality that God 
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intends and values for creation in general, and for the church in particular. I argued that 
such a theological re-framing can lower anxiety in conflicted congregations because it 
shifts the perception of diversity from a fall away from God's true intentions to a vital 
aspect of God's will for the world and for the church. Furthermore, such re-framing can 
potentially transform the vision of what binds the church together from an ideal of 
undifferentiated sameness to a goal of remaining vulnerable to and connected across 
differences. In this way, the concept of church “unity” can be re-imagined as a kind of 
“solidarity” that is “forged from honest confrontation and mutual confidence amid 
struggle.”433 In this sense, church unity can become a way of speaking about what binds 
members together in the presence of their differences, rather than that which eliminates 
all difference or seeks to reduce the community to the lowest common theological 
denominator. 
 But what might these new understandings of diversity and unity look like in 
practice? In other words, how might one bring such understandings to life in the day-to-
day existence of congregations? Building on the arguments I have already made for re-
framing diversity as a desirable theological norm, I further contend that conflicted 
congregations must wrestle with the question of what Christian “unity” might mean in the 
face of internal theological diversity. Unfortunately, many congregations currently 
understand the goal of community as striving toward a standard of “harmonious/ 
homogeneous unity” that stresses sameness or agreement over any kind of conflict or 
struggle.
434
 Indeed, as I have argued throughout this project, denying or avoiding 
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potential areas of conflict represent attempts to ignore the internal pluralism that always 
and necessarily exists within congregations, because acknowledging such differences 
creates increased anxiety. Consequently, Christians tend to understand diversity as a 
problem to be eliminated, rather than as a creative gift of God’s Spirit.  
 Yet, as the case study from Grace UCC demonstrated, even when communication 
between theological perspectives does occur within faith communities, it often takes 
unhealthy or unhelpful forms. As I noted in Chapter Four, such forms often include 
destructive behaviors like splitting/projection or rigid needs for sameness, resulting in the 
caricature of opposing viewpoints as devoid of theological integrity. Instead of these sorts 
of attempts to establish complete theological uniformity within a faith community (a 
clearly impossible task), congregations could focus on other ways in which their 
members might affirm their commonalities.
435
 One strategy for accomplishing this task 
involves using denominational resources, such as creeds or statements of faith, as fodder 
for theological conversation rather than as litmus tests for community membership. In the 
absence of agreement even on these statements, a congregation could develop its own 
articulation of values upon which to base its common life.
436
  
 At First UMC, the worship committee members did not use specific 
denominational resources as a basis for reflection. However, they seemed to have 
accomplished the same goal by engaging in a shared devotional time at the beginning of 
each meeting. As I noted above, each committee meeting began with a structured 
devotional time—led by Judith Murray—that allowed participants to focus on common 
elements of their faith. Judith understood the purpose of this time as follows:  
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 . . . my role in the group was to set the scene each night by having a devotional 
that I felt was going to help us set our sights on what we had to accomplish that 
night and get the right mindset going in all of us. So we had prayer and a 
devotional each of the nights . . . praying together was a really important part of 
what we did. 
 Interviewees described this part of the process as vital to the committee's ultimate ability 
to find a solution that would be acceptable to all involved. As Arthur put it, “ . . . it was 
helpful that people that were there were prayerfully considering their responses and 
trying to provide their input.” It would seem, then, that a common spiritual emphasis for 
committee members at the beginning of each meeting helped to break down the barriers 
that existed between the various groups, and encouraged participants to focus on the 
spiritual values they all shared—regardless of what particular worship service they 
attended. 
 In addition to the notion of shared religious resources, “interdependence” is a 
helpful notion that supplements and enhances understandings of unity, particularly in 
faith communities that are experiencing open conflict.
437
 In this view, interdependence 
refers to strategies designed to help diverse groups within a congregation work together 
toward a common goal, such as a specific service project within the wider community. In 
the process, the opportunity for polarization is minimized, and “relationships can be built 
which are very helpful in the management of the existing pluralism.”438 Thus, by joining 
together in shared acts of service and hospitality in the wider world, Christians may 
develop stronger hospitable inclinations toward each other as well, thus creating more 
unity within their congregations and denominations.  
                                                          
437
 Ibid., 37. 
438
 Ibid., 38. 
321 
 
 This emphasis on commonality and interdependence highlights the role of 
relationships between church members as key to the dialogical process, and as a possible 
resource for mitigating conflict. In terms of the congregational case studies under 
consideration here, it is important to remember that although individuals in both churches 
identified with specific positions or groups, the conflict at Grace UCC ultimately proved 
much more intense than that at First UMC. This is where interpersonal relationships 
within the congregations seem to have played important, though differing, roles. While 
virtually all the individuals I interviewed from Grace UCC expressed deep regret about 
the relational ruptures that resulted from the conflict, in the end, these interpersonal 
relationships were not enough to keep the congregation from splitting.  
 At First UMC, however, many of the individuals I interviewed talked about how 
the strength of the interpersonal relationships within the church helped to ease the 
intensity of the conflict. Specifically, interviewees mentioned the importance of First 
UMC’s Sunday School classes, which met between the early and late worship services. 
Esther, a faithful 8:45 participant, said, “ . . . I think that's probably what kept our church 
successful at having two kinds of worship, because in individual Sunday School classes 
there were people from both services. It was people from the church, not from the 
service.” Bart, another contemporary worshipper, agreed with Esther’s assessment:  
We have a very strong Sunday School component within the church. And to be 
honest with you, church revolves around that Sunday School component. . . 
Because most of our Sunday School—a lot of our Sunday School—classes were 
made up of people from all of the services. And so that's where we'd really meet.  
In addition to the importance of Sunday School, others that I interviewed from First 
UMC emphasized the general quality of relationships within the congregation as key to 
the ultimate resolution of the worship dilemma. Roy put it this way:  
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It came down, to me, to this issue of my church is fixin’ to blow up over this. And 
so, OK, we’ll get the worship times like we want them, and we got a lot of folks 
hurt, and it’s gonna take a long time to repair that—it just is not worth it.  
He then added, “I know that the Kingdom of God has gotta be bigger than what time we 
worship. It’s got to be bigger. And that these people, and their relationship with each 
other, and their relationship with Christ, is bigger than what time we worship.” 
 It would appear that at First UMC, members’ relationships with one another 
helped keep the conflict from becoming more divisive. By contrast, at Grace UCC, many 
of these relationships were ultimately ruptured, which continues to cause a great deal of 
pain for the members there. This is not to say that the relationships at Grace UCC were 
not strong. However, it appears that once the “sides” of the conflict had been formed 
there, it proved very difficult for members from opposing sides to find common ground 
or to approach each other in any way. Indeed, many of the members who wished to leave 
the UCC all belonged to the same Sunday School class, so they literally did not have to 
converse with people of different perspectives during class time on Sunday mornings.  
 At First UMC, in contrast, the Sunday School classes provided an important 
forum for individuals in different services to be together and to strengthen what we might 
call “cross-cutting” relationships439—that is, relationships that cut across the divisions of 
the three different worship services and that brought members together in shared 
conversation and projects. Such relationships, I contend, help to lower anxiety within a 
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congregation because they dilute the sharp differences that are drawn between major 
identity groups. In other words, when parishioners can see others not only as members of 
“opposing” groups, but also as individuals who share common interests and commitments 
within the congregation, they are less threatened by the differences they experience in 
those relationships. And, as I have emphasized throughout this project, a lower sense of 
threat yields lower levels of anxiety, and an increased ability to remain calm and non-
reactive in the face of conflict. 
 From a social psychological perspective, strengthening cross-cutting relationships 
within conflicted congregations makes sense as well, because such a strategy could help 
to decrease intense group polarization. Recall that group polarization typically occurs 
when members move toward what they perceive as the “prototypical” position of their 
identity group—that is, the position which most clearly represents the commonalities 
within the group as compared to members of an out-group. When this happens, groups 
define themselves solely in contrast to a specific out-group on particular dimensions, and 
the groups then polarize toward opposite extremes. However, if individuals within a 
congregation were encouraged to define themselves in a variety of ways—not simply by 
which “side” of the conflict they embraced—they might be less inclined to move toward 
an extreme prototypical position. This seems to be what happened at First UMC: 
although the conflict initially pushed individuals to define themselves according to their 
preferred worship service, the Sunday School classes cut across these categories and 
made the worship divisions less important and less prone to produce polarization. 
Perhaps if members at Grace UCC had found ways to strengthen their relationships with 
one another across the “fault lines” of the conflict, they might have discovered important 
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commonalities that would have made their disagreements on denominational affiliation 
feel less powerful.  
 Admittedly, once a conflict in a faith community has reached the level of 
emotional volatility experienced at Grace UCC, finding ways to strengthen relationships 
and foster unity across differences can prove extremely challenging. Here I have simply 
pointed to a few ideas that need to be developed further—ideas such as using a common 
spiritual or theological focus to remind the group of its shared commitments and re-
define unity; inviting members to participate together in shared acts of service as a means 
of breaking down barriers; and strengthening cross-cutting relationships in the 
congregation through educational opportunities or other activities. The key to all of these 
suggestions is finding ways to counteract the natural human tendency to gather together 
in like-minded groups. As I have argued throughout this project, this tendency is a normal 
part of human development, but in the context of groups experiencing high levels of 
anxiety it often produces rigid group identifications and polarization. Instead, 
congregations need strategies that help them to focus on their shared identity as a 
community of faith, and to value their theological diversity as an energizing resource for 
establishing solidarity, common goals, and productive conversation. 
 
Cultivating Calm, Connected Leadership 
 In this chapter, I have reflected on the importance of acknowledging differences 
and anxiety, and re-defining unity and strengthening relationships within congregations 
that are facing conflict. For each of these broad categories I have suggested specific 
practices that congregations might undertake to make these ideas a reality—practices 
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such as implementing structured, small-group processes led by skilled, non-anxious 
facilitators; encouraging congregations to “sit with” anxiety rather than moving too 
quickly toward superficial resolution; re-defining church unity through reflection on 
shared spiritual resources, faith commitments, or service; and strengthening cross-cutting 
relationships within the congregation. Yet, each one of these strategies requires a basic 
element which now invites more detailed reflection: namely, the presence of calm, 
connected leaders in the community of faith. As I noted in Chapter One, many practical 
resources are already available to help congregations develop such leadership in their 
midst. It is not my intention to duplicate those efforts here. However, in light of the 
crucial role that leaders play in the shape of congregational conflict, it is worth making a 
few specific suggestions about what leaders can do to contribute toward healing in their 
organizations. 
  
Remaining Non-Anxious 
 The first thing leaders in conflicted communities can do is to remain as non-
anxious and non-reactive as possible in the midst of conflict—even conflict that is highly 
volatile and infused with a great deal of affect. This is a very difficult task, and I do not 
wish to suggest otherwise. As many family systems theorists have noted, the ability to 
remain non-reactive in the face of intense anxiety is acquired over time, through the 
process of differentiation. In other words, it may not always be possible to decide, in the 
heat of the moment, to differentiate. Yet, if we recall the definition of differentiation as a 
leader's capacity to “maintain a position and still stay in touch,”440 we begin to see 
glimpses of ways in which church leaders might begin to develop practices that could 
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lead them down the path toward differentiation, even in the midst of very difficult 
situations. 
 As I discussed in Chapter One, the presence of anxiety frequently causes people 
to take actions designed to avoid or eliminate the anxiety through reactive behaviors. For 
many pastoral leaders, the avoidance of conflict tends to be the “default” mode of 
operating. As such, many ministers and congregational leaders prefer to ignore a problem 
(rather than deal with the anxiety it generates) until it can no longer be ignored. This 
seems to have been one of the factors at Grace UCC that caused the conflict to gain such 
momentum, and to be so explosive when it was finally brought out into the open. For 
several weeks before the summer business meeting, the senior pastor and I had been 
hearing rumors about Peter Vance's Sunday School class, and their members' outrage 
over the General Synod equal marriage resolution. Perhaps, if the class members had 
brought their concerns to the pastoral staff, or if we had inquired directly about what was 
happening in the class, the conflict could have been dealt with more effectively. Instead, 
neither party approached the other, and a volatile conflict was the result. Indeed, as Jack 
observed, “. . . I think that possibly, looking back, the way to have helped solve [the 
conflict] would have [been to] attack it right up front and said okay, let’s discuss what 
you’re talking about. But after it got momentum, there was no discussing to it.” Tom also 
commented on the importance of pastoral leadership in dealing with conflict before it 
gets out of hand:  
I’ve come to feel very strongly about the role of the pastor in church leadership 
 . . . when you become aware of conflict, it needs to be dealt with early before it 
boils over and there was, looking back on this issue, there was a lot of tension in 
the church, before the gay marriage issue ever became known. And it wasn’t 
being handled effectively. 
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 Looking back, it seems to me that one of the key mistakes the pastoral and lay 
leaders made at Grace UCC was our failure to “stay in touch” with all parts of our 
congregational system. Although the senior pastor and I and most of the lay leadership 
had a clear position on remaining within the denomination, our anxiety kept us from 
staying in close touch with those in our congregation who disagreed with us. In so doing, 
we allowed other parishioners to convince themselves that we did not care about their 
views, and by the time the conflict came into the open, many of these individuals were no 
longer willing to listen to what we had to say. “Adam,”441 a deacon and life-long member 
of Grace UCC, summed this failure up succinctly when he observed, “From a leadership 
standpoint, we missed it.” When the conflict did finally erupt, the senior pastor and I 
experienced even greater anxiety because of the prospect of losing our jobs. As a result, 
we became even less willing to stay in close touch with those we perceived as “driving” 
the conflict. In contrast, at First UMC, the structured, small-group process that was put 
into place seems to have convinced the committee members that their pastors and other 
leaders were hearing them, and striving to understand their points of view. This does not 
mean that the leaders did not have their own opinions, but they were able to maintain 
their positions while at the same time remaining connected to those in the system who 
held different perspectives. 
  
Modeling Attempts to Connect Across Difference 
 Remaining connected across differences is no easy task, especially if parishioners 
become so upset that they cut off all communication with their leaders. Still, non-anxious 
leaders can continue to promote healing within the congregation by modeling attempts to 
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stay in touch with those who disagree. Frequently, in situations of congregational discord, 
both pastoral and lay leaders are tempted to identify a few “troublemakers” and place all 
of the responsibility for the conflict onto them.
 442
 As I noted in Chapter Four, this 
tendency is actually a form of scapegoating designed to split off the negative aspects of 
the group's life and locate them in a few individuals. Psychologically, this approach is 
appealing because it convinces leaders that if they could simply get rid of the 
troublemakers—either by converting them to a different point of view or having them 
leave the group altogether—peace and harmony would be restored to the community.  
 However, as in all cases of splitting, the “negative” traits that the group wishes to 
expel actually exist in much more ambiguous and complex forms throughout the 
community. Getting rid of a few members will not solve the problem. In fact, at Grace 
UCC, the exodus of a sizable group of parishioners left a trail of pain, grief, and 
brokenness in its wake that persists in the congregation even now. Instead of succumbing 
to the temptation to scapegoat those perceived as troublemakers, calm leaders can 
acknowledge individuals with different points of view and seek ways to connect with 
them across differences. In practice, this might mean inviting persons on the opposite 
side of the conflict to have one-on-one or small-group conversations with individual 
leaders. Or, it might simply mean—as I have already mentioned—designing a small-
group process that insures that all perspectives are heard and affirmed, so that leaders are 
not tempted to discount or ignore the voices of those with whom they disagree. It is 
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important to recall here that remaining connected across difference does not mean 
abdicating one's own position in an attempt to restore “peace” to troubled relationships. 
Instead, it involves exhibiting a posture of differentiation—that is, claiming one's own 
position clearly, while also staying in touch with all parts of the system.  
  
Seeking Professional Support 
 Once again, modeling differentiation in these ways may be very difficult to do, 
especially if those with different viewpoints cut off communication or categorically 
refuse to acknowledge leaders' attempts at connection. In such cases, leaders may need to 
ask for help sooner than later. When I conducted my interviews with my former 
parishioners at Grace UCC, almost every one of them asked me, “So, what do you think 
we should have done differently?” Each time, I replied that the senior pastor and I should 
have recognized that we were not equipped to deal with such an intense conflict, and 
should have sought professional consultation immediately. Traditional conflict mediation 
services simply may not be well-suited for handling these kinds of congregational 
conflicts; consequently, leaders will have to think deeply about what kind of consultation 
will be most helpful to them.
443
 Fortunately, there are now many avenues available for 
finding consultants who are specially trained to work with congregations. I believe that 
such resources could have been immensely helpful to us at Grace UCC.
444
  
 This is not to say that this approach will not involve costs for the congregation, 
however. Seeking professional help first requires leaders to admit that they cannot handle 
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the situation on their own, which can be difficult—especially for clergy who may feel 
that they “should” be able to cope with conflicts themselves. It also requires parishioners 
to agree to the presence of an outsider in their midst, which can feel very unsettling for 
communities in open conflict. Finally, there are substantial financial costs involved, 
which may limit congregations' ability or willingness to seek such help.
445
 Nonetheless, it 
seems clear from the case studies that First UMC benefitted greatly from their pastors' 
consultation with a professional, and that Grace UCC might have benefitted from such 
services if it had sought them out. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have sketched the contours of specific practices that could help 
congregations cope more effectively with conflict in their midst. These practices include 
acknowledging difference and the anxiety it produces; re-defining unity and 
strengthening relationships; and cultivating calm, connected leadership. These practical 
recommendations flow from two main sources: first, from the insights I gained from 
talking with parishioners about their experiences with conflict in their congregations; and 
second, from my own analysis of those experiences using psychodynamic, social 
psychological, and theological tools. In this regard, my approach to this subject has been 
unequivocally pastoral theological. As I noted in Chapter One, pastoral theology 
distinguishes itself as a discipline through its use of lived experience as a starting point 
for theological reflection, its engagement with the social sciences (especially 
psychology), and its ever-present commitment to transformed religious practice. It is in 
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the spirit of this last commitment that I have offered these concrete suggestions for 
transforming congregational approaches to conflict.  
 It is also important to note here one other hallmark of pastoral theology: namely, 
its keen attention to the individual shape of human suffering. In this project, I have 
argued that the phenomenon of congregational conflict can prove intensely painful both 
for individual parishioners and for faith communities as a whole. Indeed, as the case 
studies showed, persons often experience deep suffering in the midst of congregational 
discord. In this sense, congregational conflict provides a prime example of “human 
suffering [that] evokes or calls for a religious response.”446 As such, it is a phenomenon 
that possesses inherently theological dimensions. As practical theologian Mary 
McClintock Fulkerson has noted, “. . . theological reflection is not something brought in 
after a situation has been described; it is a sensibility that initiates the inquiry at the 
outset.”447 This statement resonates deeply with my own approach to the problem of 
congregational conflict, because from the very beginning of my interest in this topic I had 
a sense that it carried theological import. Fulkerson further describes this theological 
sensibility in terms of “theology as response to a wound”:  
Wounds generate new thinking. Disjunctions birth invention – from a disjuncture 
in logic, where reasoning is compelled to find new connections in thought, to 
brokenness in existence, where creativity is compelled to search for possibilities 
of reconciliation. Like a wound, theological thinking is generated by a sometimes 
inchoate sense that something must be addressed.
448
 
In this case, the wound is the kind of conflict that I witnessed in the congregation I 
served. That conflict propelled me into an investigation of the other shapes conflict may 
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take in communities of faith, like the conflict I have researched at First UMC. The fact 
that these conflicts played out in such different ways led me to many more questions.  
 In fact, in attempting to answer some of those questions, I became convinced that 
the resources of theology alone would not be sufficient to address such a complex reality. 
Although, in one sense, this project begins and ends with theology, I have argued in this 
dissertation that in order to address the specific problem of conflict within faith 
communities—as well as the general human problem of negotiating difference—
additional tools are needed. While particular theological frameworks offer broad 
understandings of human being as marked by frailty and incompatibility, the resources of 
the social sciences cast that frailty in much sharper relief, and illustrate the ways in which 
specific intrapsychic and social phenomena are tied to the anxiety raised by encounters 
with difference. In other words, though theology may, at root, be a response to a wound, 
the social sciences are vital for diagnosing and describing the specific nature of the 
wound itself. 
 At the same time, I have argued that the social sciences still need to be balanced 
by the insights of theology—insights which offer a more robust picture of individual and 
communal healing than what the social sciences provide. Additionally, I have made the 
case that while the social sciences prove critical in describing the anxiety-producing 
impact of difference on individuals and social groups, they offer few resources for 
reframing difference itself as a resource for human development or relationality. By 
contrast, through the notion of diversity as a created good, theology offers a way of 
understanding difference both as the most basic challenge with which human beings must 
cope, and as a core aspect of God’s intentions for the Church and the world. This 
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understanding opens a pathway toward seeing vulnerability to difference and ecclesial 
hospitality as postures that Christians are called to embrace as a way of remaining 
connected across the differences that threaten to divide and destroy the unity of Christ’s 
body. 
 In addition to the general argument I have made above for correlating social 
science and theology in addressing congregational conflict, I offer a more specific reason 
why an approach like mine is vital for communities of faith: recognizing the role of 
anxiety and threats to self or identity might help congregations—and particularly their 
leaders—become more compassionate about conflict. As I noted earlier in this chapter, it 
is tempting to understand congregational conflict as resulting primarily from the behavior 
of a few “troublemakers” who want to control things. To adopt such an idea, however, 
would just be another form of splitting and projection. Furthermore, this approach misses 
the opportunity to understand more deeply what might be happening within all 
individuals in a congregation, as well as the dynamics of the group as a whole. Instead of 
seeing conflict as the result of a few “bad apples,” the approach I am commending here 
recognizes conflict as rooted in deep truths about who we are as human beings: diverse 
individuals with incompatible needs, wishes, and desires, and, at the same time, part of a 
diverse creation whose very variability is part of God’s intention for the world.  
 In summary, bringing psychological and theological insights together to address 
congregational conflict proves a vitally important task—not only because it sheds light on 
the way human beings are, but also because it calls us toward a new way that we could 
be. Additionally, when we understand the specific role of anxiety in conflict, we can take 
steps to minimize it and move toward re-framing conflict theologically. In this way of 
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thinking, difference does not have to remain a problem to be eradicated. Instead, it can 
become a source of growth and creativity for congregations and a way of incarnating the 
body of Christ. May it be so. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Interview Questions Used with Research Study Participants 
 
 
 
The following questions were approved in my research protocol for Vanderbilt’s 
Institutional Review Board, and guided my interviews, although I rarely asked the 
questions verbatim. 
 
 
 
For participants from Grace UCC: 
 
 
1.   Please tell me about your experience of the discussions that took place here in  
      2005 surrounding decisions about denominational affiliation. 
2.   What was at stake for you in this process? What felt important or meaningful to  
      you about staying in or leaving the denomination? 
3.   How did you understand the congregational decision-making process to work?  
      Looking back, what, if anything, would you like the church to have done   
      differently as it approached this important decision? 
 
 
 
For participants from First UMC: 
 
1.   Please tell me about your experience of the discussions that took place here in  
      2009 surrounding changes in worship. 
2.   What was at stake for you in this process? What felt important or meaningful to  
      you about the worship service you were previously attending? 
3.   How would you define worship? What elements make a worship service  
      meaningful? 
4.   How did you understand the congregational decision-making process to work?  
      What, in your view, were the key moments or events that helped the congregation  
      move toward an agreed-upon solution? 
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